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ABSTRACT 
THE MAKING AND TREATMENT OF AN ICONIC EVENT: 
THE MENEMEN INCIDENT (1930) IN MODERN TURKISH HISTORY 
Vaizoğlu, Mehmet Hakan. 
MA, Department of History 
Supervisor: Prof. Engin Akarlı 
February 2016, 185 pages 
The Menemen Incident is an attempt at rebellion by six armed insurgents on 
23 December 1930. The Republican People’s Party introduced the incident after its 
occurrence as a reactionary challenge to the republic instigated by the Nakşibendi 
order. The government proclaimed a state of emergency in Menemen, Manisa and 
Balıkesir, established a special military court for the trial of the accused. The court 
decided that indeed the order had preplanned the rebellion and actualized it to un-
dermine the very existence of the republic.  
This thesis explores the Menemen Incident. It reconstructs the events based 
on critical analyses of official statements, court documents and contemporary news-
papers –with special attention to the trial process. Furthermore, the thesis examines 
the various representations of the incident in the contemporaneous media as well as 
in the secondary popular and academic accounts of the succeeding years.  
The study indicates that this was a minor incident carried out by six ignorant 
hashish smokers. However, the beheading of Kubilay, an idealist republican reserve 
officer, stirred up the government to action and to hand out harsh punishments.  
The decision of the military court to condemn the Nakşibendi order as the in-
stigator of the event was preordained by the RPP leaders and unjustifiable. Neverthe-
less, the court’s decision, misleading official statements, and newspaper reports that 
echoed the regime’s position led to the emergence of a literature that continued to 
advocate and embellish this position over the years. In the process, the Menemen In-
cident grew into a potent icon that evoked the belief in the victory of republicanists 
over reactionists. A group of authors developed counter interpretations eventually. 
But they indeed reversed and perpetuated the polarized perspectives of the officially-
biased accounts. Even highly reputable scholars could not overcome the misinfor-
mation that became endemic to the coverage of the Menemen Incident.  
 
Keywords: the Menemen Incident, Derviş Mehmet, Kubilay, Nakşibendism, the 
martial court of Menemen, early republican period   
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ÖZ 
İKONİK BİR VAKAYI ANLAMAK: MODERN TÜRKİYE TARİHİNDE  
MENEMEN OLAYI 
Vaizoğlu, Mehmet Hakan. 
MA, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Engin Akarlı 
Şubat 2016, 185 sayfa 
Menemen olayı, altı silahlı asinin 23 Aralık 1930’da gerçekleştirdiği bir 
başkaldırı girişimidir. Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası liderleri, peşinen olayın cumhuriyete 
karşı irticai bir eylem olup ve arkasında Nakşibendi tarikatının bulunduğunu 
açıklamışlardır. Menemen, Manisa ve Balıkesir’de sıkıyönetim ilan edilmiş, 
sanıkların yargılanmaları için askeri mahkeme kurulmuştur. Mahkeme, Nakşibendi 
tarikatının olayı cumhuriyeti yıkmak amacıyla önceden planlayıp gerçekleştirdiğine 
hükmetmiştir. 
 Bu tez, olay sonrası yapılan resmi açıklamalar, gazete haberleri ve mahkeme 
dosyalarını eleştirel bir gözle ve dikkatle inceleyerek gelişmeleri mümkün olduğunca 
doğru tespit etmeye çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca, daha sonra yazılan ikincil kaynaklar ile 
ciddi akademik metinlerde olayın nasıl anlatıldığını da irdelemektedir.  
 Tez, olayın altı esrarkeş cahil tarafından gerçekleştirildiğini, çapının ve halk 
üstündeki tesirinin çok sınırlı olduğunu göstermektedir. Ancak idealist bir cumhuri-
yetçi yedek subay olan Kubilay’ın başının kesilerek öldürülmüş olması, hükümeti 
derhal harekete geçerek ağır cezalar vermeye itmiştir. 
Tez, askeri mahkemenin olaydan Nakşibendi tarikatını sorumlu tutan 
kararının, aslında CHF liderleri tarafından önceden verilmiş olduğunu göstermekte-
dir. Bu temelsiz mahkeme kararı, yanıltıcı resmi açıklamalar ve rejimin duruşunu 
yansıtan gazetelerin haberleri ile de beslenerek, olay hakkında daha sonra 
yayınlananları şekillendirmiştir. Süreç içerisinde Menemen olayı, cumhuriyetçilerin 
irticacılara galebe çalacağına olan inancı çağrıştıran etkili bir ikona dönüşmüştür. Bu 
ikinci kuşak yayınlar, doğru olmayan bilgileri abartarak yeniden üretmişlerdir. Za-
manla bir grup yazar karşı açıklamalar ortaya koymakla beraber, ciddi araştırmalara 
dayanmaktan ziyade resmi görüşü yansıtan anlatıların çift kutuplu perspektiflerini 
ters-yüz etmişlerdir. Saygın araştırmacıların Menemen olayına dair yazdıkları dahi 
yaygın yanlış bilgiler veya kutuplaşmış perspektiflerden etkilenmiştir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Menemen olayı, Derviş Mehmet, Kubilay, Nakşibendilik, 
Menemen sıkıyönetim mahkemesi, erken cumhuriyet dönemi  
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on various aspects of the Menemen Incident and has sev-
eral arguments. Based upon critical analysis of primary sources, this study mainly 
seeks to accurately understand what happened in Menemen on 23 December 1930 
and under which circumstances it occurred. How the event was encountered in the 
political arena and media is another specific subject matter. The thesis also analyses 
what happened after the incident and how the legal proceedings concluded. A last 
general topic of the research is the ways in which the event has been recounted in ac-
ademic and popular writings. 
The Menemen Incident is the sum of the happenings that occurred on the 
morning of 23 December 1930 in Menemen, a town in the İzmir province, located 
thirty-three kilometers northwest of İzmir, the provincial capital. Six disciples of the 
Nakşibendi order took to the road from Manisa; half of them were armed. Having 
frequently smoked weed, the group entered the town of Menemen. They took from 
the Müftü Mosque a green banner on which Quranic verses were written and raised 
it. They made a few prayers follow them and went to the town square by shouting 
that they were to bring the old regime back. 
Along with their leader Derviş1 Mehmet, who had announced himself to be 
the Mahdi (“the rightly guided one” who will appear as the world nears its end), the 
company wandered in the neighborhoods of the town and proclaimed the restoration 
of the sharia. They called people to pass under the banner, which would mean decla-
ration of their loyalty not solely to “the Mahdi” but also to the rightful way of the Is-
lamic religion. After walking within the town center, they had a demonstration in the 
municipal square led by Derviş Mehmet. He had gathered a crowd of about a hun-
dred people who joined in his group to perform a reciting of God (zikr). Another 
hundred of them watched the happenings from a distance. 
Three gendarme officers, one of whom was the commander himself, came to 
the square, spoke with Derviş Mehmet, told him to halt their activities and warned 
the crowd to disperse. However, neither Derviş nor the townspeople did what the 
commander or other officers wished. Then, a reserve officer, Mustafa Fehmi Kubi-
                                                
1 Also known as Giritli Mehmet. 
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lay, came to the square with his battalion. He left his unit behind and went to have a 
talk with Derviş on his own, unarmed. When Derviş did not heed his warnings, Ku-
bilay, hot-tempered by nature, became angry and seized Derviş by the collar. There-
on Derviş shot him with his rifle. Kubilay’s battalion fled because there were no bul-
lets in their rifles. 
Having heard the shot, some of the crowd dispersed. Kubilay tried to get 
away, yet collapsed in the courtyard of the Gazez Mosque nearby the square. Twenty 
minutes after his shooting, Derviş was somehow informed of Kubilay’s condition. 
Along with one of his fellows, Derviş then went to the courtyard and cut Kubilay’s 
head off with his knife. Derviş brought Kubilay’s head to the square, sought to attach 
it on the edge of the banner but failed. Then they fastened the banner to a pole on the 
square. There, two district wardens became engaged in a gun battle with the compa-
ny, but were killed. 
Soon enough, support battalions arrived from the regimental commandry with 
machine guns and warned the insurgents to lay down arms. Derviş and his associates 
did not surrender. In response, machine guns were fired and three of the insurgents 
including Derviş were killed. Another one of them was injured while two others es-
caped and were captured two days later. 
Martial law was proclaimed and investigations regarding both the perpetra-
tors and negligent officials were initiated. In consequence, the martial court an-
nounced the event to have been planned by the Nakşibendi order, a sufi religious or-
der founded in the fourteenth century. Its leader Şeyh Esat was accused of being the 
prime agent. Perpetrators of the incident were described to have been incited by no-
table figures of the order. At the end of the proceedings, twenty-eight defendants, in-
cluding some prominent dervishes of the order, were executed.  
The subject matter of this study was determined while I was writing the final 
assignment of Professor Şerif Mardin’s “Research Seminar on Concepts in Historical 
Change.” When examining the court records of the Menemen Incident, I noticed that 
the martial court charged the agency of Nakşibendi order as a whole of the Menemen 
Incident. The court charged some notable figures of the order in particular with incit-
ing the perpetrators, despite the lack of substantial evidence. This observation in-
trigued me to undertake a more in-depth examination of the issue, with special atten-
tion to the judicial proceedings in general, as well as on analysis of the reactions to 
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the event. The result is the present study. It shows that although some prominent fig-
ures of the order were condemned for having instigated a revolt against the republic, 
the related records of the trials and interrogations of the defendants bore no eviden-
tial value to justify these decisions. 
Although six insurgents were the core perpetrators of the actions, official 
statements as well as pro-government newspapers instantly announced the event to 
be a plot executed by reactionists against the very existence of the republic. Howev-
er, as the thesis shows, the RPP leaders were aware of the simplicity of the event and 
yet deliberately described it to be a well-rounded movement preplanned by the 
Nakşibendi order to overthrow the government.  
The Menemen Incident became one of the most commemorated and recount-
ed events of the history of the Republic of Turkey. Three years after the incident in 
1933, a monument of Kubilay and two wardens was laid on top of a hill in Mene-
men. It was built by the donations collected from citizens through a campaign orga-
nized by the daily Cumhuriyet. The monument was exceptional in that it remained 
the only one erected in the name of someone other than Atatürk, until his death in 
1938. In the ceremony of the erection of the monument, the head of the Republican 
People’s Party and of the administrative council in the province stated that the mon-
ument would be the Kaaba of republican reforms.2  
Annual ceremonies have been held in Menemen on 23 December. Thousands 
of people attended these ceremonies since the incident. These meetings turned into 
secularist demonstrations. The incident has been officially narrated as one of the 
most important manifestations of reactionary threats. RPP administrators used the in-
cident to illustrate the dangers of religious reactionism to Republican Turkey. Politi-
cal leaders and after them official historiography presented and narrated the event 
along these lines in order to remind citizens of the need to protect the secular repub-
lic against its internal enemies.3  
Kubilay was a teacher, dedicated to Atatürk’s Reforms and a member of the 
Türk Ocakları. He was known to be a nationalist who sincerely defended the republi-
can ideals. Thus, “the beheaded officer Kubilay, the heroic victim of the incident, has 
                                                
2 Anadolu, October 30, 1933. 
3 Umut Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State 
(London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 21, 43. 
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become an icon of Kemalist secularism as a source of inspiration against the enemies 
of the republic. The Kemalist elite were committed to turn him into a long-lasting 
symbol in the national memory as the martyr of the revolution and the embodiment 
of the national ideal.”4 The account of his beheading has been narrated constantly in 
commemorative ceremonies. His sacrifice has been emphasized in many official an-
nouncements and in history textbooks. Many issues of magazines have been pub-
lished and poems have been written dedicated to the memory of Kubilay.  
The purpose of the thesis is to probe and analyze this politically symbolic and 
consequential incident. It diverges from the prevailing popular and academic writ-
ings on the Menemen Incident and offers an original narrative on the whole. A criti-
cal approach to primary sources is essential in order to understand and objectively. 
Shaped by the official viewpoint to a large extent, the primary sources include mis-
leading information. In order to avoid this trap that perpetuates misinformation and 
skewed viewpoints, I strived to filter the unreliable or questionable information from 
the reasonably trustworthy through careful examination of the accuracy of the 
sources by comparing them with each other.  
In line with the purpose to reconstruct and contextualize the event, I divided 
this study into four chapters. In the first chapter, I aim to make a sensible depiction 
of the happenings that composed the Menemen Incident. I search for answers to the 
following questions: Who were the insurgents of the Menemen Incident? How did 
they come together under the leadership of Derviş Mehmet? What were their motiva-
tions to attempt to undertake such a revolt? What happened in the villages where 
they stayed prior to their arrival at Menemen? To what extent and why did the vil-
lagers aid them? What exactly happened in Menemen on 23 December 1930? How 
did the townspeople and law enforcement officials react to the group’s activities? 
Which mistakes paved the way for Kubilay’s killing? 
I construct the story line of the events from three primary source categories. 
The first class of sources are the statements of the three perpetrators of the events 
who were seized when the situation was brought under control. The statements of the 
perpetrators made in the trials of the Menemen Incident do not contradict with each 
other in terms of their activities. The second primary source is the reports of the offi-
cials who were assigned to investigate the incident. Among these, there were reports 
                                                
4 Ibid., 22, 40. 
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of the Presidency of the General Staff’s inspector, the doctor who examined Kubi-
lay’s body, and the testimonies of civil servant witnesses. Most of the materials in 
this second category were published by the Turkish Security General Directorate. I 
obtained another part of these sources from the archives of the Turkish General Staff. 
Some other sources are available online at the website of the same institution. Offi-
cial reports in general present objective information about the incident since their 
purpose was to reveal the truth. Lastly, the testimonies of townspeople from Mene-
men, who were interviewed in the aftermath of the incident, provided information for 
some aspects of the demonstrations in Menemen. By constructing a factual and justi-
fied description of actual happenings with a critical examination of the primary 
sources, I try to constitute a solid foundation upon which I make the succeeding 
analyses.  
 In the second chapter, I examine the official reactions to and media represen-
tations of the incident in general after the event but prior to the martial court trials. 
Primary sources of this chapter are parliament records and newspapers of the time. 
The chapter addresses the following research questions: What were the responses of 
the RPP leaders to the incident? How did they regard it? What decisions were taken 
regarding the official proceedings? What were the concrete steps that the government 
agencies took? How did the newspapers of the era report the incident? In what ways 
did their coverage differ from each other?  
By searching answers to these questions, I indicate the distinction between 
the real events of the incident and the ways it was officially presented. Establishing 
the political circumstances under which the incident occurred is another purpose of 
the chapter. With detailed analyses of the official statements, parliament speeches 
and media news, I also look into the extent to which the legal procedure was prede-
termined.  
Chapter three focuses on the judicial process and the trials related to the 
Menemen Incident. The primary source I use here is the court records of the Martial 
Court of Menemen. The chapter searches for answers to the following questions: 
What happened in the trials? What were the prominent features of the trials? How 
can we analyze or characterize these trials in judicial terms? What sorts of proof did 
the court have? Were they adequate to charge the defendants? Did the evidence sub-
stantiate the accusations? What sort of attitude did the perpetrators, defendants and 
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the chief judge adopt? What specific evidence did the court rely on in blaming the 
notable Nakşibendi figures for their presumed role in inciting the perpetrators? How 
did the court reach legal verdicts? What did these verdicts reflect regarding the out-
look or position of the people in power and the image of the state?  
In the third chapter, I divide the content of the trials into categories in terms 
of the chief judge’s questions and the detainees’ responses. By doing so, I try to de-
scribe the course of trials. The critical examination of the trials enables me to evalu-
ate the consistency of the court’s decisions and justifications with reality or what we 
can possibly know about the events that made the Menemen Incident.  
I offer a literature review of the Menemen Incident in a distinct chapter, 
namely chapter four. Here I divide the accounts that I analyze into three categories: 
officially-biased, counter-official and unbiased accounts and seek to answer the fol-
lowing questions: How can we group the subsequent writings on the incident analyti-
cally? What are the sources on which these accounts are based? To what extent do 
they examine the narrations they recount? What is the general content of later writ-
ings? To what extent and in what ways do they present biased accounts and misin-
formation? What unique perspectives do these relatively unbiased writings repre-
sent? This critical evaluation of the relevant literature is a major subject matter of 
this thesis. Consequently, it is addressed in a distinct chapter rather than in the form 
of an introductory literature review aiming at positioning the thesis among current 
narratives. 
There is such a vast amount of non-academic narration on the Menemen Inci-
dent that it is not quite feasible to gather and analyze all of them. Still, I tried to see 
as many of them as possible. My survey indicates that a good part of this literature 
relies uncritically on biased official accounts, newspaper reports and court records. 
They reproduce biased perspectives about the event and recount the prevailing misin-
formation. I defined the writings that adopted official descriptions of the incident as 
“officially-biased.” I name the narrations that embrace a reverse perspective as 
“counter-official.” I indicate that both group of authors not only recount the events 
from skewed perspectives, but also generate a great deal of disinformation them-
selves. I choose and take into consideration the most referenced ones among them.  
I examine all the academic writings that focus on the Menemen Incident. By 
doing so, this thesis differs from others since there is not an academic study that ex-
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plores and analyses all the scholarly texts systematically. I divide these academic ac-
counts into groups in terms of the bias or neutrality of their content. In this way, I 
evaluate the prejudiced academic texts together with ordinary writings, and I regard 
the neutral ones separately. 
Studies of Hamit Bozarslan, Eyüp Öz, and Umut Azak, whose works are ex-
amined in detail in chapter four, are noteworthy to briefly mention here. Among 
them, only Azak offers a careful summary of the actual happenings both prior to and 
during the incident, although it too gives in to some widespread but misleading in-
formation. Furthermore, the brevity of Azak’s account deprives the reader of specific 
details significant to understanding the real motivations of the perpetrators and of 
other people who were somehow involved in the incident. 
The common argument of these three authors is that the incident was not a 
plot of the Nakşibendi order and that the court records do not present substantial evi-
dence to that effect. However, they do not provide sufficient details to prove their 
points as compellingly as possible. In order to do just that, this thesis dissects and 
contextualizes the content of the judicial process –as indicated above. Another disad-
vantage of these three studies is that they do not pay adequate attention to the politi-
cal atmosphere of the era in order to contextualize the reactions to the event. Thus, 
they do not grasp the pattern formed by the official statements and pro-government 
news, which indicated the direction of subsequent official proceedings. This thesis 
shows those patterns and sheds light on the intensity of the political arena, thereby 
explaining why such a small-scale incident became so overblown as to justify prede-
termined judicial process and verdicts. 
Bozarslan and his student Öz attempt to come up with explanations based on 
the social circumstances of the region in which the event occurred. They argue that 
certain economic and political conditions, and religious feelings paved the way for a 
collective expectation of the emergence of a millenarian savior. For them, Derviş 
Mehmet stepped into action and initiated a revolt under these conditions. A crucial 
drawback of their studies is that they assume a connection between certain social, po-
litical and religious circumstances and the attraction of people to Derviş Mehmet, ra-
ther than clearly showing that connection. 
Although Bozarslan and Öz do not adopt the officially-biased arguments in 
general, their assumption of the existence of deep structural justifications to explain 
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the incident leads them to the grossly exaggerated conclusion that the incident repre-
sented an extensive rebellion. In contrast, this thesis will indicate that it is not appro-
priate to define the Menemen Incident as a “rebellion” in either social or political 
terms. The incident did not have a social base. Neither the inhabitants of Menemen 
nor the people from surrounding regions stepped into action against law enforcement 
agencies under the guidance of the perpetrators. It was a distinct and extraordinary 
accident that occurred in Western Anatolia. The act of beheading, the applause of a 
small group of the people and the religious terms the insurgents used severely dis-
turbed the government. The subsequent official proceedings reflected the authoritari-
an determination of the state to intimidate anyone who would dare to initiate such a 
revolt especially for religious-political purposes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO AND IN DUE COURSE OF  
THE MENEMEN INCIDENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to make a reasonable description of the activi-
ties that occurred just prior and during the Menemen Incident. First, it discusses the 
actors who sought to initiate a rebellion in Menemen. Then, this chapter elucidates 
the central happenings of the incident and gives a narration including all the signifi-
cant actions that occurred in the town of Menemen. It also provides information 
about Kubilay, whose vicious murder during the incident was one of the symbolic 
and pivotal elements of the event, and of the Republican history in general. By put-
ting forth the actual happenings, known in total as the Menemen Incident, this chap-
ter provides a substantial basis for the thesis to make subsequent evaluations and to 
assess other accounts. 
1.1. Before the Incident 
The basic information about the company’s actions before the incident was 
provided by the three perpetrators who were captured.5 This section of the chapter 
examines and compares the court testimonies of these perpetrators in terms of con-
sistency. Official reports that were prepared after the event and published later are 
also taken into consideration. The chapter takes advantage of the newspapers of the 
period as well. The contents of the newspapers are also carefully compared and scru-
tinized.  
This section introduces and provides brief information about the agents of the 
Menemen Incident. It accounts for Giritli Mehmet’s ability to gather followers 
around himself, lead and mobilize them with religious intentions. Thus, the section 
touches on their meetings in Manisa and their departure. It then covers their arrival at 
villages and their actions. It culminates with their coming to the outskirts of Mene-
men to propagate their motivations and goals. 
                                                
5 The other three insurgents, including Derviş Mehmet were killed in shootout. 
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1.1.1. The Insurgents and Their Activities in Manisa 
The leader of the insurgents who sought to prompt a revolt in Menemen was 
Derviş Mehmet “the Cretan.”6 He was born in Manisa and was thirty-three years old 
at the time of the incident according to official records. His family was originally 
from Girit.7 Though he was a barber by profession, he had been busy with tree trim-
ming and worked as a hoer.8 At the times of the Greek invasion between 1919-1922 
he was accounted to have taken to the hills and lived in the mountains. With respect 
to the field research of Eyüp Öz, Giritli Mehmet came down from the mountain to 
disturb the villagers of Paşa at gunpoint.9 The official recordings point out that he 
joined the Nakşibendi sufi order10 in 1923 and his sheikh11 was Ahmet Muhtar 
Efendi.12 He appeared to be always in search of something.13 According to Öz, all 
the testimony about Giritli agreed on his being a short-tempered person.14 He was 
shot dead in the shootout in Menemen. 
Sütçü (milkman) Mehmet was sixty-three years old, and the eldest of the 
company. He was from the Bozalan Village of Menemen and resided in Manisa. He 
had worked as a laborer and farm hand previously. Later on he became a milkman. 
                                                
6 Aforementioned Mehmet was known as Derviş (Dervish) Mehmet and Giritli Mehmet 
(Mehmet from Cretan) as well as Mehdi (Mahdi) Mehmet. 
7 Araştırma Planlama ve Koordinasyon Dairesi Başkanlığı Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Cum-
huriyetin 75. Yıldönümünde Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler: 150’lilikler, Kubilay Olayı, 
Çarşaf-Peçe-Peştemalle Örtünme Sorunu (Ankara: Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, 1998), 42 
Document No: 13212-5/1. 
8 According to Eyüp Öz, who studied the Menemen Incident, Giritli Mehmet had worked in 
various jobs. He had been a warden, an official in the marriage office, a farmer and even a 
bartender. Eyüp Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek: Menemen Olayı İrtica Mı, Komplo 
Mu?,” FSM İlmî Araştırmalar İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Dergisi 5 (2015): 412. Accounts 
about the incident are elaborated on in the literature review chapter. Since Öz’s statements 
are exceptional because he seeks to establish the personal background of the perpetrators, 
they are discussed when the occasion arises in the thesis. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Öz asserts based on witness accounts that Giritli Mehmet was a Sunni-Bektashi. Again for 
Öz, Giritli might have been fascinated by the significations of the Twelve Imams in the 
Bektashi order. That is why, he announced himself as the twelfth imam along with being the 
Mahdi in Menemen. Ibid., 419. 
11 Sheikh means the spiritual head in the religious order. 
12 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 42. 
13 Again with regard to Öz’s unverified allegation, Giritli was a good speechmaker and was 
able to convince people to follow him. Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 413. 
14 Ibid. 
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He joined the Nakşibendi order in 1925 and his sheikh was Giritli Mehmet. He was 
captured dead at the time of the incident.15 
Şamdan Mehmet was also killed in the gunfight in Menemen. He was from 
Manisa, twenty-eight years old and a vine grower. He joined the order in 1927 and 
his sheikh as well was Giritli Mehmet.16  
Mehmet Emin was twenty-nine years old and from Manisa. He was a vine 
grower. He joined the Nakşibendi order three months before the Menemen Inci-
dent.17 He was seized wounded after the firefight in Menemen. According to Mehmet 
Emin’s statements in court, Derviş Mehmet hired him as a laborer to work in his 
vineyard. Later on Giritli associated him to the Nakşibendi order. Derviş Mehmet 
talked to his followers about the requirements and benefits of becoming a disciple, 
made them seek spiritual signs in their dreams (istiare), and interpreted their dreams 
in terms of spiritual meaning. Mehmet Emin stated repeatedly in the court that 
Derviş Mehmet’s spiritual explanations fascinated them.18 
Ramazan was another member of the company who ran away on the journey. 
He was in his twenties at the time. According to his statements in court, he had met 
Sütçü Mehmet when buying milk from him. He committed himself to the Nakşibendi 
order five months before the incident. He had not known Derviş Mehmet before join-
ing the order. It was Sütçü Mehmet who introduced Ramazan to Derviş Mehmet. 
Ramazan, like other detained perpetrators, stated that Derviş Mehmet had many oth-
er disciples. Yet, Ramazan did not know any other sheikh in Manisa except Derviş 
Mehmet. Ramazan also alleged that Sütçü Mehmet remarked about 70,000 angels 
who were supporting and defending Derviş Mehmet. According to Sütçü Mehmet, it 
was the reason why Ramazan became a follower of Derviş.19 
                                                
15 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 42. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Yirmi Beşinci İn’ikat T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt: 25, “Menemen Hadisesini Ika Ve 
Teşkilâtı Esasiye Kanununu Cebren Tağyire Teşebbüs Edenlerden 37 Şahsın Ölüm Cezasına 
Çarptırılması Hakkında 3/564 Numaralı Başvekâlet Tezkeresi ve Adliye Encümeni Maz-
batası,” January 31, 1931, 9. 
19 In the court, Ramazan alleged that Sütçü Mehmet intimidated him that in case he refused 
to dedicate himself to Derviş, things would go wrong for him. Ibid., 15. However this state-
ment might be Ramazan’s fabrication in order to convince the court that he had been forced 
to obey. The arrestee made this sort of expressions in the court frequently to please the court 
members. This issue is discussed in “The Process of the Court” section in detail. 
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Küçük Hasan, was seventeen years old, and the youngest member of the 
company. He resided in Manisa. He was a vine grower and single.20 He had no edu-
cational background, similar to other followers of Derviş Mehmet. Küçük Hasan 
joined the Nakşibendi order one month before the Menemen Incident. He, along with 
Nalıncı Hasan, fled from Menemen during the shootout taking advantage of the en-
suing confusion. As Küçük Hasan stated in the court, one day Derviş Mehmet had a 
talk with Küçük Hasan’s father and asked him whether his children went to mosque 
and prayed. This was the initial point of Küçük Hasan’s acquaintance with Derviş 
Mehmet. Then he asked Küçük Hasan if he knew about Derviş.21 Küçük Hasan said 
that he did. Thereon Derviş Mehmet introduced himself as the expected Mahdi and 
invited Küçük Hasan to become his disciple. Derviş Mehmet then taught him invoca-
tions (zikr) of God.22 
Nalıncı Hasan was twenty years old and from Manisa. He was a clog mak-
er,23 single, and unschooled. He joined the Nakşibendi order two years before the 
Menemen Incident. His sheikh was Laz İbrahim from Manisa. According to Nalıncı 
Hasan, he met Derviş Mehmet at his workplace in Manisa, through the agency of 
Şamdan Mehmet. He stated not to have been familiar with him for a long period. 
One day, though the date is not accurate, Şamdan Mehmet and Derviş Mehmet came 
to his shop and Nalıncı Hasan ordered coffee for them. There, Derviş Mehmet ex-
pressed his being “the Mahdi” and his plan to declare himself. Derviş told Nalıncı 
Hasan his intention to recover the Islamic religion. He spoke of becoming a better 
Muslim and spiritually getting closer to God by way of citing his name. In addition, 
Derviş Mehmet stressed the significance of their gatherings in Çırak Mustafa’s cof-
feehouse, where they had performed zikr, and asked Nalıncı Hasan to attend to be-
come a fellow and his disciple. Nalıncı Hasan began to participate in the meetings 
and perform zikr in the coffeehouse.24 
                                                
20 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 42. 
21 Mahdi is a savior who, Muslims believe, will emerge at the end of times. He is deemed to 
provide justice, maintain order and restore the faith. Ekrem Sarıkçıoğlu, “Mehdi,” Türkiye 
Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi (DİA) (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, n.d.), 
369. 
22 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 13. 
23 His name Nalıncı came from his vocation. 
24 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 11. 
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Mehmet Emin, Ramazan, Tatlıcı (confectioner) Hüseyin, Nalıncı Hasan and 
Küçük Hasan, all disciples of Derviş Mehmet, used to congregate in Çırak (appren-
tice) Mustafa’s coffeehouse in Menemen. They were accustomed to perform collec-
tive invocations of God.25 They had religious goals to fulfill, such as reaching a cer-
tain number of invocations. For example, as Küçük Hasan recounted in the court, 
Derviş Mehmet obliged him, during their meetings at Çırak Mustafa’s coffeehouse in 
Manisa, of reciting the holy phrase of lâilâhe illallah for 500 times.26 Derviş 
Mehmet’s spiritual assignments of this nature did not invite adverse reaction. All his 
disciples seemed to comply and carry out their assignments. 
However, Derviş Mehmet’s religious motivations apparently deviated from 
those of typical sheikh affiliated with the order. According to Mehmet Emin, Derviş 
Mehmet used to tell his companions that God appeared to him and commanded that 
believers should cite him frequently. Together with his revelations, Derviş Mehmet 
referred to these revelations and advised his companions to cite God as much as they 
could. In another time, when Derviş asked his followers how many reciting they 
practiced, they told him “500”. Then, he suggested to them that they should increase 
the number. He told them that the Prophet used to mention God ever so much that by 
this means he could become God’s beloved.27 In obedience to their mentor, they cit-
ed one of the most significant divine phrases in Islamic faith, lâilâhe illallah28, more 
than a 1,000 times a day.29 
Derviş Mehmet had primarily asked the ones he met whether they prayed and 
cited God. His overall argument was that the greater the number of times they recited 
God’s name and prayed to him, the closer they would become to God. Derviş pre-
scribed to those who were acquainted with him to step up their efforts and he led 
them in prayers. He was a guide who directed them to religious reciting and praying, 
and remained around to check upon them.30 Derviş Mehmet manifested himself as 
being the Mahdi to some of his followers. He notified others of the imminence of the 
arrival of the Mahdi. He advised them to keep on reciting God’s name in order to 
witness to the Mahdi’s arrival. 
                                                
25 Ibid., 8–9. 
26 Ibid., 13. 
27 Ibid., 8. 
28 A statement of acknowledging and accentuating the oneness of God. 
29 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 11. 
30 Ibid., 18. 
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In the court, Mehmet Emin recalled a conversation between Hafız Ahmet, 
another person of the Nakşibendi order in the Manisa region, and Derviş Mehmet 
about the Mahdi in one of their gatherings. The Mahdi was expected to show up at 
the end of the world (ahir zaman) according to their belief. Hafız asked Derviş 
Mehmet whether the Mahdi would be a human being or emerge in a shape of some-
thing else. In his answer, Derviş Mehmet stated that all of the prophets had been hu-
man beings, therefore the Mahdi as well would necessarily be a human being. Then 
Derviş Mehmet told Hafız Ahmet that he was the expected Mahdi. From that mo-
ment on, he declared that he was the Mahdi. After this, Hafız Ahmet asked Derviş 
Mehmet whether he could overcome and cope with being the Mahdi or not. Derviş 
replied he would get through. Hafız Ahmet kissed Derviş’s hand and announced him 
as a true saint. Hafız Ahmet then summoned the people present in the meeting to 
firmly believe in Derviş and warned them not to touch him. However, this story 
stands in the middle of truthfulness and fabrication. Mehmet Emin mentioned that he 
had heard about this affair both from Derviş and Fırıncı Ahmet (baker), a follower of 
Derviş. However, there was no other testimony that validated this questionable ac-
count.31  
Somehow the police had learned about the gatherings to recite zikr. Later on, 
the coffeehouse was closed down. The police might have known about the group and 
the identity of the participants, who they were, and what they did when they came 
together in the coffeehouse, including their performance of zikr. Yet, no legal action 
was initiated against them. After the coffeehouse was closed, Tatlıcı Hüseyin pro-
posed to continue the zikr meetings in his house. That is to say, the group came to-
gether in a coffeehouse and then at a private home in Manisa before their departure. 
They kept on praying in Tatlıcı’s house for a while.32 Ramazan asserted that they 
continually talked about the issues of Mahdism there as well.33 
1.1.2. Departure from Manisa 
As Mehmet Emin told in the court, they were performing zikr every afternoon 
in the house of Tatlıcı Hüseyin until they left. In one of the last days of their gather-
ings in Tatlıcı Hüseyin’s house, Derviş Mehmet brought forward his consideration of 
                                                
31 Ibid., 8. This issue is discussed in chapter three. 
32 Ibid., 11. 
33 Ibid., 15. 
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the necessity of enhancing their invocations of God. He propounded the idea of a 
constant fifteen days of seclusion in a cave for better praying. He told his compan-
ions that he would be expecting revelation from God in this cave. He recounted them 
that the Islamic Prophet Muhammed had taken divine inspiration in the same way 
when he prayed in seclusion in cave. He also referred to Şeyh Esat in İstanbul. By 
Derviş Mehmet’s own evaluation, Şeyh Esat, the mentor and leader of Nakşibendi 
order, possessed very large power. He held the world in his hand and he could create 
cataclysms, storms, and was able to run the world upside down. After their staying in 
the cave, Derviş Mehmet intended to go to the village of Paşa, declare his Mahdism, 
and invite people to join him.34 He shared his plans with others in Manisa. No dis-
pute occurred over those plans when he mentioned them.  
Derviş Mehmet charged Küçük Hasan to go to a certain İsmail, present his 
compliments and ask for a rifle for himself. Küçük Hasan did as Derviş wished and 
brought a rifle to him. It was the first gun they acquired. Derviş in addition obtained 
a knife from Koca Mustafa in Manisa. When they left Manisa to go to the village of 
Paşa, they had one rifle and one knife as their weapons. They also speculated about 
assaulting a law enforcement station to obtain guns.35 According to Ramazan, Sütçü 
Mehmet as well obtained a gun for himself in Manisa.36 The company, composed of 
seven people, namely Derviş Mehmet, Şamdan Mehmet, Sütçü Mehmet, Küçük Ha-
san, Nalıncı Hasan, Mehmet Emin, and Ramazan, thus, intended to initiate a reli-
gious movement in their own way. To fulfill their goals, some, but not all of them 
obtained guns and left the city armed.37 Yet, Derviş Mehmet did not mention going 
to Menemen during any of their meetings in Manisa. 
They split into two groups in Manisa before taking the road. The first group 
consisted of Derviş, Sütçü Mehmet, and Şamdan Mehmet. The other group included 
Mehmet Emin, Ramazan, Nalıncı Hasan, and Küçük Hasan. The first group was 
                                                
34 Ibid., 11. 
35 Ibid., 13. 
36 Ibid., 15. 
37 Eyüp Öz asserts that Derviş Mehmet, Sütçü Mehmet and Mehmet Emin divorced their 
wives before setting off for Menemen. Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 415. Öz’s 
study generally seeks to stay away from prejudiced arguments. However, as it is the case 
here, he gives unverifiable information. No other account mentions that these people di-
vorced their wives before their departure. This information appears to be fabricated as evi-
dence of Derviş Mehmet and his followers’ commitment to their goals. Such problems of our 
sources are discussed in the literature review chapter. We refer to this particular rumor here 
because of its relevance. 
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headed for the village of Paşa where they waited for the second group to join them 
subsequently. They intended to go to the village of Bozalan after Paşa. According to 
the statements of the three perpetrators who were detained alive, their journey would 
continue after these two initial stops. They planned to go to many villages, towns, 
and cities to summon people to join them to uphold the religion. Derviş spoke about 
going to Arabia and even to China. He would unite with Jesus (upon Jesus’ second 
coming) and then head for European countries to invite them to Islam.  
1.1.3. The Group in Paşa 
The groups arrived at the village of Paşa separately and united at the house of 
Derviş Mehmet’s mother-in-law Rukiye and brother-in-law Ahmet, a post officer. 
Ahmet hosted them for three to four days and met their needs. There, Derviş ob-
tained another weapon for himself and one for Şamdan Mehmet.38 
In the village of Paşa, they stayed for four days and kept on invoking God’s 
names and smoking hashish. Initially they told the villagers that they were in the vil-
lage for hunting. Yet later on, Derviş Mehmet declared his Mahdism to the villagers. 
He had a dog with himself called Kıtmir, named after the dog of the ashab-ı kehf, 
known as the companions of cave and seven sleepers. Derviş instantiated the dog to 
townspeople as his sign of Mahdism.39 He told them to obey him and stated that eve-
ry one of villagers was obliged to do so.40 Most likely due to the absence of an evi-
dence to verify his Mahdism, he pointed out his dog to the villagers.  
As mentioned by perpetrators, some of the inhabitants of Paşa believed in 
Derviş while some others did not. Still, no one reported the unusual assertions of the 
company to officials. The reason of their silence was most likely kinship. As re-
                                                
38 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 9. 
39 An article published in Cumhuriyet after the event claimed that Derviş Mehmet and his 
fellows adopted second names for themselves after seven sleepers. They called themselves 
Mernuş, Etabiyoş, Kefeş, Sazenuş, Debernuş etc. Cumhuriyet, January 17, 1931. Indeed, ac-
cording to one version of the legend, seven sleepers would join the Mahdi. However, this 
matter was not mentioned in the court process nor touched upon in the official reports. The 
perpetrators did not mention that they adopted the identity of the ashab-ı kehf in the trials. 
Only the newspapers alleged this point. As it will be discussed in the relevant section, much 
misinformation was fabricated after the event, especially by the newspapers. Umut Azak, 
another scholar who wrote about the Menemen Incident in detail, took this situation serious-
ly and stated it in her study. Azak remarks that according to the story, Eshab-ı Kehf, the sev-
en sleepers, were to be the helpers of the Mahdi. For Azak, even the number of Derviş 
Mehmet’s own group, seven, was not accidental, “showing that he wanted to enact the Ko-
ranic story of Eshab-ı Kehf with his disciples”. Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, 26. 
40 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10. 
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marked, Derviş Mehmet’s mother-in-law and brother-in-law resided in Paşa. As vil-
lagers stated in the court, Derviş Mehmet, used to come to the village previously 
along with some others as well. That is to say, villagers were familiar with, at least, 
Derviş. If Öz’s statements are true, the villagers knew of Derviş from his times of 
banditry as well. Since Derviş could arrive at Paşa armed with his disciples and man-
ifest his Mahdism comfortably, there seems to have been no hostility between him 
and the villagers. The population of the village at the time is not clear. Neither is 
proportion of the ones who believed in Derviş is known. Still, no matter how sincere-
ly some of the villagers believed in him, not a single one of them joined the company 
and dedicated himself to Derviş’s purposes. Moreover, as stated by perpetrators in 
the court, Derviş’s mother-in-law warned and advised him not to go in pursuit of his 
intentions during their stay and when they left the village. Derviş did not heed the 
advice. 
Derviş and his followers left the village of Paşa for the village of Bozalan. 
They arrived in a district named Sünbüller after an eleven-hour walk at night. They 
sat in a pinetum beside running water. Ramazan, a member of the group, left to re-
lieve himself. However, he did not return. Sütçü Mehmet went to look for him but 
could not find him. Ramazan had run away from the group. According to the state-
ments of three perpetrators in the court, Derviş Mehmet began to keep a close watch 
on his followers in the aftermath of Ramazan’s escape. He intimidated and threat-
ened to shoot them in case any one else would tend to run away. In Sünbüller, Derviş 
spent time interpreting his companions’ dreams, and they carried on smoking hash-
ish.41 
1.1.4. In the Village of Bozalan 
When they approached Bozalan, they spent the night on a hill close to the vil-
lage. In the morning, Sütçü Mehmet went to the village and returned to the company 
with his younger brother Hacıismailoğlu Hüseyin, an inhabitant of Bozalan. They 
were taken to the village and initially hosted by Hacıismail.42 Sütçü Mehmet’s older 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Another misinformation about the motions of the company before the Menemen Incident 
is that they visited nearly a dozen villages before arriving at Bozalan. (See Öz, “Yasak Bir 
Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 415.) Neither the statements of the defendants nor the official rec-
ords mention that insurgents had been to any villages other than Paşa and Bozalan. They 
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brother, Hacıismail’s son, whose name was also Hüseyin, put them into a house 
where they continued to chant God’s names for a week. Initially, Derviş told the vil-
lagers that they were there for hunting.43 Yet, later on he declared his Mahdism and, 
according to Küçük Hasan, some of the villagers blessed him and rendered their 
thanks to God, saying elhamdülillah for letting them witness the arrival of the Mahdi 
and see his face. Derviş explained his duty to summon people to the religion and told 
villagers to join him. Moreover he stressed that as soon as he succeeded in his goal, 
he would distribute official duties (memuriyet) to them.44 
When they were in the house supplied for them in Bozalan, Derviş Mehmet 
assigned two of the villagers, who were relatives of Sütçü Mehmet, to go to Manisa. 
Those two villagers were to pretend that they were to buy things, but in reality they 
would check out whether the government officials realized the absence of the mem-
bers of his company. The two villagers went to Manisa and learned from Sütçü 
Mehmet’s wife that their absence was noticed and the police officials were trying to 
get additional information about them. However, this does not mean that a warrant 
was issued for their apprehension or any other legal action was taken by the law en-
forcement agencies.45 When he got the news that the police were aware of their ab-
sence, Derviş Mehmet became concerned. On the excuse that they could not concen-
trate on reciting God comfortably in the village, he asked Sütçü Mehmet to construct 
a cottage for them on the hill on the outskirts of the village. Sütçü Mehmet assigned 
this task to his brother-in-law Mustafa.  
                                                                                                                                     
might have passed by some villages, but evidently they entered only the aforementioned two 
villages. 
43 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10. 
44 Ibid., 14. 
45 Another allegation about the company’s activities, again mentioned by Öz, is that the ru-
mors about Giritli Mehmet’s departure from Manisa spread to rural regions. Whispers of an 
imminent rebellion reached even Menemen. Furthermore, the issue was discussed in the 
Menemen office of the Türk Ocakları, which was an official organization that aimed to 
propagate the nationalist ideals of the republic. Öz asserts that Kubilay as well was presuma-
bly involved in that discussion. In this presumed meeting, participants talked about their loy-
alty to Atatürk and the virtues of the republic. (See Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 
418.) There is no source to verify this information. There were meetings held in the Mene-
men Türk Ocağı, yet no rumors about the company spread in the neighboring regions. Öz’s 
statements imply that the law enforcement agencies became alarmed and began to follow the 
company around. However, the company’s journey was not so serious as to cause such an 
alarm. Their absence was noticed in Manisa since Küçük Hasan’s father had reported the de-
parture of his son with others to the police station. There was neither a legal action nor an 
emergency measure taken upon this news. 
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Mustafa built the requested cottage, and the group proceeded to perform their 
chants there. According to Nalıncı Hasan, they were praying day and night. At the 
recommendation of Derviş, they used to recite the phrase of lâilâhe illallah 200,000 
times at night. They also kept on smoking hashish in the cottage. Derviş asserted that 
the Prophet Muhammed as well had smoked hashish and it was after doing so that he 
experienced the ascension (miraç) to the level of God and had been able to speak to 
God.46 Mehmet Emin further claimed that Derviş told them that God appeared to him 
on several occasions.47 They stayed in the cottage for fifteen days. During their lodg-
ing, villagers from Bozalan, named Hasan and Hacıismail, brought food to the 
group.48 
According to the statements of the insurgents in the court, Derviş Mehmet 
frequently exemplified the circumstances of the Prophet’s period while defining his 
intentions to redeem the religion and re-establish the former religious institutions. He 
remarked how and in what ways the Prophet handled the issues that he faced in his 
time. Derviş took advantage of the anecdotes about the methods the Prophet used to 
convince his followers and to increase their commitment to the way they were on. 
Derviş presented his plans by drawing analogies with the Prophet’s. He used the pre-
sumed correspondence of his approach to the Prophet’s to consequently enhance his 
deeds and aims, and to increase the legitimacy of his position in general in the eyes 
of his disciples.49 He told them that the center of the Nakşibendi order was the 
Prophet himself. 
Mehmet Emin accounted that in their last days in the cottage, Derviş asked 
Küçük Hasan about who knew the town of Menemen best. Küçük Hasan pointed 
Nalıncı Hasan, since Nalıncı had frequently been visiting Menemen bazaars for mer-
chandise. Derviş asked Nalıncı about the number of gendarmes in Menemen. Nalıncı 
said gendarmes were small in number there. Derviş then, mentioned of going to 
Menemen to listen to the teachings of Saffet Hoca, a person he knew. Planning to 
                                                
46 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10. 
47 According to the newspapers Derviş Mehmet told his disciples in the cottage that the time 
had come and he had reached the level of the Prophet. Cumhuriyet, December 27, 1930. No 
other source verifies this information. Kemal Üstün, another author who wrote about the 
event, took this datum for granted and stated it in his book along with other ungrounded in-
formation. Kemal Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1978), 66. 
48 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10. 
49 Ibid., 13. 
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stay at Saffet Hoca’s house, he intended to send telegrams to Şeyh Esat and other 
sheiks to bring them together in on effort to hold down the government,50 re-establish 
the dervish lodges and suspend the government for two months. On this journey to 
redeem the Islamic order, Derviş’s aim was to arrive at İstanbul, proclaim the cali-
phate and to appoint sheikhs to each city of the country, such as Şeyh Saffet to 
Menemen.51 All three of the perpetrators accounted in the police station as well as in 
the court that these were Derviş’s goals. Newspapers, official accounts and subse-
quent writers presented these plans as if they were very realistic. Six people took the 
road from Manisa, and finally headed for entering Menemen with only three of them 
armed. On the eve of their entrance to Menemen, they still upheld their aims, alt-
hough these goals were impossible to actualize under the aforementioned circum-
stances. The only reasonable explanation of how on earth they could suppose to ful-
fill those goals is that they were blunted by the hashish they had been smoking. 
When they left the cottage in the outskirts of the village of Bozalan and took 
the round to Menemen on the night of December 22, villagers Abdülkerim and 
Hacıismailoğlu Hüseyin accompanied them until the Gediz River. Abdülkerim told 
Derviş not to forget about him and wished success and Godspeed for their purposes. 
Abdülkerim also told that they would follow him. They were to observe Menemen 
from Bozalan and if they heard a gunfire burst, they would bear their arms and arrive 
at Menemen.52 Lastly, he gave them cigarettes and sent them off.53 It is notable that 
not a single villager of Bozalan participated in the company though they hosted 
them. The villagers of neither Paşa nor Bozalan reported anything about Derviş 
Mehmet, his armed company and their purposes to the gendarme. The reasons why 
                                                
50 These statements indicate that Şeyh Esat, the leader of the Nakşibendi order of the era, did 
not know about the so-called mission of the company. As it will be discussed in subsequent 
sections, Mehmet Emin, along with other perpetrators, sought to leave the impression that 
their actions were planned within the knowledge of the order. For them, the leader of the or-
der, notably Şeyh Esat, not only knew about the upcoming rebellion, but also motivated it. 
However, as it will be designated in the relevant section, there is no proof of a connection 
between Derviş Mehmet’s company and Şeyh Esat. Here Nalıncı Hasan seems to be stating 
unwittingly that Esat did not know about their actions. Otherwise, why should Derviş plan to 
send telegrams to Şeyh Esat to inform him? 
51 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10. 
52 When they departed from Bozalan, Derviş Mehmet gave a gun to Küçük Hasan as well. 
Yet, Küçük Hasan claimed in the court not to have used it. T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25, 
14. In that case, almost every one of them had a gun when they were about to enter Mene-
men. 
53 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10. 
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they were taken for granted in Paşa is also pertinent for their hosting in Bozalan. 
There were relatives of the members of the company living in Bozalan as there were 
in Paşa. Besides, the extent to which the inhabitants of Bozalan had faith in Derviş to 
be the Mahdi is unknown. Still, the case that no one joined the group indicates that 
the villagers refrained from stepping into armed action against the government. 
The company arrived at the Gediz River where they needed to get across. The 
boatman was asleep and they awakened him. Derviş Mehmet named himself as the 
Mahdi even to the boatman and told that they were going to summon people to the 
religion under their banner. Derviş said that they had no money, and asked the boat-
man to help them to cross the river through giving a verbal guarantee that they would 
please him afterwards via appointing him to a government office.54 Early in the 
morning, they sat in an olive grove near Menemen. There, they smoked hashish 
again and read the ayetel-kursi, a specifically significant verse of the holy Quran, to 
ask help from God. Before their departure, Derviş gave his company instructions of 
how they would enter the town.55 
1.3. Events in Menemen 
This section gives details about the events that happened in Menemen on 23 
December 1930. The development of these events is constituted here mainly in refer-
ence to official records. Statements of the perpetrators made in the court and official 
reports prepared after the events are taken into account as the primary sources to re-
construct the actions. There is hardly any contradiction between the statements of the 
company members and official reports. However, newspapers of the era published 
much misleading information about the movement in Menemen as well as about the 
background of the event. Many of those distortions are discussed in relevant parts of 
this thesis. Still, some of them are specified in this part as well. The purpose here is 
to determine what exactly happened so as to provide the basis of subsequent evalua-
tions. 
1.3.1. Entrance to Menemen and Initial Activities 
Menemen is a town, located thirty-three kilometers northwest of İzmir, the 
third big metropolis of Turkey. According to the population census results of 1927, 
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Menemen’s population, including affiliated villages, was 28,000.56 According to the 
results of the 1935 census, 13,000 people lived in the town itself.57 That is to say, 
when the Menemen Incident occurred, there were approximately 12,000 habitants 
living in Menemen. 
The group came to an olive grove near Menemen in hunter clothes before 
down on 23 December, 1930.58 After smoking hashish one last time and reading 
Quranic verses, they took action. They entered the Menemen town center chanting 
the holy words lâilâhe illallah (there is no god except Allah) and Allahuekber (God 
is supreme). They initially went to the mosque named Müftü. A few people were in 
the mosque to perform their morning prayers.59 In the mosque Derviş Mehmet intro-
duced himself as the Mahdi. When he did so, some of them cited the words of testi-
mony (kelime-i şehadet), a special religious phrase that implied they approved and 
believed in him.60 Thereon, Nalıncı Hasan took a green banner on which Islamic ho-
ly phrases were written and left the mosque with a couple of men.61 The number of 
the prayers in the Müftü Mosque is unknown. Still, there were not many people in-
side and not all of them followed Derviş. They came to the town square after leaving 
the mosque. There, they performed zikr for a while. Then, Derviş wished to go 
around the neighborhoods in the town. He asked one of inhabitants62 to guide them.63 
They walked in the quarters of the town while chanting God’s names and prayers and 
shouting Islamic slogans loudly with the banner in their hand. Derviş began to an-
nounce that a caliphate army of 70,000 soldiers was waiting outside of Menemen for 
his sign to intervene. The ones who were not willing to join him would be slaugh-
                                                
56 “T.C. İzmir Vilayeti 1930 Senesi Yıllık İstatistiği,” in T.C. İzmir Vilayeti İstatistik Yıllığı 
(Başbakanlık İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1930), 12. 
57 Başbakanlık İstatistik Genel Müdürlüğü, Genel Nüfus Sayımı 1935 (Devlet Basımevi, 
1936), 333–4. 
58 Hikmet Çetinkaya made interviews with two residents of Menemen who witnessed the in-
cident. Their names were Osman Yurtsever (Singer Osman) and Ragıp Dere. Osman 
Yurtsever stressed that some of the townspeople initially took the insurgents for hunters be-
cause they wore hunting clothes. Hikmet Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları (İs-
tanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1997), 19. 
59 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10. 
60 Ibid., 14. 
61 Ibid., 10. 
62 The names of the people who participated in the actions of the company are indicated not 
here but in the section on court sessions later in the thesis. The point here is that all of the 
townspeople who were explicitly or implicitly related with the events in Menemen were ar-
rested and taken to court.  
63 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 14. 
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tered.64 He claimed that they had no other purpose except to redeem and replenish 
the religion of Islam in Menemen. According to Nalıncı Hasan, while they walked 
through the districts, some of the townspeople believed in their claims, joined their 
crowd and tagged along with the company, but many others did not. Derviş indicated 
the dog by his side as the evidence of his Mahdism to townspeople as well.65 
Before coming to Menemen, Derviş Mehmet mentioned Saffet Hoca, who 
lived in Menemen. According to the Derviş, they would receive help from Saffet and 
reside in his house when they took control of the town. According to Küçük Hasan, 
Derviş Mehmet encountered Şeyh Saffet during their tour of the streets.66 When Saf-
fet saw Derviş, he began to walk to his home in discontent. Derviş followed him to 
his home and called his men. He made them stand in line and perform a formal bow-
ing for Saffet while he was getting into his home.67 However, Saffet did not pay at-
tention to them and went inside his home and closed the windows.68 
After the wander in the streets, they came back to the municipal square at 
07:40. They planted the banner they carried to the ground with the help of an inhab-
itant of the town who did the digging.69 According to Nalıncı Hasan, when they came 
to the town square, there were approximately a hundred people in their group, partic-
ipating in the zikr led by Derviş Mehmet. There were also a hundred more who were 
waiting around and observing the events.70 
Derviş repeated in the town square as well that there was an army of 70,000 
caliphate soldiers nearby.71 He kept intimidating that whosoever did not get under 
the banner and join them would be beheaded by midday.72 The company was con-
stantly chanting Allahuekber in the square under the banner.73 Derviş Mehmet pro-
                                                
64 Ibid., 10. 
65 Ibid., 12. 
66 Ibid., 10. 
67 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 45. 
68 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 14. 
69 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 45. 
70 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 12. The point that there were 200 people in the square in 
total is compatible with official reports: “Büyük Erkânı Harbiye Riyasetinin 26/12/930 Ta-
rihli ve 6747 nolu Tezkeresi Sureti,” Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle 
Gerçekler, 57. 
71 This matter was voiced in different terms. For instance, Küçük Hasan stated the army con-
sisted of 70,000 saints (evliya). Some newspapers alleged that Derviş and his followers de-
clared they had conquered İzmir and İstanbul. (See Yeni Asır, December 24, 1930.) 
72 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 15. 
73 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 19. 
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claimed that wearing hats was a sin. Both the religion and the state would be re-
deemed eventually.74 They further asserted to have cut the telegraph lines so they 
hindered the communication of the town with the outside.75  
1.3.2. Attitude of the Officials During the Events 
The first official who came to interfere with the demonstrators was a certain 
gendarme clerk named Ali Efendi. It was an attorney clerk named Mehmet Tevfik 
Efendi who informed Ali Efendi of the situation. When he learned what was happen-
ing, Ali Efendi took four armed gendarme privates with him and went to the square. 
Ali Efendi came and asked Derviş Mehmet what he wanted. Derviş stressed that he 
was the expected Mahdi and said they were to summon the townspeople to return to 
Islam and to invite them to join the order. Ali Efendi refused his claims, urged him to 
call off the meeting and warned the crowd to scatter. Yet, Derviş repeated his state-
ment that he was the Twelfth Imam and 70,000 soldiers surrounded the town. He ig-
nored the gendarme and proceeded with zikr.76 Neither the crowd nor the company 
intended to disperse. In the face of this antagonistic situation,77 Ali Efendi went to 
the house of the commander of gendarmes, along with the four soldiers accompany-
ing him. The Commander Captain Fahri Bey came directly to the square with Ali 
Efendi.78 Derviş repeated his assertions and purposes to him as well. Fahri Bey men-
tioned they, too, were Muslims and asked the group to disperse. Derviş again reject-
ed the warning. As accounted in the official reports, Captain Fahri Bey plainly invit-
ed the crowd composed of inhabitants of Menemen to disperse. However, they did 
not budge and remained in the square with and around Derviş.79 As soon as Fahri 
Bey realized his commands did not make any effect, he left the crowd and got inside 
the state house in the square along with Ali Efendi and four armed gendarme pri-
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75 The official reports preserved in the ATASE Archives of the General Staff include the tes-
timonial statements of Nail Bey, a post office clerk in Menemen at the time. Nail Bey ex-
plains that as soon as he heard the allegation that they had cut the lines, he checked them. He 
found that  the wires were not cut and worked properly. Nail Bey further informed the İzmir 
Governorate of the situation. (See “Menemen Telgraf Memuru Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin 
Tanıklık İfadesi,” Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ATASE Arşivi, http://www.tsk.tr/Content/img/ 
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76 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 11. 
77 Küçük Hasan moreover stated in the court that Derviş Mehmet pulled a gun on the gen-
darmes. Ibid., 15. However, official recordings do not refer to such an incident. 
78 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 46. 
79 Ibid. 
 25 
vates. Thereafter Fahri Bey did not leave the government office until the end of the 
events.80 When the captain was leaving the square after the Derviş’s disregard of his 
warnings, a part of the crowd applauded,81 acclaiming his success in repulsing the 
law enforcement officers.82 This applause uplifted and encouraged Derviş.83 
As indicated above, the state officers heard about the happenings in the town 
center and began to step into action. The situation was serious. Plain intervention 
without using active force would not suffice to disperse the company. There was a 
series of phone calls made by state officers to each other to pave the way for effec-
tively dealing with the situation. However, according to official reports that assessed 
the officers’ acts, the process of conveying the armed forces to the scene of incidents 
was not conducted efficiently. That inadequacy in coordination of the state offices 
culminated in the brutal murder of a reserve officer. 
After getting inside the state office, Fahri Bey phoned the Third Regimental 
Command Headquarters in Menemen and recounted the situation to the officer on 
duty and the deputy commander Nedim Bey. He requested from the command head-
quarters a battalion to be deployed to the government square. He sought to reach the 
district governor by phone but could not. Moreover, Fahri Bey phoned the gover-
nor’s office in İzmir to inform them of the situation in Menemen. He ordered the four 
gendarme privates to defend the building in the case of an offensive action until 
backup arrived.84 The captain also sent the gendarme clerk Ali Efendi to meet and 
                                                
80 “Büyük Erkânı Harbiye Riyasetinin 26/12/930 Tarihli ve 6747 nolu Tezkeresi Sureti” 
ibid., 57. 
81 ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin Tanıklık İfadesi.”  
82 According to other assertions, Derviş stated to the mass in the square after Fahri Bey’s de-
parture that the state forces actually supported them. Bahriye Acar, “İzmir Basınında Mene-
men Olayı,” Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Çağdaş 
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(Artık hükümet yok.) Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 418. Although the state admin-
istration responded harshly to the townspeople’s approving attitude, there is no record indi-
cating that the crowd shouted the aforesaid slogan attributed to it. 
83 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 11. 
84 He is reported to have placed two of the gendarmes to window ledge so they could com-
mence fire in case of need. Yet, there was no gunshot from the state building when Kubilay 
was shot or Derviş Mehmet beheaded him twenty minutes later. This situation invites the 
question whether the governmental square was within the state building’s range of view or 
not. We may assume that if soldiers had seen Kubilay’s being shot, they would have opened 
fire. It makes sense that they did not see what was happening in the square. Thus, their pur-
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accompany the battalion that would be sent from the regiment headquarters.85 
Meanwhile, an unknown inhabitant of Menemen saw the goings-on in the square and 
went to regimental headquarters to inform them. Before entering the headquarters, he 
came across the reserve officer Kubilay Bey, who was preparing his detachment for 
morning drills, and conveyed to him what he observed. According to the records, that 
inhabitant went into the headquarters and recounted the situation there as well. 
Meanwhile, Captain Fahri Bey also required a battalion from the regiment. Deputy 
Commander Nedim Bey dispatched an order to Kubilay to delay his departure. How-
ever, this order could not be conveyed to Kubilay since he had hit the road as soon as 
he learned the situation from the aforementioned inhabitant.86 
Ten minutes after the entrance of Fahri Bey into the building, another soldier, 
the mess officer Mehmet Ali Bey, on duty of the Fourth Regiment, came to the 
square and encountered the movements. Derviş Mehmet saw Mehmet Ali Efendi, 
and called him to talk.87 He loudly preached him about tevhid, the oneness of God, 
the sharia, and finding the rightful path. As soon as Mehmet Ali realized the serious-
ness of the circumstances, he too called for a battalion from the deputy commander 
Nedim Efendi. Nedim Efendi mentioned the request made by Captain Fahri Bey and 
that a battalion was already on its way to the square. Nedim Efendi also told Mehmet 
Ali Bey to contact the forthcoming squad. Mehmet Ali Efendi waited for the arrival 
of the unit for a while and dispatched his orderly to bring his gun from his home. 
However, without waiting for his gun, he went on to enter the government office. In 
the building Captain Fahri Bey gave him a rifle and told him to stay there with him.88 
As indicated above, Fahri Bey had ordered the gendarme clerk Ali Efendi to 
meet the division sent from the headquarters. Kubilay and his detachment however, 
took a shortcut to arrive at the square. Therefore Kubilay missed Ali Efendi and con-
fronted the demonstrators without knowing about the state of the other law enforce-
ment units.89 
                                                                                                                                     
pose to stand by the windows was to resist in case the crowd came close and intended to en-
ter the building. 
85 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 46–7. 
86 “Erkânı harbiye riyasetinin 26/12/930 tarihli ve 6747 nolu tezkeresi sureti” ibid., 58. 
87 Summoning an officer to talk to seems to derive from the exaltation Derviş felt after the 
encouraging applause of the crowd for his deeds. 
88 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 58. 
89 Ibid. 
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When Fehmi Efendi phoned the district governor, he could not reach him due 
to a connection problem. He then called the post office and talked to the postmaster 
to deliver the information. It was the Postmaster of Menemen Hüseyin Sabri Efendi 
who informed the district governor and the regiment commander of the develop-
ments. As soon as he witnessed the group performing zikr in the square, he decided 
to let the state executives know. Sabri Efendi initially went to the home of the district 
governor. Thereon they found the regiment commander. Afterwards, the district gov-
ernor and the regiment commander came to the regiment headquarters together. They 
ordered three more battalions to get prepared and to bring the incident under control. 
The report prepared by an inspector of General Staff Headquarters after the 
incident refers to and criticizes the lack of healthy communication between state of-
ficers. The report remarks that the captain neither mentioned the extent of the event 
nor expressed the reason why they demanded the division. Due to the poor infor-
mation Fahri Bey provided, the first group was sent to the scene of the incident un-
armed.90 However, this seems to be untrue. As accounted in the archival documents 
of the police and indicated above, Fehmi Bey informed the regimental commanders 
about the situation.91 Although assistant regiment officer Nedim Bey gave the in-
struction for Kubilay to stand by, the order was not conveyed to Kubilay. Hereon, 
there seems to have been two possibilities to explain why Kubilay did not order his 
detachment to put bullets into their rifles. First, the information Kubilay received 
from the inhabitant may not have made him realize fully the severity of the situation. 
The second possibility is that Kubilay simply forgot to order his men to put bullets 
into their rifles. 
1.3.3. Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay 
Before explaining the following events, providing information about Kubi-
lay’s character will help to understand why his murder made such a tremendous im-
pact. State administrators, newspapers, and writings in the aftermath of his murder, 
have condemned the incidence ever since. Though neglected during some periods of 
republican history, there have been regular ceremonies conducted to commemorate 
Kubilay and the two wardens, as martyrs of the Republic up to the present.  
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Kubilay92 was a reserve officer who sought to intervene in Derviş Mehmet’s 
actions and was brutally murdered by him in Menemen. He was twenty-four years 
old when he was murdered. His real name was Mustafa Fehmi. He took the name 
“Kubilay” at Teacher’s Training School in İzmir during his studentship. Taking the 
name of famous persons or the places they had lived in Turkish history was a current 
trend in those years. Under the influence of this tendency, Mustafa Fehmi got the 
name “Kubilay”.93 After his graduation, he began to work as a teacher in Aydın. 
There he met Fatma Vedide,94 who was a teacher as well and they got married. On 
May 10, 1929 their son Vedat was born. However, later on they divorced due to ir-
reconcilable differences.95 Meantime, Mustafa Fehmi was at Menemen doing his 
military service as reserve officer at the 43rd Infantry Regiment. 
Fatma Vedide’s interview with Hikmet Çetinkaya, a Kemalist journalist writ-
ing for the Cumhuriyet, includes information about Mustafa Fehmi’s personality. 
Vedide mentioned that they got married in Aydın and this was the first civil mar-
riage, namely the first matrimony that took place according to the new code of civil 
law. Vedide placed importance on this matter.96 Vedide and Kubilay used to talk 
about national matters a lot. For Vedide, they both loved their country very much and 
had strong nationalist feelings. They also adhered to “The Great Redeemer” Ata-
türk’s revolutions such as “rescuing the woman from çarşaf, adoption of the new al-
phabet, closure of the madrasas and dervish lodges”. For Vedide, they both were not 
devoutly religious or conservative. Ataturk had abolished the order of sharia and they 
were both teachers of the era and dedicated to Ataturk’s principles.97 For Vedide, 
Kubilay neither was an alcoholic nor a gambler. He did not go to coffeehouses. He 
only used to do sports and teach his students about Ataturk’s reforms.98 
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Vedide depicts Kubilay as a hot tempered and impulsive person.99 He used to 
play volleyball with his students at break times. He was ambitious to win and when 
he lost the game, he became upset. Vedide told that once when Mustafa Fehmi’s 
team lost the game, he yelled and created havoc so much so that nobody could come 
near him due to his temper.100 Vedide added that he was a persistent person who de-
fended his opinions to the end, yet he did not act hostilely. He entered into tough dis-
cussions but did not pick a fight. Mustafa Fehmi was a member of the Turkish 
Hearths and participated in its meetings held in the Menemen office.  
One of his friends from the Turkish Hearths and the football team was Bedri 
Onat. Çetinkaya’s book includes an interview with him as well. Onat also lived 
through the Menemen Incident and served as the city manager of Menemen town ten 
years. According to Onat as well, Mustafa Fehmi was quick-tempered and intensive 
in football matches.101 Onat remarked about the discussions they held in the Turkish 
Hearths about various matters. Mustafa Fehmi became exited and insisted on his ide-
as. However he calmed down as soon as the discussion was over.102 Neither Onat nor 
Vedide witnessed him fighting with someone. Onat stressed that Kubilay was an af-
fectionate and courageous person.103 Kemal Üstün, who also wrote about the Mene-
men Incident, states that he knew Mustafa Fehmi. Üstün also refers to Mustafa 
Fehmi’s hotheadedness nervous treatment.104  
Mustafa Fehmi’s temperament helps to understand his actions in Menemen. 
Mustafa Fehmi buttonholed Derviş Mehmet in the government square and was shot 
due to this of his action. Official pronouncements, newspapers reports, and other 
writings harshly condemned his murder. Along his being a reserve officer on duty to 
maintain order, his personality traits contributed to the intensity of the reactions to 
his murder. He was a successful student at school.105 After his graduation, he began 
to serve as a teacher of the republic. He was dedicated to his job. He had taken the 
name of a legendary emperor, and became a member Turkish Hearths regularly at-
tending to its meetings. In short, he was a prototype of Republican ideals. The brutal 
                                                
99 Ibid., 13. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 26. 
102 Ibid., 20. 
103 Ibid., 26. 
104 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 20. 
105 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 14. 
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murder of such an iconic citizen in the hands of “Islamist reactionaries” caused great 
resentment and indignation in the official circles and others who shared republican 
ideals. 
1.3.4. Kubilay Rushing to the Scene 
Kubilay and his unit arrived at the town square at 08:30. He ordered his sol-
diers to fix bayonets to their rifles and left them thirty to forty meters away from the 
crowd.106 He went to face Derviş Mehmet and his cohort alone. Derviş repeated his 
claims to Kubilay as well. When Kubilay warned the group to disperse, in the way 
the former officers did, Derviş ignored him too, and rejected Kubilay’s warnings. 
There, due to his hot-tempered characteristic, Kubilay suddenly buttonholed107 
Derviş and yelled at him to do as he said. Then Derviş pushed back Kubilay. At that 
point, Derviş108 shot Kubilay in the chest.109 Having been heavily wounded, Kubilay 
fell down there. 
After the gun shot, Kubilay’s platoon fled. They neither commenced fire110 
nor made any kind of intervention.111 Therefore, they had no information about what 
happened to their commander afterwards. At that point, a part of the crowd dispersed 
                                                
106 The number of soldiers in Kubilay’s unit is unknown. It is recorded that the sergeants and 
corporals in his detachment were put on trial afterwards. However, how many of them were 
there and waiting behind is unclear. 
107 It was asserted in various writings, including the statement of a witness, Mustafa Şen-
gönül, that Kubilay slapped one of the insurgents in the face. (See Can Dündar, Gölgede-
kiler, 1st ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1995), 64.) But it is not true. The perpetra-
tors unanimously mentioned that Kubilay buttonholed Derviş. 
108 There are different accounts about who shot Kubilay as well. In their court statements, 
perpetrators Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan stressed that it was Derviş himself who shot 
Kubilay. “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 15. However, the General Staff’s report mentions 
that it was one of Derviş’s followers who shot Kubilay. ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya 
İlişkin Tanıklık İfadesi.”  
109 There are rumors about this point as well. For instance, Sami Özyılmaz, one of the wit-
nesses of the incident who was a child at the time and was interviewed by Can Dündar, de-
scribed Kubilay having been shot in the foot. Can Dündar, “Menemen’in Son Tanıkları An-
latıyor” (www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/12/25/yazar/dundar.html) But the autopsy report leaves 
little doubt that he was shot in the chest. The bullet busted Kubilay’s rib cage bones and his 
lung. “Otopsi Raporu” Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 67. 
110 It was alleged that soldiers fired blank shots to no effect. However, there was not any sort 
of bullets in their rifles, including blank cartridge. ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin 
İfadesi.” 
111 “Büyük Erkânı harbiye riyasetinin 26/12/930 tarihli ve 6747 nolu tezkeresi sureti,” Emni-
yet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 57. Witnesses also remarked that 
the soldiers fled. Dündar, “Menemen’in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor.” Specifically non-reaction 
of the soldiers was harshly criticized in the official reports prepared in the aftermath of the 
incident. 
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as well. Some of them, including the gendarme clerk Ali Efendi, entered the post of-
fice. Post officer Nail Bey mentioned that it was illegal for people to enter the post 
office and asked them to leave. Ali Efendi requested to use the back window to exit. 
They broke the back window and Ali Efendi went away. Nail Efendi advised him to 
get a gun and return to the scene. Ali Efendi did not do so.112 
After getting shot, Kubilay was on the ground for fifteen seconds.113 Then he 
stood up and could walk to the courtyard of Gazez Mosque, which was twenty to 
thirty meters away.114 However, under the influence of the heavy wound, he fell on 
the ground in the courtyard.115 Kubilay waited there for a while since insurgents did 
not intend to chase him initially. However, after fifteen to twenty minutes, one of the 
insurgents learned about Kubilay’s condition, and told it his friends. Derviş and 
Şamdan Mehmet went to the courtyard and held Kubilay.116 There, Derviş Mehmet 
cut Fehmi’s head off with a knife by Şamdan Mehmet’s help.117 Later on, Derviş 
brought Kubilay’s head to the square and tried to attach it to the tip of their ban-
                                                
112 ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin Tanıklık İfadesi.” 
113 Ibid. 
114 According to an eyewitness, Sami Özyılmaz, and some other narrations, Kubilay sought 
to enter the state building at first. The locked door obliged him to walk to the mosque. 
Özyılmaz comments that in case Kubilay had entered the government office, he would not 
have been beheaded. (See Dündar, “Menemen'in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor.”) But these state-
ments do not make sense. The captain of gendarmes, the regiment officer Mehmet Ali and 
four gendarme privates were in the building. They would certainly have intervened in the 
situation and taken Kubilay inside. Such unreasonable explanations paved the way for con-
spiracy accounts about the event, which claim that the law enforcement officers deliberately 
abandoned Kubilay to his fate and watched him murdered from the windows. 
115 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 45. 
116 The newspapers of the time, together with many others later, gave wrong information 
about this point as well. It was asserted that having been wounded, Kubilay sought to escape 
from the hands of insurgents, but could not. Meanwhile, there were people around watching 
the scene and applauding Derviş and they even cried “Allah Allah.” Vakit, January 16, 1931; 
Milliyet, January 16, 1931. This is a faulty assertion, putting the townspeople under severe 
suspicion. The number of people in the square at the time or the number of those who fol-
lowed Derviş to the courtyard is unknown. As discussed later in the relevant section, the 
Chief Judge of the martial court persistently clamped down on people charged with applaud-
ing in the square, but there was no one accused of acclaiming Kubilay’s beheading. 
117 ATASE Arşivi, “Nail Bey’in Olaya İlişkin Tanıklık İfadesi.” There was some misinfor-
mation about Derviş’s knife as well. As discussed in the literature review section, some writ-
ers claim that the knife was blunt and therefore the process of beheading took a while, im-
plying the depth of the hatred of the reactionists and Kubilay’s suffering. However, the knife 
was keen-edged. “23 Aralık 1930 tarihli hükümet tabibi imzalı Keşif Zabıt Varakası”, 
Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ATASE Arşivi, http://www.tsk.tr/Content/img/tarihten_kesitler/ 
menemen1.jpg. 
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ner.118 But the head fell down from the banner. Then, they asked a rope and a 
townsman brought it. They fastened the head to a pole with the rope.119 Under the 
circumstances, two district wardens engaged in combat with the insurgents and were 
killed.120 Another part of the crowd dispersed after this shootout.121  
Before long, the three battalions dispatched by the regimental commander 
and district governor arrived at the scene. Troops encircled the company, warned the 
remaining spectators to disperse, and called the insurgents to surrender, while firing 
their guns into the air.122 But Derviş was in absolute trance claiming invulnerability. 
Other insurgents were in a similar state as well. Although they saw the arrival of the 
armed troops, they did not give in and lay down their arms. Then the troops opened 
fire with their machine guns. Three of the insurgents, Derviş Mehmet, Şamdan 
Mehmet, and Sütçü Mehmet were killed. Mehmet Emin was wounded. Nalıncı Ha-
san and Küçük Hasan took the advantage of the disorder that erupted after gunshots, 
and fled.123  
                                                
118 Newspapers of the next day reported that Derviş said; “Drinking blood is forbidden in our 
religion, but it is halal to drink this blood," and then drank Kubilay’s blood. (Anadolu, De-
cember 24, 1930.) There was no reference to such an incident or words in any official report 
or court statement. We have to conclude that this news as well was fabricated. However, it 
found a place in later narratives, particularly in Kemalist accounts of the incident.  
119 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 15. 
120 Yet the precise time or conditions in which they engaged in combat with the insurgents 
and got shot are quite uncertain. They might have clashed with the insurgents before the ar-
rival of the regimental troops. It was also claimed by some writers that the two wardens were 
killed by the machine gun fire of the troops. No source supports this claim. The records indi-
cate that the troops warned the insurgents to surrender before starting the gunfire. Therefore 
it is quite impossible that the wardens would remain standing within the fire range of the di-
visions. 
121 Certain newspapers published news that Derviş cried to the crowd not to run away be-
cause the Messenger Mahdi was invulnerable and immortal. (Anadolu, December 24, 1930) 
Eyüp Öz, who believes this point, argues Derviş Mehmet relied on an amulet, which Ahmet 
Muhtar, an associate of the Nakşibendi order in Menemen had given him previously. (See 
Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 415.) There is no evidence to indicate the back-
ground of this amulet. Derviş was able to send away three officers who came to ask the 
crowd to disperse. He did the same with Kubilay’s troops. These incidents combined with 
the killing of Kubilay and two district wardens probably made him feel that he could succeed 
in taking hold of the town center. Furthermore, being under the influence of the hashish he 
smoked must have convinced him of his immortality. 
122 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 48. 
123 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 15. 
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1.3.5. On the heels of the Events in Menemen 
Some townspeople were wounded during gun shooting.124 Witnesses of the 
incident accounted that the law enforcement forces searched all the houses in the 
town center to capture the fugitives.125 The crime scene investigation team examined 
Kubilay’s dead body. Soldiers waited beside his blood in the square. Mehmet Emin 
was captured and immediately interrogated. As reported by the newspapers, he was 
talking nonsense when he was seized.126  
In the town center, machine guns remained to stay deployed all day. It indi-
cates that the armed forces were ordered to provide security in case of an offensive 
action. They stayed on alert against the rumor that Derviş had spread about the arri-
val of an army of 70,000 soldiers. Until they determined whether this was true in any 
measure, the officials maintained the safety. 
Menemen townspeople related with the incident may be divided into four 
categories. The first group consisted of the ones who solely stood still as spectators 
in the square. They neither participated in the activities of Derviş and his cohort nor 
helped them in any way. The second group assumed an appreciative attitude. They 
joined the people who gathered under the banner, took part in zikr performance, and 
applauded Derviş. Third, a small part of the crowd de facto helped the insurgents. 
One inhabitant guided the company through the neighborhoods. Another person dug 
the hole into which the banner was planted. Yet another gave cigarettes to insurgents. 
Also, a man brought rope to attach Kubilay’s head to the banner. Furthermore, two 
townspeople were charged with shooting during the actions.127 The ones on the side 
                                                
124 For the official records and some of the newspapers, merely one inhabitant was wounded. 
“Büyük Erkânı harbiye riyasetinin 26/12/930 tarihli ve 6747 nolu tezkeresi sureti,” Emniyet 
Genel Müdürlüğü, Polis Arşiv Belgeleriyle Gerçekler, 57; Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubi-
lay, 24; Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 25, 1930. According to some other newspapers, four 
people got wounded and taken under treatment. Anadolu, December 25, 1930. Kemal Üstün 
was a teacher and friend of Kubilay. He remarks that there were bullet holes on some walls 
and broken glass pieces in the square. This shows that troops may have fired the machine 
guns quiet randomly. 
125 Dündar, “Menemen’in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor.” 
126 Indicating his unconscious condition, he said his friends did not die and the Mahdi would 
be resurrected soon. He also said that they were like the prophet Ibrahim who was thrown in 
the fire and came back alive. Yeni Asır, December 24, 1930. 
127 According to a local researcher, at the time of the incident, there was a rifle in almost eve-
ry residence of Menemen for protection against wild animals and burglars. Oktay Özengin, 
Kubilay Olayı Tarihi: “40 Gün” (İzmir: Özengin Matbaası, 1996), 31. Still, the extent to 
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of the government may be categorized as the fourth group. As mentioned above, 
there were people who de facto acted against the insurgents. Post officer Nail Efendi 
served as a witness and expressed what he had seen during the events to government 
inspectors. He as well helped the gendarme officer to run away and informed them 
about the fleeing of two insurgents. An advocate clerk Mehmet Tevfik Efendi, in-
stantly reported the happenings to gendarme officers. Postmaster Hüseyin Sabri 
Efendi128 rushed to the home of the district governor to inform him of the develop-
ments as soon as he received Fahri Bey’s call. People from the first three groups 
were detained and put on trial.  
 
*** 
This chapter sought to filter the primary sources in order to present as accu-
rate a picture as possible. It provided details of actual events and developments to re-
construct a reliable narrative of the Menemen Incident. Activities of the perpetrators, 
on the hole, occurred in the ways expressed above. Additional actions attributed to 
the perpetrators and mentioned above when relevant are mostly fabricated and there-
fore misinformation. Misinformation about this incident spread to many narratives 
and evaluations made subsequently, beginning with the official statements and 
newspapers of the era. Furthermore, the supposed intentions and criminal behavior 
were attributed to people who were not on the scene in Menemen. The notables of 
the Nakşibendi order in particular were accused of inspiring the incident implicitly 
by inciting the perpetrators. A great part of the accounts of the incident defined it as 
a reactionary rebellion executed by a malicious organization. Others pointed to the 
opposition circles in general, and the former Free Republican Party, in particular as 
instigator of such acts.   
                                                                                                                                     
which the people in the square had their rifles with themselves is unknown. There were only 
two inhabitants charged with shooting their guns during the incident. 
128 Sabri Efendi was the father of Sabahat Erkal, who was a little girl at the time and gave an 
interview to Can Dündar many years later. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE OFFICIAL REFLECTIONS AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS  
OF THE MENEMEN INCIDENT 
This chapter investigates the general reactions of officers and the media ele-
ments displayed after the Menemen Incident. The event initiated quite a great im-
pulse and remained on the agenda until the judicial process was over. I begin with 
the meeting Mustafa Kemal held in İstanbul and Ankara with the RPP leaders. These 
meetings determined the court rulings. Namely, court verdicts had already been de-
cided at the very beginning of the legal proceedings. I will then discuss the govern-
ment’s condemnation of the event and its preparations for formal investigations. The 
establishment of the martial court and details of internal inquiries are among the sub-
ject matters of the chapter. These inquiries also signify the dimensions of the event. 
Newspaper reports on the incident are discussed in depth and grouped in accordance 
with the differences in their approach. In this regard, reflections discussed here will 
constitute a meaningful whole as to what the Menemen Incident meant for the Early 
Turkish Republic. 
 Official statements and pro-government newspapers, announced the incident 
as a serious and well-rounded revolt shortly after the event. For them, the perpetra-
tors aimed at overthrowing the republican regime as well as re-establishing the Cali-
phate order and a state upholding the sharia. Along with this prejudgment, much mis-
information about the actual happenings was published in these newspapers. Initial 
reactions to and representations of the event influenced the subsequent narrations of 
the event deeply and led to recursively recounted misinformation. 
2.1. Determination of the Government’s Stance in the Aftermath of the Incident  
This section discusses mainly the meeting held by Mustafa Kemal in the 
Çankaya Palace on 7 January 1931. In a previous meeting in Dolmabahçe on 2 Janu-
ary 1931, Mustafa Kemal met Şükrü Kaya and received detailed reports about the 
event as well as about sufi organizations in the western region of the country. The 
meeting of 7 January is significant since it determined the procedures and policies 
observed in the aftermath of the incident. Top government officials such as Prime 
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Minister İsmet (İnönü) Paşa, President of the Assembly Kazım (Özalp) Paşa, Interior 
Minister Şükrü (Kaya), Minister of National Defense Zeki (Apaydın) Bey, Chief of 
the General Staff Fevzi (Çakmak) Paşa, and Fahrettin (Altay) Paşa the Commander 
of Martial Law in the region attended the meeting held by the President of the Re-
public, Mustafa Kemal. How the judicial process would continue and be concluded 
were issues particularly addressed during the meeting. Moreover, the statements ex-
pressed in the gathering synoptically reflected what the event meant for the state 
from that day on. The meeting prejudged the incident officially as a collective action 
planned by a religious order. The main sources of the meeting in question are the 
notes of Fahrettin Paşa and Kazım (Özalp). In his memories, Fahrettin Paşa remarks 
that the content of the meeting was like instructions for him, and hence he wrote 
down the details carefully. 
Mustafa Kemal was unusually angry, nervous and upset about the Menemen 
Incident.129 He indicated the importance of investigating the background of the event 
and looking for political organizations behind it. He stressed that the investigation 
would aim at revealing whether it was politically motivated or not.130 He also stated 
his concern that if the former members of the Progressive Republican Party (Ter-
akkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) were involved in the event in any manner and for po-
litical interests.131 He further emphasized that the investigations should not be limited 
to the town of Menemen alone.132 
In the meeting, İsmet İnönü put forward the issue of the Free Republican Par-
ty, which had been closed down one and a half months before the event.133 He stated 
                                                
129 In his memoir, Özalp wrote that Mustafa Kemal would never forget about the event. 
Kazım Özalp and Teoman Özalp, Atatürk’ten Anılar (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları, 1992), 48. 
130 Taylan Sorgun, İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete: İmparatorluk, İttihat ve Terakki, Cum-
huriyet 1902-1938 Üç Devrin Galerisi: Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor (İstanbul: Kamer 
Yayınları, 1988), 434–5. 
131 Ibid. However as partly remarked in the previous chapter, when the course of events and 
the judicial process are examined, it is difficult to establish a substantial connection between 
the insurgents and political actors. 
132 Fahrettin Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş: 1912-1922 ve Sonrası (İstanbul: İnsel Yayınları, 1970), 
438. 
133 FRP was the second opposition party set up primarily by the instructions of Mustafa Ke-
mal. He expected Fethi Okyar to help take some tension off the political arena of the repub-
lic. Instead, the establishment of the party led to a rise of political tension, especially in the 
western regions of the country. In some places, in İzmir above all, people welcomed the new 
party with cheers and rendered it as “the savior” of the people from RPP. The political ten-
sion became so unbearable that the party abolished itself. 
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that a probable relationship between the insurgents and former members of FRP 
should be looked into.134 Such suspicion derived from a few substantial issues. For 
instance, during his trip in the Aegean region, Fethi Okyar visited Menemen and was 
welcomed with joy and acclamations.135 As soon as the party was established, the 
Menemen office was set up. Upon settling in the town center, FRP planned to expand 
into the villages and sought to open offices in districts as well.136 During the Munici-
pal Elections held on 14 October 1930, it was the FRP candidate who was elected to 
the mayorship of Menemen. Furthermore, Sami Özyılmaz, one of the witnesses of 
the event, mentioned that there had been rivalry among a few people in the town on 
the political party issue. This meant that members of FRP and RPP had been having 
quarrels, to some extent.137 This was the reason why İsmet İnönü brought forward 
the issue of FRP in the meeting. Since the day after the incident, there were newspa-
per articles and deputy statements accusing FRP implicitly or explicitly as being re-
sponsible for the eruption of such a reactionary event, occurred against the very ex-
istence of the republic. 
As recounted by Kazım Özalp, Mustafa Kemal was extremely angry about 
the people of Menemen. He was concerned for the matter that an officer of the army 
could be beheaded at the governmental square in the name of religion, and no one 
among the people would report anything to the officials.138 According to Mustafa 
Kemal, instead of preventing such an incident, the people of the town preferred to 
encourage the beheading by shouting Allahuekber.139 Mustafa Kemal, filled with an-
ger, asked where the appreciators had been during the Greek invasion and why they 
did not protest the Greeks. According to him, the townspeople believed that a ruth-
less attack on an officer of the army would save their honor and religion. Therefore, 
                                                
134 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 435. 
135 Hizmet, September 9, 1930 
136 Hizmet, September 22, 1930. 
137  Can Dündar, "Menemen'in Son Tanıkları Anlatıyor," (December 25, 2005), www. 
milliyet.com.tr/2005/12/25/yazar/dundar.html 
138 It seems that Mustafa Kemal was not aware that a few of the Menemen townspeople re-
ported the events to law enforcement officials, as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
139 Let me repeat that Kubilay was not beheaded on the square but in the courtyard of a cer-
tain mosque. Also there was not a crowd of thousands of people but about 200 people. 
Moreover, there probably was not anyone around when Derviş was cutting the head of Kubi-
lay in the courtyard. However there might have been some people who acted in an approving 
manner when he returned to the square with the head in his hand. Still, in the trials, the chief 
judge did not charge anyone with appreciating the beheading though he frequently drove the 
defendants into a corner. 
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not only the traitors who killed Kubilay, but also the townspeople ought to be pun-
ished severely. Mustafa Kemal emphasized that beheading an officer meant behead-
ing the republic itself. As the entire town was responsible for the rebellion in his 
mind, Menemen should be declared as Vilmodit.140 For Mustafa Kemal, the least 
guilty of the townspeople were the ones who stood as onlookers to the actions and 
would all be banished.141 He further stated that particular new laws should be imple-
mented to announce the accused towns and villages as uninhabitable.142 Villagers re-
ceived their share of verbal reactions in the meeting as well. For instance, İsmet Paşa 
mentioned that some of the villagers could dare to suggest to the insurgents to raid a 
certain gendarme station and take their guns in order to achieve their goals.143 
One major subject of the meeting was the Nakşibendi order. As mentioned 
above, Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya had been to the Dolmabahçe Palace on 2 Janu-
ary and filed a report for Mustafa Kemal. It was about the order’s operations in the 
country, its members, and intensive activities in the regions of İstanbul, İzmir, Mani-
sa, Alaşehir, Balıkesir and Antalya.144 During the Çankaya meeting, Mustafa Kemal 
stressed that the order had many disciples in the country,145 and while not all of them 
could be harmful, the prominent ones were dangerous and able to cause much harm. 
Members in the locations where the order was active must be scattered and eliminat-
ed.146 Some unrealistic and extreme words were uttered in the meeting as well. For 
instance, Kazım (Özalp) defined the Nakşibendi order as a political institution that 
                                                
140 Özalp and Özalp, Atatürk’ten Anılar, 47–8. In its French origin, the word ville maudite 
meant the punished city. If a city or town were declared as “Vilmodit,” all families who lived 
there would be one by one exiled to other cities and the city set afire entirely. To make an 
example of it all, a huge black column would be planted in the city square. Taking Mustafa 
Kemal’s overreaction into consideration, others neither objected immediately to this idea nor 
accepted it. They opted to appease him and suggested to wait for the official reports. Though 
in the end of the meeting Mustafa Kemal was still quiet angry, the idea of making Menemen 
a “Vilmodit” did not recur. 
141 Sorgun, Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor, 434–5. 
142 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 438. 
143 Ibid., 434. 
144 Cumhuriyet, January 3, 1931. The title of the report: “Menemen’deki irtica hareketi ile 
birlikte ülkedeki tarikatlar ve bunların mensupları ve bu tarikatların İstanbul, İzmir, Manisa, 
Alaşehir, Balıkesir ve Antalya’da yoğun faaliyetleri.”  
145 Sorgun, Fahrettin Altay Paşa Anlatıyor, 434–5. Laz İbrahim was one of the alleged plan-
ners of the incident and also a prominent member of the order. He was detained and interro-
gated by the investigating magistrate. As recorded in the archives of the Turkish General 
Staff, he stressed that before the abolishment of the dervish lodges, Şeyh Esat had approxi-
mately 20,000 disciples. ATASE Arşivi, CDİ Koleksiyonu; Kls.: 135; D.:1; F.:2-272/273. 
146 Altay, 10 Yıl Savaş, 438. 
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incited all former revolts. To him, Abdülhamit II was also a member of this order. 
Furthermore, Şükrü (Kaya) recounted that the protagonists of the 31 March Incident 
were associates of order as well. Kazım Özalp defined the Nakşibendi order as a vi-
cious snake, which had to be exterminated. To him, dervish lodges should either be 
transformed into public schools or be set on fire.147 Mustafa Kemal expressed similar 
thoughts. He stated that women disciples of the order should not be tolerated. “All 
administrators of the state must know that this order must be annihilated. There must 
remain no qutb148 or qutbu’l-aktab (leader of leaders).”149 
One other issue dealt with during the meeting was the oppositional press. 
Mustafa Kemal expressed that such newspapers as Son Posta and Yarın were used to 
publishing any sort of negative materials that aimed to poison the public opinion. 
They sought to cause damage to the government as much as they could and made 
every effort to overthrow it. Mustafa Kemal expressed that these newspapers created 
and incited the impression that “the government was not something to be feared 
of.”150 “Therefore, the responsible managers of these newspapers must be court-
martialed.”151 According to the president, the journalists in question must thus be 
taught a lesson, showing them that what they had been doing so far had nothing to do 
with the freedom of press.152 
The procedures of the martial court were also addressed in the meeting. Mus-
tafa Kemal stated that the martial court must be able to decide the forced migration 
of the townspeople of Menemen.153 He also introduced a new criminal code impos-
ing heavy penalties to the sheikhs and their disciples who were found guilty of the 
charge of regularly practicing the order’s ritualistic activities.154 Kazım Paşa pointed 
out that the court should decide that the Nakşibendi order was a political organiza-
tion and the activities it maintained after the abolishment of dervish lodges were a 
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reactionary conduct. The sheikhs of the order should gradually be taken to court.155 It 
was also decided that the capital punishments decided by the court ought to be con-
firmed by the National Assembly.156 Mustafa Kemal urged that the martial court 
should act quickly. For him, particularly the ones who received the death penalty 
should be executed immediately.157 Other detainees who were sentenced to different 
punishments would also be penalized one by one, rather than leaving all to the 
end.158 Finally, Mustafa Kemal gave directions for the trials to take place in public.  
He also indicated that some closed sessions may be arranged if considered necessary. 
In brief, subject matters of the meeting were the Nakşibendi order, the towns-
people of Menemen, villagers of that area, issues related to the already closed FRP, 
and the opposition press. The meeting was held on 7 January 1931, two weeks after 
the incident. Remarks expressed in the meeting correspond to the earlier official ac-
counts and newspaper reports as well as to the subsequent statements of administra-
tive officials. It was in this meeting that the course of the subsequent judicial process 
was decided. The martial court reached verdicts as indicated by the attendants of the 
meeting. 
2.2. Official Assessments  
This section presents the initial official reactions to the event. In its discourse 
and de facto actions, the state administrators responded harshly to the event. The 
most prominent feature of the event was that it received public appreciation, alt-
hough to a small extent. Therefore, the common element of government officials was 
the condemnation of the people of Menemen. The remarks of the administrators, in-
cluding İsmet İnönü, in the aftermath of the incident involved also criticism and ac-
cusation of the former FRP for encouraging reactionary elements to dare to under-
take such a rebellion against the republic. The opposition press as well received their 
share of criticism. According to the Republican People’s Party leader and deputies, 
these journalists attempted to overthrow the government through constant fault-
finding in its conduct. By doing so, they instigated the enemies of the republic to riot. 
Officials who were on duty during the events in Menemen were also criticized. To 
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some, law enforcement forces of Menemen were responsible for the development of 
the events that culminated in the brutal murder of Kubilay. Some official accounts 
drafted after the events involved misinformation. Thus, in the very early days after 
the event, it was declared that what happened in Menemen was a planned attack 
against the very existence of the state. However, virtually all accounts agreed in ex-
tolling the republic and the emphasizing on the state’s eternity. 
The funeral ceremony of Kubilay and the two district wardens took place on 
24 December 1930. Newspapers reported that thousands of people attended the cer-
emony. Members of the Türk Ocakları offices of Menemen and İzmir, the deputies 
and the governor of İzmir, associates of teaching school, military and civil officials 
of Menemen and nearby districts, and students in Menemen constituted the crowd 
during the ceremony. Many wreaths were sent to the funeral as well. Three funeral 
prayers were performed for each of the martyrs. Kubilay was buried in his uniform, 
which was still bloody.159  
The first account condemning the public attitude was the Governor of İzmir 
Kazım Bey’s report of 24 December 1930 written to the Ministry of the Interior. 
Kazım Bey indicated some of the townspeople were watching during the murder of 
Kubilay, which was by itself a cause of misery.160 When the Minister of Internal Af-
fairs Şükrü Bey and the Commander of Martial Rule in the region, Fahrettin Paşa, 
arrived at Menemen on 28 December, they went to the cemetery straight away. At 
the graveside of Kubilay, Şükrü Bey stressed that the most grievous aspect of the 
event was that, several people among the public appeared undisturbed, approving 
and even encouraging in the face of such a disastrous murder of an officer.161  
Mustafa Kemal, in his letter of 28 December, offered his condolences to the 
Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces Fevzi Paşa. He underlined that it was a 
shameful situation for all republicans and patriots that in the presence of such reac-
tionary ferocity, some inhabitants acted in a confirmatory manner by clapping 
hands.162 In his speech in the parliament, Prime Minister İsmet Paşa stated that the 
striking point in the initial reports about the event was the people watched the devel-
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opments carelessly at the square. He remarked that some of them were even affirma-
tive. İsmet Paşa added that during this action that defied the law, summoning the mil-
itary force was the last option. Although Kubilay’s vocational responsibility by his 
position was to use his gun in the first place, he, a young man in his twenties, ap-
pealed to the people to bring them to their senses and to end the rebellion without re-
sort to violent measures. What he received in return for his nobility was in no terms 
acceptable. İsmet Paşa asked to what extent could that neighborhood be poisoned so 
as to have been deprived of their senses. Inhabitants watching the scene in cold blood 
was in itself utterly intolerable.163 Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey, current independent deputy 
and former magnate of the FRP, also drew attention to the nonreactive public. To 
him, this was a tragic and vulgar mental attitude, and when he first heard of it, he 
would have liked to curl up and die out of embarrassment.164 Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey in 
his parliament speech said that the idea of republic itself was a religion from top to 
bottom. This religion, this faith meant to have a sacred book, a type of praying, and 
believers. There was supposed to be men working day and night to disseminate the 
virtues of the republic in order to educate ignorant communities. For Ağaoğlu, the 
pioneers of the republic had failed in fulfilling this responsibility. If they admitted 
this failure as their share of the sin in the spiritual presence of the martyr, if they 
awoke and carried out their duties, Kubilay’s holy blood would not be wasted. If the 
intellectuals of the country came to the government’s help, only then the measures of 
the state would be able to have an impact. Otherwise, the enemy of the republic, the 
giant (reactionary elements in general) had forty thousand heads and when one was 
cut, another one would emerge. The main point was to kill the sinister giant itself.165  
Although Ağaoğlu made speech against reactionism, it triggered discussion, 
which was likely to erupt soon. Ali Saip Bey, a deputy of the RPP, asked Ağaoğlu to 
beg for the forgiveness of the nation from the platform of the parliament. For Ali 
Saip, Ağaoğlu was wrong when he said they were all responsible for what happened. 
He remarked that three months earlier, Ağaoğlu travelled to Menemen where he was 
welcomed with the same banner on which Kubilay’s head was attached later.166 Al-
most all members of the parliament were RPP deputies and already accusing the 
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former FRP of instigating reactionism. For them, the presence of FRP heartened the 
puritans who were eager to get into action to subvert the republican regime. FRP was 
considered politically responsible for the rise of the reactionaries from the grave and 
providing them with a political sphere to work toward their goals. However, there 
was neither explicit nor implicit connection between associates of the former FRP 
and the agents of the Menemen Incident. 
In his speech in the parliament, İsmet Paşa also claimed that the perpetrators 
of the Menemen Incident could act such defiantly because they assumed a weakness 
in government. “They had this impression because of the irresponsible and exagger-
ated criticisms directed against the government.”167 For İsmet Paşa, the incident was 
nothing short of using religion as an instrument of politics.168 
Officials on duty during the events in Menemen became targets of politicians. 
The Governor of İzmir Kazım Bey, mentioned in his first report to the Ministry of 
Interior that they were investigating the reason why the troops under Kubilay’s 
command withdrew. They were looking into whether they feared and fled in a rush 
or were confused due to becoming leaderless.169 İsmet Paşa, again in his parliament 
speech, stressed that the citizens and law enforcement agencies were supposed to 
know clearly the conditions under which military forces should be summoned and 
what their missions involved in such cases. He asserted that military intervention 
should be sought as a last resort in the case of internal threats to public security.170 
RPP deputy Mazhar Müfit Bey in his parliament speech, also accused law enforce-
ment forces and city officials for not taking the necessary steps in the face of the de-
velopments.171 
Official interpretations of the event in its aftermath involved misinformation 
as well. For instance, while evaluating the Menemen Incident in the assembly, Ma-
zhar Müfit reported that it took the rebels twenty minutes to cut Kubilay’s head off 
with a blunt knife. Witnessing the event, thousands of townspeople kept their silence. 
Müfit Bey said one could assume they were terrified, but there was no defense for 
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their appreciative applause of the beheading.172 Ağaoğlu Ahmet stated Kubilay’s be-
heading took twenty minutes without any outside intervention.173 However, as re-
marked in previous sections, there was no record indicating how many of the towns-
people were there, watching the beheading of Kubilay by Derviş at the mosque 
courtyard. It is true that some of the public applauded particularly when Derviş 
chased away the gendarme officers and the commander. Still, the extent to which 
townspeople welcomed Derviş when he beheaded Kubilay and brought his head to 
the square, is unknown. Moreover, the doctor’s report clearly stated that the knife 
Derviş used for the beheading was sharp. Exaggeration of the actions by adding mis-
information served to increase the reactions to the event and left the impression that 
the enemies of the republic could become furious. 
Along with the disinformation, the prejudiced belief that the incident was not 
of a small scale became considerably pervasive. Thus the belief that the event was 
the initiation of a planned overthrowing of the government by a religious organiza-
tion. The first official account, drawing a frame for the background of the event was 
Kazım Bey’s second report to İzmir dated 25 December. In the report, he marked the 
Nakşibendi order to have backed up the reactionaries. Derviş Mehmet, who an-
nounced himself as the Mahdi, had been under the influence of and encouraged by 
certain leaders of the order in Manisa, such as Şeyh Hafız Hasan, Şeyh Hacı Hakkı 
and Hacı Hilmi Efendi.174 That is to say, Kazım Bey’s report was a pioneer that 
shaped the following official accounts.  
As can be understood from the following process of the incident, Mehmet 
Emin was interrogated as soon as he regained his consciousness. He must have re-
counted the names he had known from earlier times related to the event. The issue of 
group members having been smoking hashish was also mentioned in the report. 
Kazım Bey accounted that all of the perpetrators were in possession of hashish. 
Derviş Mehmet had the habit of giving hashish to his disciples in Manisa and had 
been increasing his influence over them this way.175 
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One of the initial reports that was congruent with Kazım Bey’s statement was 
that of Mustafa Muğlalı Paşa, the commander of the Second Corps. In his military 
report written on 26 December, he indicated that the Menemen Incident was not a 
movement of “six punks.” For Muğlalı, it was apparent that a number of traitors pro-
voked the reactionaries of Menemen.176 
Mustafa Kemal, in light of the initial information from the scene of the inci-
dent, touched upon the essence of the event in his letter of condolences. For him, the 
nation regarded the outrage to the young and heroic soldier, as a conspiracy against 
the Republic itself.177 The same assessment of the incident was verbalized in the Na-
tional Assembly of Turkey as well. İsmet Paşa, in his speech on 1 January 1931, re-
marked that the reports from the region in question were being examined. For İsmet 
Paşa, reports indicated the event to be a reactionist and savage incident. The issue 
they were facing was an attempt against the very existence of the republic.178 For İs-
met Paşa, investigations demonstrated that the perpetrators had previously gone to 
Menemen to explore it and in this way they were able to plan their rebellion. This 
was not an impromptu attempt undertaken by three-four men, but one organized in 
Manisa in the last three months. There had been meetings in Manisa after the act of 
rebellion was decided. Moreover, İsmet Paşa accounted, there had been many goings 
back and forth between big cities in the preparation process. Furthermore, there were 
collaborators in Menemen who waited for the arrival of the rebels in order to provide 
them with assistance.179 
Many of İsmet Paşa’s statements were inaccurate. Statements of the perpetra-
tors in the court did not involve anything about a former exploration of Menemen. 
Derviş did not tell them they would go to Menemen before leaving Manisa.180 The 
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aforementioned travels between big cities referred to the visits made to Şeyh Esat’s 
home in İstanbul. One of the three perpetrators in the court accounted that he stayed 
at Esat’s house and he mentioned that there had been talks, though he himself was 
not included. He alleged that the republican state was criticized in these talks. But no 
substantial connection was constituted between the talk and Derviş, his intentions, or 
the Menemen Incident. Moreover, there was no one waiting for the group to arrive in 
Menemen. Not a single person was charged with this in the court. For İsmet Paşa, 
when the initiation failed in Menemen, the situation in other regions remained hid-
den. Here he implicated that the Nakşibendi order organized a nationwide rebellion, 
and was suggesting that while no such movement occurred in other areas, this did not 
mean there would not be upcoming events. The state officers had not uncovered the 
other actors who were supposed to start the riots in other districts as of yet.181  
When Mazhar Müfit Bey took the floor in the assembly to speak for the RPP 
group, he said they were convinced of İsmet Paşa’s statement that the Menemen In-
cident was a large-scale and prearranged movement.182 In a petition given to the 
speakership of the parliament, RPP deputies named the Menemen Incident as a direct 
conspiracy against the republic itself. For them, the treatment to which the heroic of-
ficer was subjected proved that this was not an act of a few bandits and hashish ad-
dicts but an organized and far-reaching movement.183 Interior Minister Şükrü (Kaya) 
Bey prepared a report about the event upon his arrival at Menemen and investiga-
tions. He initially indicated that the event occurred locally and did not pervade to 
other regions. The substance of the event, however, was extensive in his opinion. 
Fellows of the order in Turkey gave their support to the event in such a way that a 
multitude of men from a lot of cities had become associated with the events. The in-
cident was “the result of the greed of some ill-minded people.”184 Thus, Şükrü Bey’s 
report is quite ambiguous in terms of defining the extent of the event. This might be 
due to the lack of substantial evidence to depict the incident as wide-ranging. 
                                                
181 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 4. 
182 Ibid., 7. 
183 Ibid., 2–3. Deputies of the parliament made these expressions on 1 January 1931. As seen 
above, these inferences regarding the essence of the event derived from İsmet Paşa’s state-
ments. İsmet Paşa himself, predicated his conclusions on the reports written by state inspec-
tors sent to Menemen. However, these reports were based not on substantial evidence but ra-
ther the words of the captured perpetrator Mehmet Emin. 
184 Vakit, January 3, 1931. 
 47 
As soon as the nature of the incident was declared as a well-rounded organi-
zation planned by a religious order targeting the very existence of the republic, depu-
ties expressed their severe condemnations. They stressed their absolute loyalty to the 
republican principles in impassioned enthusiasm. Reactionism was presented as the 
ultimate internal enemy of the republic. The fight against it would continue with de-
termination. Within the general political atmosphere, as previously remarked, the 
opposition press and the former FRP were regarded as responsible for encouraging 
the reactionists and for favoring the adoption of antagonistic attitudes against the re-
public. For instance, RPP deputy Ali Saip Bey stated that the newspapers opposing 
the regime were sold for a price ten times higher than the ones supporting it. For Saip 
Bey, the perpetrators of the Menemen Incident gave rise to the 31 March Incident as 
well. He further alleged that they waged war against the republicanists during the 
war of independence. They were responsible for the Şeyh Said Rebellion also. Once 
again, the same enemies now brought Derviş Mehmet forward against the republic in 
Menemen.185 
Political agents of the early republican period often stated that the nation 
would prevail despite many antagonisms. For them, no trouble could discourage or 
frustrate the progress of the nation under republican regime. Moreover, any problem 
the nation had would contribute to the betterment of the republic. Mustafa Kemal, 
this way, emphasized in his letter of condolences that the pure blood of the protago-
nist young soldier Kubilay, an element of the community of idealist teachers, would 
strengthen and intensify the vitality of the republic.186 In the parliament, Mazhar 
Müfit addressed the “damned force.”187 He stressed that the army, which provided a 
new homeland for them, had always been and would permanently be the guardian of 
the republic and the reforms. He asked the deputies in the parliament not to worry 
because honorable souls would rest in peace. The republic and the reforms were Ku-
bilay’s ideals and no one would be able to hinder them. These principles would be 
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preserved continuously. For him, the Turkish youth included thousands of Kubilays 
who were determined to constantly choke and crush the “black snake” and prevent it 
from poisoning its environment.188 
The official accounts expressed after the occurrence of the event correspond-
ed to many of the newspaper reports. The event was announced as a planned rebel-
lion, designed by the Nakşibendi order and therefore detailed investigations had to be 
executed in the first place. As it is discussed in another section of this chapter, con-
tradictions arose between the partisan press and the opposition newspapers. The 
Menemen Incident was not the only issue of dispute for the newspapers. The political 
atmosphere of the country had already tension lines and the press reflected this situa-
tion. As official statements demonstrated, internal investigations were on the way. 
Not only the perpetrators and their explicit and implicit supporters would be arrested, 
but also the state officers would be interrogated to detect and punish whoever did not 
perform his duties properly and promptly. 
2.3. Proclaim of the Martial Law 
Before the enactment of martial law, the Council of Ministers submitted a 
law for the preservation of reforms (inkılabı koruma kanunu) to the Turkish National 
Assembly for approval. The code gave exceptional powers to the government in the 
case of such reactionist movements. The law authorized the government to constitute 
an emergency court or to assign an established court to hear a specific case. Verbal 
and actual interference with the republican reforms would be severely punished. The 
government would be at liberty to take extraordinary measures for the duration it 
deemed appropriate in the event of attacks against the reforms.189 
After the aforementioned speeches took place, the deputies voted for the dec-
laration of state of emergency in Menemen and putting it under martial law on 1 Jan-
uary 1931. The draft of this decision was prepared by the Council of Ministers and 
undersigned by the Prime Minister İsmet Paşa. The draft remarked that the council 
took the preparation phase of the incident into consideration and determined that it 
was a far-reaching organizational act against the republic. It was thus decided to put 
the town of Menemen and the cities of Manisa and Balıkesir under state of siege for 
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one month. Along with the approval of the parliament, martial law went into effect in 
these places as of 1 January. 
Although the state of emergency was approved by the parliament on 1 Janu-
ary, the executive order was announced on 7 January. After the martial law went into 
effect, all civilian officials in the involved regions delegated their duties and authori-
ty to the military.190 Martial law rules imposed a curfew from 08:00 PM. to 07:00 
AM.191 when no one could be outside except the security forces. If someone was 
seen he would be warned immediately, and executed by a firing squad if he diso-
beyed the firing.192 Every workplace had to be shut down before 08:00 PM. All in-
habitants would deliver their weapons to the officials. Defiant ones would be pun-
ished.193 Hunting was prohibited.194 People could go to Menemen only with the cour-
tesy of a credential taken from the district governorate, with the photo of the person 
on the document. Leaving the town required the same permit. Identities would be 
controlled at the train station.195 The post office was closed down. Letters were sub-
ject to censorship. Any letter had to be short and delivered to the officer unclosed. 
They had to be written in Turkish, using other languages in letters was forbidden. 
The writings would be plain and could not be encoded. Legal actions would be taken 
about anyone who would not conform to the instructions. All gatherings and celebra-
tions were prohibited, including circumcision feasts, weddings, birth celebrations 
etc.196 All directives were publically announced.197 
2.4. Internal Inquires 
Under the stunning effect of the incident, not only the perpetrators and their 
supporters, but also the state personnel, both civilian and military, related with the 
event, charged with inattentiveness began to be interrogated. These officials included 
mainly those from the municipal police of Manisa, Governorship of Manisa, District 
Governorate of Menemen, Gendarme Commander of Menemen, and the soldiers of 
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Kubilay’s battalion. Internal and external investigations began amid politicians’ grim 
talk and condemnations of the Menemen Incident.  
The first detailed official report indicating the negligence of state officers and 
soldiers was written by the Deputy Commander of First Corps Mustafa Muğlalı 
Paşa198 on 26 December in detail. He was appointed by the Headquarters of the Gen-
eral Staff. This report recounted all officers who were supposed to execute their du-
ties in a much more responsible way than they actually did. All officers mentioned in 
the report under this charge had to be interrogated and punished in various forms. 
Muğlalı Paşa stressed that the evildoer insurgents initially came to public sight in 
Manisa. They regularly met in a coffeehouse of hashish-addicts and turned that place 
into a dervish lodge. Recently, they had grown beards and adopted an utterly suspi-
cious appearance. Muğlalı Paşa mentioned that the municipal police of Manisa had 
been aware of this situation. Rebels’ immediate disappearance from Manisa was de-
nounced by a family member of one of them. Even so, the Governorship of Manisa 
did not take any action against the group. The governor’s office neither informed the 
nearby towns about the insurgents nor investigated whether they were organized in 
Manisa and outside. The situation was thus left to chance. None of the public au-
thorities were aware of what went on in the adjacent regions and Derviş Mehmet’s 
and his gang’s inculcations to villagers for fifteen days.199 The district administrators 
in Menemen were in no way aware of the armed group’s arrival at Menemen, their 
morning prayer performance, their leaving the mosque with a banner in their hands 
along with few of the townspeople, and their arrival in front of the government of-
fice. The district governor of Menemen came to the government office only after it 
was surrounded by soldiers. Until then, he was a mere spectator. Muğlalı Paşa’s 
statements about the gendarme commander were quite insulting. He described him to 
be “womanly,” hiding in his office with four privates while one of his fellow soldiers 
was being butchered.200 Muğlalı also condemned the soldiers of Kubilay’s unit for 
leaving their commander and running away while bandits slaughtered him. “Due to 
their cowardice, those soldiers should instantly be sent away from Menemen to other 
regiments. Starting a legal process about their misconduct is also necessary.”201 
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The deputies in the parliament as well criticized those who breached their du-
ties were acutely. For instance, Mazhar Müfit Bey questioned, “Where have our ci-
vilian administrators been in the preparation phase? Were not there a governor, mu-
nicipal and city polices, a gendarme commander?”202 Local civil servants were to be 
treated as required by the applicable legislation for failing to carry out their duties. 
The newspapers as well addressed this issue. For instance, a reporter from Yeni Asır, 
İsmail Hakkı Bey, asserted that the gendarme commander of Menemen was not 
aware of his responsibilities. This situation gave six punks the opportunity to per-
form malicious acts in the middle of the town for five or six hours.203 This plain case 
of incompetent management required substantial investigation. For İsmail Hakkı, 
such improvidence might have culminated in more disastrous consequences.204 The 
same newspaper questioned, “Were not there any other bullets in the rifles of the bat-
talion except plastic ones?”205  
In the same manner as in Mustafa Paşa’s report, the newspapers severely crit-
icized the Gendarme Commander Fahri Bey and, to a lesser extent, the District Gov-
ernor Cevdet Bey. Fahri Bey was defined to be a mere spectator of the insurgents’ 
activities. It was further alleged that when the privates with him in the building 
wished to commence fire on the rebels, he prevented them by saying “This is not a 
matter for you to decide.”206 Vakit’s columnist Mehmet Asım Bey expressed that 
subsequent support force “fortunately” caught up and banished the reactionists. Oth-
erwise, the cowardice of the qaimaqam (district governor) and the commander would 
undoubtedly have cost the nation more heavily, according to Asım Bey. “The negli-
gence of civil servants and gendarmes in the face of such reactionism was incompa-
rable to anything else. The qaimaqam and the commander’s failure to act against the 
rebels’ felonious deeds made not much difference than directly obeying Derviş.”207 
                                                
202 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 6. 
203 From the group’s entrance to the mosque to the firing of machine guns, there elapsed a 
maximum of three hours. The events did not take place as long as it was asserted by İsmail 
Hakkı Bey. 
204 Yeni Asır, December 26, 1930. 
205 Yeni Asır, December 30, 1930. However, this question reflects a misinformation, rather 
than a criticism. As indicated earlier, the soldiers under Kubilay’s command ran away with-
out any shooting because they did not have bullets of any kind in their rifles. 
206 Vakit, December 31, 1930; Hakimiyeti Milliye, December 29, 1930. Fahri Bey’s alleged 
saying in Turkish: “Bu sizin bileceğiniz bir iş değildir.” 
207 Vakit, December 31, Aralık 1930. 
 52 
After the Interior Minister Şükrü Bey and the Commander of the Martial Law 
Regions arrived at Menemen, they examined the scene of the incident. Then, they 
went to the state house and interrogated Fahri Bey and Cevdet Bey. Then, Fahri Bey 
was arrested for not executing his duty.208 Cevdet Bey was regarded as negligent of 
his responsibilities in the course of the event and was moved to the central office of 
the ministry.209 Baha Bey, the District Governor of Urla, was temporarily appointed 
to Menemen.210 Some rumors spread among the press as well that the Governors of 
İzmir and Manisa might be dismissed. There were further allegations that the  prose-
cution of the Governor of Manisa was about to begin.211  
After inquiries were made about Fahri Bey, he was released. Still, his file was 
sent to the martial court.212 After the martial court pronounced rulings regarding the 
detainees of the Menemen Incident, it heard the cases of the state officers who were 
charged with negligence of duty. In the court, Fahri Bey stated that he waited in the 
building so as to take precautions and protect the state offices. Besides, he stressed 
that he had informed the regimental commander of the happenings immediately. As 
for Cevdet Bey, he stated that he went to the regimental headquarters and ordered 
them to send soldiers to the scene of the incident. Thereon in the court, he began to 
cry by saying he had been appointed to Menemen just recently and was not familiar 
with any one.213 The regiment guard officer Mehmet Ali Efendi, who was sent by 
Fahri Bey to meet Kubilay’s battalion, was also put on trial. The court appealed to 
the testimony of the deputy commander of the Menemen regiment Major Şefik Bey 
about the details of the incident.214 The sergeants, captains and corporals of Kubi-
lay’s platoon were charged too, for having left their commander behind and escaped. 
They were expelled from Menemen, and relocated somewhere else. The Martial 
Court of Menemen determined that the trials of Mehmet Ali Efendi and Fahri Bey 
had to be conducted by a superior military court since their crimes were in the cate-
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gory of military offence.215 Court files of the two officers were sent to the military 
court of the First Army Corps.216 
Another group of officers put on trial by the martial court included the gen-
darmes of Manisa. Officer Hamdi and Platoon Commander Lieutenant Kemal were 
charged with dereliction of duty regarding their conduct when they heard about 
Derviş’s departure. Lieutenant Kemal was accused of not paying attention to and tak-
ing legal action about Küçük Hasan’s joining of Derviş Mehmet and others, though 
he had been informed about it. Küçük Hasan’s father Bedevioğlu Ali Ağa and his en-
tourage were called to the court. It was understood that Küçük Hasan’s father, along 
with few friends, went to the gendarme station in Manisa fifteen days prior to the 
Menemen Incident to report his son’s leaving the city with others. Ali Ağa had re-
ported to officer Hamdi and explained clearly the details of the circumstances and 
requested the officers to save his son. According to the newspapers, Ali Ağa had also 
explained the group’s political intentions to officer Hamdi. Hamdi Efendi, in front of 
Bedevi Ali Ağa and his companions, phoned Lieutenant Kemal and clarified the sit-
uation.217 Officer Hamdi was being charged for not applying to a higher authority 
and not reporting the situation to another superior unit, and thus not stopping at the 
outset a development that caused such damage to the state.218 However, when Bedevi 
Ağa and others testified about Hamdi’s phone call to Kemal Bey, the court ruled that 
he performed his duties and released Hamdi. As for Kemal Bey, he was sentenced to 
imprisonment of three months and suspension from state service for his carelessness 
and misconduct.219 
The aforementioned officers charged with neglect and misconduct were treat-
ed tightly in the course of interrogation and trials. This situation, too, indicates the 
seriousness of the issue and the tense mood that emerged after the incident. So to 
say, the state brought its officers to account for their misconduct both in the days 
leading to the incident and when it occurred. 
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2.5. Newspaper Reports 
National and local newspapers gave considerable space to the Menemen Inci-
dent starting as early as the day after it occurred. All the internal and external inves-
tigations and detentions had widespread media coverage. Including the executions of 
the penalties and judicial processes, all developments were followed and represented 
on a daily basis. This way, the incident and its aftermath were kept on the agenda. 
There was one distinct uniformity in the newspapers, coverage of the incident. All of 
the press reported the event as a reactionist movement bearing religious goals and 
condemned it for this. Apart from this overall label and unanimous condemnation, 
there were sharp contrasts in the presentation of the details of the event. The press 
displayed great disintegration and tension particularly when regarding the back-
ground and context of the incident. A major part of the press promoted and echoed 
the official statements. They described the incident as a preplanned action imple-
mented by an organization that aimed at overthrowing the republic. This study refers 
to this press, which echoed the government as “officially-biased.” A minor fragment 
of newspapers, which were already known for their oppositional stance, defined the 
event as “not that big of a deal”. This study defines the newspapers of this sort of 
content as “counter-official.” The reactions of the newspapers to the event corre-
sponded to the political atmosphere. In other words, the tension of the political arena 
was represented in the contradictions of the newspapers’ coverage of the Menemen 
Incident. Some information the newspapers conveyed was true, while others were 
apparently false. A part of the newspapers reported information which can not be 
confirmed or falsified because their sources remain unknown or unverifiable. 
2.5.1. Officially-Biased Newspapers 
The officially-biased newspapers, along with official statements, harshly crit-
icized the townspeople who were at the square at the time of the incident. For Ha-
kimiyeti Milliye, the citizens of a contemporaneous and secular republic watching the 
events so motionlessly was the true catastrophe about the Menemen Incident.220 It 
was shameful that Menemen’s townspeople stood there without reaction as if they 
were looking at a table while bandits beheaded a young soldier and displayed his 
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head by attaching it to a banner.221 Had the people of Menemen born civic ethical 
values, they would have prevented the occurrence of the incident.222 Such civic so-
cial consciousness had not developed among them. They did not consider the fact 
that the public itself may have had a set of liabilities and duties of their own. There-
fore, they held that Turkish revolutionists must direct all their efforts to teach the 
public to nurture civic moral values of which the people were deprived.223 Newspa-
per Vakit defined the townspeople’s applause as disgusting. Whoever acclaimed the 
unprecedented homicide would be revealed one by one and be spat on the face.224 
For Cumhuriyet, there was no difference between applauding that ferocity and de 
facto participating in it.225 Akşam named Menemen “the land of the cursed.”226 
Misinformation about the activities that happened in Menemen appeared par-
ticularly in officially-biased newspapers. Hakimiyeti Milliye asserted that when 
Derviş Mehmet and his group approached Menemen, they met with someone outside 
the town and proceeded to subsequent actions. They also had supporters in the town. 
They arranged the banner inside the mosque earlier. In Menemen, Derviş went to the 
home of “a sheikh” and had a talk with him.227 However, according to the statements 
of the perpetrators and official records, the group did not meet with any one outside 
the town. There was no assistant waiting for them inside the town either. The afore-
mentioned sheikh was Saffet Hoca and he did not talk with Derviş, though they met 
in the town. He merely went to his home and did not leave it after then. For the same 
paper, Kubilay’s beheading for twenty minutes in front of the eyes of the townspeo-
ple.228 Again, twenty minutes was not the correct time period of Kubilay’s murder. 
As discussed in the first chapter, Kubilay could move away from the square after get-
ting shot and then fell in the courtyard of a mosque. He waited there for some time. 
After a while, Derviş Mehmet and Derviş Mehmet came there and cut his head off. 
The knife was sharp and there was definitely no evidence as to indicate that his be-
heading took twenty minutes. Instead, twenty minutes was the time between Kubi-
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lay’s getting shot and Derviş’s bringing his head to the square. As for the people 
watching his murder, the only official report that gave this information was written 
by Muğlalı Paşa. However, as will be shown in the following chapter, Mustafa Paşa 
himself did not charge someone with acclaiming the beheading of Kubilay in the 
court, although he frequently gave the detainees a hard time.  
Another fabricated fact was the part about the drinking of Kubilay’s blood. 
Hakimiyeti Milliye and Cumhuriyet stated that after Derviş murdered Kubilay, he 
cried out “although drinking blood is forbidden by the religion, the blood of Kubilay 
is lawful” for him since he had killed on behalf of religion and became deserving of 
heaven. Thereon Derviş is asserted to have drank Kubilay’s blood.229 This has been 
one of the most fictive information regarding the actions in Menemen. No official 
report involved this information, nor did any perpetrator account for such story. Still, 
for the sake of exaggeration as to what extent those crazed reactionists had been, this 
sort of disinformation was given space in newspapers. 
According to some periodicals, after he was seized, Mehmet Emin stated they 
would not burn in fire but that they would return from it as did prophet İbrahim.230 
As for Anadolu, Mehmet Emin asserted that his friends were not dead and would be 
resurrected at night. Moreover, he was also alleged to have said that the world would 
be falling apart that night. He told the officials to bring the mufti of Menemen to 
whom he would confess everything. It was reported that although the mufti came, 
Mehmet Emin talked nonsense and summoned him to religion.231 Indeed, it is quite 
impossible to determine whether Mehmet Emin told such things when he was cap-
tured. No official report refers to these statements and they did not come up during 
the court process either. Consequently, we can consider them a fabrication. However, 
because the members of the group had been smoking substances, they were not 
sound-minded in general, and Mehmet Emin might have talked such absurdly for this 
reason. The most significant point here is the newspapers’ treatment of the subject. 
For Milliyet, Mehmet Emin’s presumed statements indicated their dedication to what 
they were doing.232 However, it is quite explicit that such words demonstrate the 
senseless and distracted mood in which Mehmet Emin and his friends were, rather 
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than their dedication as alleged. As for Anadolu, the expressions of Mehmet Emin 
were ridiculous.233 However, the same newspaper asserted that a uniform secret or-
ganization centered in Manisa was exposed. This organization had been in operation 
for a long time and gave instructions to perpetrators of the Menemen Incident.234 The 
periodical might have sensed no contradiction between the news and interpretations 
it conveyed on the same issue. For Anadolu, the “black force”, which revolted in 
Menemen was, in full sense of the word, an outbreak of a prepared, rooted reactionist 
movement. “The investigation pointed to this conclusion without hiding any-
thing.”235 However, this report was dated 25 December, two days after the incident. 
Since no investigation had been concluded by this time, apparently, the newspaper 
prejudged the events. Anadolu was not the only paper that defined the incident as a 
preplanned action of an organization. Many other newspapers, compatibly with offi-
cial statements, announced the incident as a planned movement of a religious order, 
aiming to subvert the republican regime, at a very early stage even before the draft-
ing of any official report. Anadolu further asserted that when looked from a broad 
perspective, it was clear that though it was an extensive and widespread plan, it 
broke out in the most convenient region, Menemen.236  
Unfounded stories related to the event were narrated as well. For instance, a 
certain draper Akif Efendi was asserted to have reported a significant issue to the 
public prosecutor. One week before the event, Akif Efendi bought walnuts from 
three women living in a Manisa village, Türkmen or Sarınasuhlar.237 It was asserted 
that these women told Akif that in one-week fes would be worn, sheikhs and der-
vishes who were banished from Manisa would return and Muslimism would revive. 
Thereon, “the officials began to look for the women in question.”238 This was noth-
ing short of a fictive story aiming to mislead the public to presume the presence of 
early plans of revolting against the state.  
Cumhuriyet as well depicted the event as a planned action. “The armed insur-
gents believed in their cause and agreed among themselves beforehand upon pretend-
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ing to be mad if they failed.”239 According to Cumhuriyet, the situation was not the 
doing of a few lunatics as some newspapers asserted. The country faced a pre-
planned reactionism. The six perpetrators men took strength from the ones who were 
behind the movement. The reactionist movement was not restricted to Menemen and 
had the Menemen uprising worked, plans regarding other regions would have been 
executed. “The movement was instigated by an organization, which had spread to 
various parts of the country, including İstanbul.”240 
According to another newspaper Vakit, the situation was so serious and a 
number of “malicious microbes” were perceived in the heart of the Menemen 
events.241 Insurgents intended to re-establish the theocratic state. Toward that end, 
they intended to riot against the republican regime, to re-establish the caliphate and 
to bring Caliph Abdülmecit Efendi to power.242 A reader of such news might have 
supposed that the government repressed an immense uprising. The newspapers con-
veyed the perpetrators as if they were well-minded and determined people whose in-
tentions to overthrow the republic were realistic. They represented the situation as 
though a massive rebellion was precluded on the brink. Newspaper Vakit based its 
own reasoning on signifying the presence of a concealed organization. Insurgents 
bore arms and came to Menemen by crossing the mountains and hills. They waited 
until the morning twilight to enter the town and went straight to a mosque. For Vakit, 
the activities of the perpetrators proved to what extent they had thought over their 
plans and determined to succeed before stepping into action. “The plan could not 
have been prepared by a number of ignorant and inexperienced young people at the 
age of 18-20.”243  
As already indicated above, although these newspapers represented the events 
as a consequence of a planning process, they were in fact simple in nature. Basically, 
six insurgents came together, found a few arms, went to two villages and finally ar-
rived at Menemen where they attempted to initiate an inconsequential movement. Al-
leging that these simple happenings derived from an extensive plan does not make 
sense. Nevertheless, officially-biased newspapers saw no harm in making these crude 
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actions look as if they reflected a huge foundation. Besides, they undertook the task 
of embellishing the official statements about the incident. 
Milliyet depicted Derviş Mehmet not as a crazy and raving person but rather 
one who was trained by an association, and a shadow of that background structure.244 
According to the newspaper, he gathered his team, dedicated himself to climbing the 
hills and colliding with law enforcement forces in a sound-minded manner. To re-
peat, the presence of an organization backing up the perpetrators was enunciated as 
early as two days after the incident.245 
The reports of the officially-biased newspapers did not ascribe the event only 
to a religious order. There were also references to Derviş Mehmet’s former and pre-
sent connection with Çerkez Ethem.246 It was asserted that he had worked with 
Çerkez Ethem at the time of the Independence War. Furthermore, he was alleged to 
have served the Greeks.247 Derviş Mehmet had participated in robberies Çerkez 
Ethem committed. Thereon he had been corresponding with Çerkez Ethem.248 As it 
was mentioned during the trials, Derviş Mehmet’s being a bandit for some time was 
true. Still, it was uncertain whether he was a follower of Çerkez Ethem or not. The 
prominent matter here is that Derviş Mehmet was not as significant a person as he 
was depicted in the newspapers. The reports about his ties to Çerkez Ethem were ra-
ther aimed to make people think he had leadership ability. Although there was no a 
substantial evidence about his working with Çerkez Ethem, he was represented as 
such, even as a co-leader. 
A portion of the officially-biased newspaper contents sound to be far-reached 
conspiracies in nature. For instance few periodicals claimed that the rebels had made 
a deal with a factory in Vienna and had placed an order for a great number of fes. 
This was because they would have repealed the hat act and liberated wearing fes if 
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they succeeded in their revolt.249 In other words, after a certain point, assertions 
about the incident completely exceeded realistic grounds and became eccentric fic-
tion. In reality, members of the group were utterly penniless so that they even needed 
a boatman to bring them across the river for free. All support they got such as host-
ing, harboring and weapons were provided by their relatives and  acquaintances. 
Another early predication of many officially-biased newspapers was that cer-
tain political institutions, notably the former FRP, was responsible for the incident. 
The evidence for this argument was Mehmet Emin’s alleged statements. For such 
papers, officers questioned Mehmet Emin as soon as they seized him. They immedi-
ately asked him the reason why Menemen was chosen for a reactionary action. 
Mehmet Emin gave the answer that FRP had won the mayorship of Menemen in the 
last elections. Then they had decided that if they initiated the rebellion in a district 
where FRP had been elected, they might succeed.250 Thus, Menemen was not a ran-
dom choice. As the townspeople had voted for the mayoral candidate of FRP, the in-
surgents believed they would now support them.251 This account was included in the 
newspapers published two days after the incident, but it was a total fabrication. From 
the beginning of their gatherings in Manisa, during their departure, and travel to the 
nearby villages, neither FRP nor anything related to it entered the agenda of the 
company. The matter of FRP connection was mentioned neither in the official re-
ports written in the aftermath of the event nor in the statements of perpetrators given 
in court. 
The pro-government newspapers continued to blame the opposition, though 
none of the oppositional parties was active at the time. For Vakit, the actions towards 
provoking people to revolt in Menemen were the consequences of previous ideas, 
which were brought forward in several districts of the country under the name of par-
tisanship.252 For them, the seeds of intrigue that were spread in various regions of the 
nation in the name of a political party burgeoned in Menemen.253 The same journal 
remarked that Abdülkadir Kemali Bey, the leader of the Community Party,254 had 
disappeared three days before the incident. The newspaper insinuated his involve-
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ment in the event also.255 Although CP had no influence in the political arena of the 
country, its leader was depicted to be another agent responsible for the Menemen In-
cident since he was in an opposition position. But the perpetrators had no implicit or 
explicit connection to the man in question. This was yet another fabricated interpre-
tation of the newspaper. 
According to officially-biased papers, opponents in the political arena and the 
media had to learn from the Menemen Incident. They needed to recognize that the 
event was a consequence of excessive opposition. The antagonism against the repub-
lic reached up to the level of blind passion. The antagonists unconditionally attacked 
everything related to RPP and the government just for the sake of opposition. For the 
pro-government papers, under such circumstances, it was not difficult to determine 
who encouraged the insurgents of Menemen.256 Recently, the opposition abused 
freedom in the country at the utmost due to the government’s neglect and tolerance. 
In a society that underwent a radical transformation, the government’s exposition to 
such harsh attacks in the name of the liberty of press paved the way for deviants to 
undertake such events as the insurgence in Menemen.257 “Some ill-minded writers 
raved each day in the name of the freedom of press so much so that the springing up 
of such events was not surprising at all.”258 
Facing such charges and accusations, the opposition press took the line of de-
fending freedom of the press and emphasizing the significance of the opposition in 
democratic regimes. They argued that what happened in Menemen had nothing to do 
with the opposition media. For them, the event was completely local in nature and 
there was no reason to dramatize it as if the republic encountered a reactionist threat. 
2.5.2. Counter-Official Newspapers 
Counter-official newspapers, issued both locally and nationally, approached 
the event and its details differently. Their main arguments were that the activities of 
the insurgents of Menemen did not reflect the characteristics of the entire nation. Ac-
cording to them, the incident was not as big a deal as the pro-government press made 
of it to be, and there was no nationwide reactionism in the country. 
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One of the arguments of the counter-official papers was that the inadequacy 
of the police department gave the dervish lodges and the reactionist networks a 
ground to operate.259 Counter-official newspapers regarded the incident to be the ac-
tion of “six punks” who certainly did not have significant and extensive origins. “The 
perpetrators were miserable followers of sharia. The Republican regime was in no 
way in danger and it was safe.”260 It would be more accurate to name the event as an 
insolence of six lunatics rather than calling it “the Menemen Incident.”261 The event 
was not political by nature, and had nothing to do with the former FRP.262 These pa-
pers published the accounts of Ağaoğlu, a prominent member of the former FRP, to 
prove their points. He remarked that the government circles held FRP liable for the 
blood spilled in Menemen. Moreover, RPP asserted that FRP leaders had been in 
touch with Derviş Mehmet. According to Ağaoğlu, holding the former FRP respon-
sible for the Menemen Incident was a mistake.263 
Counter-official newspaper accounts as well tended to exaggerate their 
points. For instance, some of them stressed that although the reactionists had arrived 
at Menemen with the hope of receiving support, they did not find the attention and 
support they had expected to receive.264 Among the inhabitants of Menemen, there 
was not “a single brainless” soul who would follow the insurgents.265 For these 
newspapers, if the townspeople had born reactionist ideas, they would have fallen for 
the traitors’ cries to save the religion. However, the periodicals argued that the 
townspeople of Menemen did not listen to these traitors and waited consciously and 
patiently. “Although the people of the town were ignorant, they still properly recog-
nized and embraced the virtues of the state and the republic. Nothing could convince 
the people to betray the state.”266 This picture drawn by the opposition press did not 
reflect reality. In order to maintain a counter stance against the officially-biased 
newspapers and to suppress their exaggerated accounts, they resorted to covering the 
attitude of the townspeople. It was quite apparent that though the crowd was small in 
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proportion to the town’s population, an approximate number of 200 people stood in 
the square. Half of this number participated in the zikr performance of Derviş and his 
group. They merely looked on when the military officers came to talk to Derviş and 
they stood still when warned to disperse.  
Apart from the last issue just pointed out, many of the counter-official ac-
counts, although exaggerated, were on a large scale accurate. As discussed in the 
previous sections of this study, official records and the statements of the perpetrators 
by no means mentioned the involvement of FRP or any other political organization 
in Derviş’s doings. Moreover, Derviş Mehmet’s aim in declaring himself as the ex-
pected Mahdi was to takeover the republican state and to re-establish a religious or-
der. These aims had nothing to do with supporting another political party instead of 
RPP. For the opposition press, the government circles and newspapers supporting 
them used the Menemen Incident to annihilate the opposition.267 Surely, such an in-
cident was not an issue the secular republican regime wished to face. Politicians and 
administrators affiliated with RPP, along with many of the newspapers published to 
support the republican regime, constantly advocated the republican principals, par-
ticularly secularism. The state was established and the main reforms were already put 
into practice. What the RPP administrators expected from the Turkish public was to 
interiorize the republican principles and become modernized in desired ways. The 
republican state had no tolerance for those who initiated an undertaking intended to 
bring back the “old order”. In other words, there was no room for a movement that 
sought to interfere in the political sphere hailing such religious references. This in-
tolerance against a riot using religious slogans is perhaps understandable. However, 
this notion of RPP transformed into a political monocracy that rejected almost all 
kinds of contrarian attitudes in the political arena as well as in the press. 
As for the FRP issue, it was established on 12 August 1930 by Fethi (Okyar), 
as a second attempt to transition to a multi-party system. It was Mustafa Kemal who 
wanted this “deliberate opposition” party to be founded. However, its establishment 
revealed the dissatisfaction of the public with the new regime, including certain as-
pects of its secularist policies. After the municipal elections held on 14 October 
1930, harsh discussions took place in the parliament and on the eve of the closure of 
the party. Deputies of RPP asserted that on the election day, FRP members went door 
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to door to cry the slogan “no more taxes, God and the Prophet are with us, do not 
vote for RPP” in cities such as Konya, Balıkesir and others.268 The district heads of 
FRP were asserted to be crying out “Damn the government and the Republican Peo-
ple’s Party!” Moreover, it was alleged that they threatened those who ignored them 
with death.269 There were sheikhs gathering people in the mosques and ordering 
them how to vote. Villagers were looking for fes to put on in the crowd and crying 
out ecstatically that religion would be recovered on the election day. 
According to the statements of RPP deputies, the events in question presented 
a situation of sedition and anarchy.270 In the parliament, RPP deputies in this way 
urged upon the motivations of people who voted for FRP with the expectation of the 
establishment of a religious order soon. A specific example of this was an old man 
who stood over the ballot box and cast his vote by saying in the name of religion and 
sharia. RPP deputies stated that this man was Şeyh Halil Efendi, father of İbrahim 
Sururi, who was the General Secretary of FRP. According to RPP members, similar 
instances occurred in many regions.271 RPP representatives took such events into ac-
count to conclude that the public expected FRP to bring back “the old regime”.272 
FRP deputies were accused of not condemning explicitly those who acted and spoke 
with ill against the republic on behalf of FRP until that day. For them, FRP members 
solely gave vague replies. 
The situation threatened to become uncontrollable for RPP. The members of 
FRP were presented to have estranged from the republican and revolutionary princi-
ples. FRP members were introduced as if they exploited the naiveté of the public for 
easy success, and thus, they were responsible for damaging the state and the na-
tion.273 These accounts reflect the extent to which FRP was considered responsible 
for reactionist activities. RPP deputies envisioned the country to be on fire, and FRP 
as resurrecting reactionism from the grave. FRP deputies, including the leader Fethi 
Bey, rebutted the accusations and accounts of RPP members by pointing out their 
exaggerated and fictitious aspects. However, the accusatory attitude of RPP leaders 
did not change. Convinced that conflicting views in the political arena undermined 
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the republican reforms and principles, they decided to end FRP. The party was 
forced to dissolve itself on 17 November 1930, thirty-six days before the Menemen 
Incident. 
That is to say, the political atmosphere of the country had already been tense, 
particularly regarding issues considered to be provoking reactionism. Along with 
FRP, the opposition press as well was blamed for inciting the reactionists in the 
country. After the Menemen incident, opposition newspapers were charged with be-
ing responsible for yet another reactionist act. 
2.5.3. Blaming the Opposition Newspapers 
Many of the newspapers reporting the details of the event gave place to offi-
cially-biased interpretations and accused the opposition press of causing reactionism. 
As discussed above, the newspapers can be divided into two separate groups. Most 
of them accused the opposition press and politicians. A minor part of the newspapers 
defended freedom of the press and stated that the opposition had no relation to the 
incident. This sharp contrast was evident in the coverage of the Menemen Incident 
but not new. A battle of words had already been raging between the two media 
groups.274 
Accusatory papers asserted that the encouraging content of the opposition 
press had stimulated the reactionists.275 For them, articles published by the opposi-
tion press were like declarations of counter-revolutionary positions.276 This criticism 
intensified when Mehmet Emin replied in his interrogations that a series of articles 
named “Kan Kalesi” published in the İstanbul newspaper Köroğlu.277 Aside from the 
content of the articles, this news itself was fabricated. As discussed previously, there 
were many statements Mehmet Emin was asserted to have made when he was cap-
tured. However, these words were attributed to him most likely inaccurately. 
Mehmet Emin’s accounts in question, including his making an analogy with Prophet 
İbrahim, were inconsistent. While few of the newspapers described his words as 
“nonsense,” for some others, they indicated the extent to which the group acted with 
determination. In the court, neither Mehmet Emin nor other perpetrators projected 
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the image of having read any newspapers or followed other sorts of publications that 
might have inspired them. According to their expressions, Derviş Mehmet was not a 
scholar, whether in religious or secular terms. Officially-biased newspapers made a 
deliberate effort to impress their readers so that they assumed the insurgents well-
minded and thoughtful men who acted knowingly and decisively. 
 
*** 
This chapter presented the official statements and the newspaper reports 
made after the incident. The starting point has been the meetings held by Mustafa 
Kemal. These meetings are especially significant, because they demonstrate two is-
sues regarding the incident and have been ignored by many subsequent writers. First, 
they revealed, contrary to officially-biased narrations, that the state already knew 
about the activities of orders. The Nakşibendi order in particular did not have under-
ground activities outside of the government’s knowledge, as alleged by many. Se-
cond, the outcome of legal proceedings, including capital punishments and execu-
tions, were determined in advance. This chapter also discussed the statements of RPP 
leaders and the reports of officially-biased newspapers. The latter case revealed the 
extent to which prejudgments and disinformation influenced the publications about 
the event and how this distorted information spread. It indicated how the incident 
was conceived and reflected upon in the overall political medium of the republic at 
the time. Subsequent writings recounted these early reflections made after the event 
and relied on them almost exclusively.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS OF THE MENEMEN INCIDENT 
This chapter discusses the judicial process of the Menemen Incident. The trial 
records of the case along with the court decision documents were sent to the parlia-
ment for approval. The written records and documents include all the conversations 
between the court board, particularly the Chief Judge Mustafa Muğlalı and the de-
fendants. The defendants in the trials were divided into four groups. The first group 
was composed of the three perpetrators who gave basic information about their activ-
ities prior to and in due course of the happenings in Menemen. The second group 
was composed of the people who provided substantial support to the group such as 
hosting and food, or provision of arms and the like. The third group included the 
townspeople who participated in the activities of the insurgents in Menemen. The no-
table Nakşibendi dervishes and sheikhs constitute the fourth group, and they were 
charged with instigating Derviş and his followers. 
Although the number of arrestees was high, there were not too many charges 
brought against them, because there was not enough evidence against many of the 
defendants. The interrogations did not take long. It was the statements of the three 
perpetrators and the defences of the alleged promoters of the event, namely a few no-
tables of the Nakşibendi order, which took much time. Statements of these prominent 
figures and other defendants and the questions and interpretations of the chief judge 
constitute certain patterns. This chapter will discuss the content of trials in sections 
that correspond to those patterns.  
One of the arguments of this chapter is that the verdicts the court reached had 
already been determined before the trials began. The intention had been to declare 
the Nakşibendi order as the organization behind the event. It was determined before-
hand as well to give death sentences to certain defendants including prominent fig-
ures of the order and to those who provided substantial support to the group and the 
core perpetrators. This chapter will show the lack of evidence needed to define the 
Nakşibendi order as the true agent of the incident by discussing the trials of each of 
the aforementioned groups. Beginning with the establishment of the martial court, 
this chapter will discuss the trials and the issues they brought in, including the behav-
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iour of the perpetrators, other defendants and the chief judge. Thus, I will discuss the 
defendants’ fear before the court, due to which they occasionally turned against one 
another. Another subject matter is the perpetrators’ very eagerness to denounce the 
Nakşibendi order and blame the respondents. In addition, I will argue the pressure 
put on the arrestees by the chief judge in the name of the republic. I will further focus 
on several suspicious issues within the judicial process and demonstrate how the 
newspapers published distorted reports about the trials. Lastly I will analyse the court 
decisions and touch upon the second phase of the judicial proceedings. 
3.1. The Constitution of the Martial Court 
Preliminary inquests were launched the day after the incident by an investiga-
tion committee under the leadership of the state attorney of İzmir. This committee 
acted until the specially formed martial court reported for duty on 2 January 1931. 
When Mehmet Emin was able to stand up, since he was captured injured, and 
Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan were seized, they pointed to certain inhabitants of 
Menemen who had participated in the activities.278 As it was asserted by the newspa-
pers of the time, the Menemen office of Türk Ocakları accused fifteen inhabitants of 
Menemen for applauding the actions of the core group of insurgents. Türk Ocakları 
organization was involved because one of its members had been martyred. Reported-
ly, the members of the organization wandered around the neighbourhoods of the 
town to determine the ones who applauded the reactionists in order to get them ar-
rested.279 Based on the statements of Mehmet Emin, Nalıncı Hasan and Küçük Ha-
san, additional people were detained in various cities, towns and villages.280 
Colonel Mustafa Muğlalı Paşa, Deputy Commander of the First Corps, who 
as mentioned previously, wrote a report on the incident for the Headquarters of the 
Turkish General Staff, was appointed as the chief judge of the martial court of 
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Menemen. Among the members of the court board, there were four other military of-
ficers and four prosecutors as well as three investigating judges.281 Still, it was al-
most always Muğlalı, who interrogated and dealt with the defendants. 
The path that the martial court followed to decide whether a trial would be 
held for a particular detainee, was as follows: The investigating judges conducted the 
preliminary inquiries, evaluated the files and made their decisions as to whether to 
bring a particular detainee to trial. Thereon they delivered the files to the attorney 
general to get his opinion.282 The examining committee prepared nine investigation 
files, each of which was of 200 pages. These files were delivered to and examined by 
the board of the martial court once it assumed its judicial duty.283 An approximate 
number of 220 people were arrested during the investigation process in the first 
phase of the tenure of the martial court.284 
The martial court’s area of jurisdiction was not limited to the districts put un-
der martial law. Whenever seen necessary, the court could summon a certain citizen 
from anywhere in Turkey as a witness or suspect. The verdicts of the martial court 
could not be appealed and they had to be executed immediately.285 In the proceed-
ings of the court, detainees were not permitted to have advocates. Thus, the arrestees 
of the Menemen Incident would prepare their own defence.286 
 The trials of the Menemen Incident began on 15 January 1931. Interrogations 
took place until 24 January and the court adjudicated the following day. Proceedings 
of 105 defendants, implicitly or explicitly related to the Menemen Incident were held 
at this stage.287 After the execution of sentences, the court board dealt with the cases 
of other detainees accused of being associates or notable members of the order. 
 Prior to the trials, Fahrettin (Altay) Paşa, the Martial Law Commander, gave 
an interview to newspapers. He was asked about the probable death sentences that 
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the court might pass. He merely stated that the death penalty was subject to the ap-
proval of the parliament. What attracts attention here is the presence of an expecta-
tion of death penalties. The harsh reactions of state administrators and the disputes in 
newspapers reflect the tense atmosphere that emerged in the country following the 
Incident. In compliance with official statements, Fahrettin Paşa described the be-
heading of Kubilay, a lettered son of the country, in front of the very eyes of many 
townspeople as an outrageous incident.288 Muğlalı Paşa also spoke to newspapers be-
fore the trials. His statements were in concordance with what he had written in his 
report of 26 December. He indicated that “following the traces” of the incident re-
vealed a secret organization that used religion only for its members’ own interest un-
der the mask of a tarikat.289 His explanation did not amount merely to a mere pre-
conceived opinion, but reflected the prejudgement of the court. He recounted this 
statement during the trials word for word. Consequently, regardless of almost all the 
defences, the court reached rulings according to the same early assumptions. 
The proceedings of the martial court were to be open to the public. Yet, 
closed sessions could be held if considered necessary.290 If needed, trials would con-
tinue in the evenings and nights.291 Audiences could attend the proceedings provided 
that they submitted credentials from the District Governorate of Menemen.292 
3.2. Attitudes and Expressional Patterns of the Perpetrators 
The court based its verdicts primarily upon the statements of the perpetrators. 
In other words, the perpetrators’ words were judicially prevailed over the assertions 
of others. When one of the perpetrators spoke about someone’s illegal actions, such 
as performing a collective zikr, or talking against the state and the like, he was very 
likely telling the truth, according to the judge. This was because, in the eyes of the 
judge, the perpetrators had nothing to lose for reporting the crimes. A perpetrator 
was not asked to prove his allegation. Rather, it was the denier who was supposed to 
somehow demonstrate that he had not committed the crime of which he was accused. 
The perpetrators, namely Mehmet Emin, Küçük Hasan, and Nalıncı Hasan cooperat-
ed with the court and provided detailed information in the hope to receive relatively 
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light sentences. There was almost no contradiction between their statements about 
the general course of the event as well as about the participation of others. 
It was only these perpetrators who accepted their roles in the events as they 
considered it was of no use to deny. Still, all three of them asserted their delusion. 
For them, they were unaware of what they had being doing, which was indeed, the 
only defence or excuse behind which they could take refuge. However other inmates, 
without exception, utterly rejected all the accusations. In general though the perpetra-
tors explained their previous doings explicitly, they abstained from providing details 
regarding the events in Menemen. It was the happenings in Menemen, particularly 
the brutal murder of Kubilay (and the two wardens) that mostly drew reaction. For 
instance, Mehmet Emin stated that while they were wandering around Menemen, he 
was unconscious, so he had no recollection of what exactly happened.293 For the per-
petrators, their acquaintance and companionship with Derviş Mehmet remained be-
cause they were, in a sense, captivated by him. Under his influence, they acted in the 
way he wished, as if they had no other option. They had no choice other than follow-
ing him, because they were frightened, spiritually overwhelmed, and unconscious.294 
Mehmet Emin, for instance, during his statement in the trial, defined himself as in-
sane, and stated he could not remember many things as he had lost his mental bal-
ance for the last three months and he was not even aware of himself, of whether he 
was in the sky or on the earth.295 He held that he had been so frightened that he could 
not escape from Derviş.296 He also repeatedly mentioned that Derviş Mehmet’s 
words were meaningless and regretted to have known him.297  
Moreover, Mehmet Emin frequently discredited the Nakşibendi order. He de-
scribed the order as a center of malignity and poison. According to Mehmet Emin, 
the order should be exterminated. Unless the organization was eradicated, the repub-
lic would not be able to find safety. He even personally requested the Chief Judge 
Muğlalı to annihilate the order in the trial.298 Although all three men asserted the 
same thing, Mehmet Emin put much more emphasis on being deceived by Derviş 
Mehmet and the order. Compared to the other two men, he gave much more infor-
                                                
293 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 21. 
294 Ibid., 11. 
295 His saying in Turkish was: “Yerde miyim gökte miyim belli değil.” 
296 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi C: 25,” 10. 
297 Ibid., 8. 
298 Ibid., 10. 
 72 
mation to the court against the other detainees. He consistently extolled the republi-
can government and the court. The reason why he kept on talking so much about his 
regret was because he wanted to gain the favour of the chief judge. As for Küçük 
Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan, they knew they would get over the judicial process by re-
ceiving only imprisonment since they were under twenty-one years of age. However, 
Mehmet Emin was much older and he desperately hoped to elude the death penalty. 
Therefore he adopted an excessively reconciliatory attitude towards the court. 
Nalıncı Hasan, likewise, defined his acquaintance with Derviş Mehmet as a 
matter of deception. He expressed that Derviş deceived them by reciting the verses of 
the Qur’an and emphasizing the virtues of the order. Nalıncı described himself as 
having lost his consciousness ever since he became attached to the Nakşibendi or-
der.299 Küçük Hasan mentioned being threatened by Derviş Mehmet frequently even 
before the retreat of Ramazan. He asserted that he was in fear, because he had been 
inwardly fascinated by religious invocations and prayers. He identified Derviş as an 
evildoer who had malevolent intentions of which they did not know beforehand.300 
He, as the other two defendants did, defined himself as an insane person, and said he 
could not even understand whether he was on earth or in the sky at the time. 
Ramazan was one of the insurgents, yet he had fled the company on the way. 
He as well asserted to have been deceived by Derviş Mehmet’s spiritual remarks and 
suggestions. Derviş used to advise him to cite God as much as he could, in order to 
get closer to God. Ramazan also described the journey to Menemen as an indispen-
sability for him, because he was forced to go. For instance, on their way to Bozalan, 
which took eleven hours on foot, he claimed to have walked under compulsion. He 
and Küçük Hasan were following the others, and they were not among the leading 
ones.301 Ramazan stated Sütçü Mehmet made him join the order. Yet according to 
Ramazan, Sütçü had did not tell him what the meaning of the order was. Thus, he 
expressed that he was completely ignorant about the issues of the order except for re-
citing the name of God.302 
These critical accounts of the perpetrators stimulated the other detainees to 
denigrate the order. They frequently indicated that the Nakşibendi order was a malef-
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icent organization for the republic and the nation. They talked this way since they 
thought discrediting the order would help them get acquitted. All the arrested people 
refuted any sort of allegations of association with the order. Furthermore, some of 
the defendants told in trials that they were invited to become a member of the order 
in the past but refused the invitation on grounds that joining the order was not a reli-
gious necessity. They also alleged that when they encountered someone who dedi-
cated himself to the order, they sought to dissuade them from this commitment. 
Those, who gave statements along these lines, portrayed the perpetrators and Derviş 
as fractious and malevolent liars who always talked nonsense.303 Many of the detain-
ees agreed on several issues such as this one. Still, they did not protect one another 
during the trials all the time. Instead, they often resorted to give information against 
each other to become cleared of the blames. 
3.3. Informing Against One Another 
There were three ways of speaking against one another in the court. First, 
though rarely, the perpetrators refuted each other’s statements. For instance, court 
judges asked Ramazan why Derviş had preferred him as a disciple. In his interroga-
tion, Ramazan replied that he had not been acting in his own free will. Mehmet Emin 
stood up and expressed that Ramazan willingly adhered to Derviş. He also stressed 
that Ramazan used to give them food. Ramazan immediately replied to have been 
frightened and said he rarely provided them with food.304 
Second, the perpetrators provided information against other detainees. Gener-
ally when asked by the judge, Nalıncı Hasan and Küçük Hasan gave information 
about the defendant who was being interrogated. In comparison to the other two, 
Mehmet Emin was more ready to incriminate others. Because he was quite sure that 
he would be condemned to capital punishment, he tried desperately to change the 
opinion of the court. He was eager to demonstrate that he was at the side of the court, 
and hence of the republic. Even so, when someone unfamiliar to them was interro-
gated, they honestly told the court that they did not know that person. For instance, 
Hacıalioğlu Mustafa from Bozalan was charged with not reporting the arrival and 
acts of Derviş and his followers. He denied to be aware of someone named Derviş. 
Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan acknowledged that they did not see this man. 
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During his interrogation, İbrahimoğlu Mehmet from Bozalan claimed to have 
gone to welcome the company of Hacı İsmail’s brother Sütçü Mehmet, but then, he 
went to his field where he remained ten days and did not know about Mahdi. 
Mehmet Emin intervened to express that everyone knew about their presence in the 
village including İbrahimoğlu Mehmet. Mehmet Emin told that İbrahimoğlu brought 
them food during their stay at the cottage. Nalıncı and Küçük Hasan confirmed this 
statement. Mehmet Emin referred to the villagers as “microbes.” İbrahimoğlu 
Mehmet refused the assertion. İsmailoğlu İsmail, another inhabitant, also stated that 
he did not see the insurgents in the village nor was he seen by them. However, the 
perpetrators said İsmail visited them, once every night and once again during mid-
day.305 
Derviş’s brother in-law Ahmet from Paşa Village claimed he had a conflict 
with Derviş about an issue of heritage. Because of this hostility, he did not follow 
any activities of Derviş, including his coming to the village. The three perpetrators, 
however, again appeared determined to tell the truth. They told the court that it was 
impossible for Ahmet not to notice their arrival at the village with their guns and zikr 
performances. Thus, perpetrators rebutted Ahmet’s defence. They did the same to 
many others who were being interrogated and making false statements.306 
Derviş Mehmet’s mother-in-law Rukiye from Paşa was questioned about 
hosting and feeding Derviş with his companion and not reporting their actions to the 
officials. Rukiye stated that Derviş came to her house with two guests and a dog. 
They explained they were there for hunting. Rukiye told the court that she believed 
them because of the dog. She was reminded that Derviş Mehmet had declared his 
Mahdism there. Thus, chief judge asked how it was possible that she did not know 
this. Rukiye asserted that Derviş Mehmet did not say anything about his Mahdism in 
her village. Yet, Mehmet Emin stood up and stated that she was lying.307  
Hacı İsmail, Sütçü Mehmet’s elder brother from Bozalan, as well asserted 
that he was unfamiliar with the intentions of Derviş and his companions. At that 
point, the chief judge questioned him as to whether he asked the group what their in-
tentions were while he hosted them in his house. Hacı İsmail claimed not to have 
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asked anything, as they used to come over on a regular basis to his house. The judge 
stressed that he should have suspected their intentions, as they were acting strangely. 
Hacı İsmail said they were not acting weirdly and seemed to have been right-minded. 
Again, Mehmet Emin interfered and cried out: “Shame on you!” He recounted that 
they had been in their village for a while, performing zikr even so they were denying 
this. Hacı İsmail was also questioned about the cottage he constructed for the com-
pany. He disclaimed this and said he had nothing to do with the cottage. Nalıncı Ha-
san interfered and repointed that the cottage was repaired by them and even Hacı İs-
mail’s son Hüseyin helped them set up a pole for the cottage. Hüseyin denied this.308 
Nalıncı Hasan claimed that Hacı İsmail and his sons Hasan and Hüseyin came to the 
cottage.309 
When questioned, İbrahim Ethem and Fırıncı Ahmet from Manisa empha-
sized they had nothing to do with Derviş. Yet, Mehmet Emin intervened, again, to 
indicate that both men were dervishes of Derviş Mehmet. They knew about perform-
ing the zikr and Derviş’s teachings though they pretended as if they did not.310  
Third, the detainees denounced each other. Along with asserting their inno-
cence, they occasionally pointed fingers to the “true criminals” in their own terms. 
For instance, Çulha Mehmet Çavuş, who was accused of participating in the gather-
ings in Manisa, denied any sort of connection with the zikr activities. He brought up 
some certain inhabitants of Manisa such as Hacı Mehmet Emin Efendi as the dervish 
of Hafız Ahmet. Fırıncı Ahmet and Mutaf Süleyman were also dervishes according 
to him. He added that the real criminals were slandering him. Hacı Hasan Efendi 
from Manisa was accused of participating in the gatherings and performing the zikr. 
He rejected the allegations and said that he had not heard of such a thing before. He 
indicated that Hacı Emin, Nalıncı Hasan, Hacı Hasan, Mehmet Çavuş, Fırıncı Hafız 
Ahmet and Süleyman Çavuş were the disciples of Hafız Ahmet and continued to 
gather at Hafız Ahmet’s house to perform the zikr on Thursdays and Fridays. He 
added the windows of Hafız Ahmet’s home were covered with paper to prevent be-
ing seen from the outside. Hacı Hasan intervened and said he had nothing to do with 
the assertion.311 It must be noted there was not even a single villager who spoke 
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against another villager in the court. The ones who gave counter testimonies were 
from Manisa, and few were from Menemen. 
3.4. The Court’s Pressure on Detainees 
The chief judge of the court grilled the detainees about certain points of the 
incident. These questions were mainly about why they did not report anything to 
government officials, or why they did not suspect the behaviour of the insurgents and 
similar points.  
It must be noted that the atmosphere of the court was tense. The chief judge 
was the dominant figure in trials. None of the defendants were able to withstand or 
resist the successive interrogations of the judge. They could in no terms behave in an 
adverse and negative manner in the court. No one was able to question the attitude of 
either the chief judge or other members of the court board and the prosecutor. Fear 
was the ultimate determinant of the statements of the arrested. They were on trial and 
accused of participating in and/or and supporting a revolt against the state. If found 
guilty, they would be sentenced to capital punishment. As they were quite sure of 
what would happen to them, the detainees were merely defending themselves. At the 
expense of making inconsistent statements, they were declining all the pressed 
charges. 
One of the common questions the chief judge asked to all of the detainees 
was why they did not let the government officials know about the actions of Derviş 
and his companions. Some of the defendants indicated that Derviş and his followers 
were insane, and therefore they did not suspect they might be involved in a conspira-
cy against the regime. For example, Tütüncü (tobacconist) Haydar from Menemen, 
stressed that when he heard of the insurgents creating trouble, he thought they were 
only a few mad men. He alleged to have considered that the government would sure-
ly seize them soon. He further told he recommended to the people around him in 
Menemen, not to believe the words of the company. According to Haydar, his rec-
ommendations were sensible and everyone agreed with him.312 
For some others, the insurgents were acting in a normal manner. Thus, there 
was no reason to doubt their actions. Nearly all of the defendants stated that if in any 
way they had known about the malicious intentions of the company, they would most 
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definitely have informed the officials of the situation. Some of them asserted that 
they would themselves shoot the insurgents if they had been aware of their purposes. 
Hacıalioğlu Mustafa was another person charged with not reporting the arrival and 
acts of Derviş’s company. Hacıalioğlu Mustafa stated he would have informed the 
officials if he had known the men, in any way, had malicious intentions. He stated he 
had been the village headmen previously and knew how things worked. Further, he 
claimed he would have shot the fellows himself if he knew about their plans.313 
Some of the villagers asserted that their homes were far from the place where Derviş 
and his company stayed. That is why they had not been informed about their arrival 
or any other actions. As for some others, they saw only one or two people. For in-
stance, Şerif Ahmetoğlu Eyüp from the village of Paşa claimed to have seen only 
Küçük Hasan coming to the village.314 The villagers claimed that the persons they 
saw were usually someone’s relative. 
When counter evidence was brought forward by the court, the detainees in-
sisted on their denials as far as they could. Many of them swore oaths for they were 
entirely innocent. The judge was quite aware that the initial aim of the arrestees was 
to reject the charges against them in any way possible. Therefore he frequently told 
them to tell the truth. Whenever such a dialogue occurred, the subject defender pro-
ceeded to refute the alleged crimes in different terms. When the judge questioned the 
detainees persistently, many of them gave desperate answers. They only sought to 
save the moment. For instance, the judge questioned Ramazan as to whether Derviş 
had talked to them about the places they would go to in their walks. When Ramazan 
answered no, the judge in return questioned whether he was not able to ask the 
townspeople about Derviş’s intentions, since they provided them weapons. Rama-
zan’s replies remained desperate. According to Ramazan, he instantly ordered the 
company to depart as soon as Derviş got the guns. He said, there was no time left for 
him to inquire about their destination and their goals. The judge further asked what 
the time period was exactly between their getting guns and the departure. Ramazan 
answered it was around a quarter of an hour. Yet, the judge objected, and stated that 
there was an extended period of time and asked Mehmet Emin the same question. 
Mehmet Emin replied as 1-1,5 hours. 
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The judge persistently questioned the arrestees as to why they were not think-
ing about the consequences of their actions. He asked the villagers repeatedly why 
they had not become suspicious of the company. Furthermore, he asked some of 
them why they had not questioned Derviş or other disciples about their aim since the 
defenders constantly denied any knowledge of the purposes of the company. The 
court’s persistence about this issue mainly derived from two facts. First, the insur-
gents carried guns with them on their way. Second, Derviş Mehmet declared his 
Mahdism in the villages of Paşa and Bozalan.315 Thus, the chief judge grilled the vil-
lagers how they did not doubt his intentions and report the situation to law enforce-
ment agents. 
When the judge questioned Haliloğlu Hasan from Bozalan along these lines, 
he said he saw them but thought they were there for hunting as they had come to the 
village for that purpose the previous year. This is why he did not become suspicious 
upon their arrival. Sarıoğlu Halil, another resident of Bozalan, stated he did not know 
when the insurgents arrived at the village. He said Hacı İsmail informed them about 
his brother’s arrival. Later, Halil went to welcome him and thought he was there for 
hunting as they had done two years ago. So there was no reason for Halil to become 
doubtful of the men in the village.316 The judge was not satisfied with this answer 
and continued to ask the men how they could so easily believe they came to hunt. 
But the arrestees had no considerable reply to this question.  
On occasion, the judge implicitly repeated questions he had asked before 
when dealing with another issue. His purpose was to provoke the detainees to unwit-
tingly confess what they had been accused of. Still, the situation did not change in 
general and they maintained their refusal of all the accusations. 
The Chief Judge Muğlalı kept looking for contradictory or inconsistent 
statements. He questioned Hüseyin, the warden of Bozalan, who gave him a gun and 
why. He replied that the government had given him the gun to protect the village ter-
ritory against strangers with suspicious behaviour. He was then questioned as to how 
he could not see six armed men coming into the village planning to do violence 
against the government. The answer of the warden was similar to those of the others. 
He claimed he did not see the group. The judge insisted that it was his duty and obli-
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gation to know, and kept on questioning him relentlessly. He asked Hüseyin, where 
exactly he had been so that he could not see the group. His answer was that he had 
been with the tax collector. The judge questioned for how long he had been with the 
official and Hüseyin replied it was for one day. Then the judge asked how he possi-
bly could not see the men as they had stayed in the village for fourteen days. He then 
claimed he had been busy elsewhere distributing coal. The judge asked how long that 
work took, and Hüseyin replied he arrived at the village after two days. The judge 
turned and asked the village headman Mustafa whether the tax collector had been at 
the village during the time in question. The headman confirmed, but he mentioned 
that during the collector’s stay, the company was not in the village. The judge under-
stood that Hüseyin was lying, and turned to another person to ask the same questions 
as to whether he had seen Derviş Mehmet and his companions or how he had seen 
them.317  
Thereon, the chief judge interrogated Mustafa, the village headmen of Boza-
lan, about how he was not informed of the rebels’ presence in the village for fourteen 
days. The headmen replied that he was a newly appointed official in the village and 
had been there for only eight days, living in a house far from the village. Besides, he 
was busy attending to the tax collectors who were in the village.318 
The detainees from Menemen asserted that they were compelled to obey 
Derviş Mehmet. Arabacı (driver of municipality) Hüseyin, for instance, was accused 
of digging a hole for the rebels to plant the banner. Hüseyin claimed that the rebels 
threatened him and held a rifle against his head. He stated he left his house in order 
to buy medicine as he had a sick person at his house. But the insurgents withheld on 
his way, gave him a shovel, and obliged him to dig the hole. He claimed to have re-
fused initially, pretending that the ground was firm, yet they pressed him to do as 
said. When he hit the ground, the shovel was bent. He asserted to hit the ground for 
only two times. However the judge objected that a shovel would not be bent by hit-
ting the ground only twice. Still, Hüseyin insisted on his statement and on the firm-
ness of the ground. The defendants, similarly, objected to the accusatory arguments 
of the chief judge and kept on purporting the truthfulness of their claims. Kamil from 
Menemen was charged with providing the rope with which the insurgents tied Kubi-
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lay’s head to a pole. He told he was a shoemaker and he had the rope in his pocket 
already when Derviş detained him. He claimed that Derviş held a gun to his chest 
and forced him to give the rope. He was frightened so he did as said.319 As it seems, 
these defences were not reliable in the eyes of the court board so that the two men 
were executed in the end. 
3.5. Grudge and Consent 
Another attitude pattern in the trials was the defendants’ occasional assertion 
that they were slandered. For them, the charges brought against them were the deni-
gration of specific people. These people carried a grudge against them and this was 
why they were blamed for the Menemen Incident and the events that led to it. 
An arrestee did not have to know his accusers to call them slanderers. For in-
stance, Süleyman from Menemen was charged with standing among the crowd that 
gathered around Derviş Mehmet and his companions when they performed zikr with 
the banner in their hands. He claimed he had no connection to the company and to 
what happened in Menemen. For him, anyone who asserted a relationship between 
him and the events had hostility towards him. Süleyman added that he did not have a 
single enemy in Menemen and he did not even realize why such an allegation was 
made against him.320 Tütüncü Haydar Efendi was charged for applauding the move-
ment at the government square. Yet, for him, whoever denounced him ought to have 
been either a debtor or a competitor.321 
Harputlu Memet from Menemen was yet another person charged with ap-
plauding. He said he was accused because someone had a grudge against him. Ac-
cording to Harputlu, he had seen Hacı Hasan, the witness who said he had applaud-
ed, drinking rakı in his shop on a Ramadan day. When Harputlu warned him not to 
drink, at least not during the holy month of Ramadan, Hacı Hasan developed a 
grudge against him since then. That was the reason why he cast blame on him. To 
evoke pity, he also mentioned that he was a man loyal to the government for sixty 
years and an old man who could hardly see or hear.322  
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Driver Ali was accused of firing a gun during the actions in Menemen. How-
ever, he stated, there was hostility between him and Kepekçi Mehmet Efendi, the 
witness who accused him of such action. One day Ali was standing by the fountain to 
fill his container. He accidentally broke Kepekçi’s pitcher. Thereon Kepekçi held a 
grudge against him. According to Ali, this was why Kepekçi accused him. He further 
mentioned that Kepekçi’s house was located far from his, and he asked how Kepekçi 
could have seen him firing a gun.323 
Jözef was as well interrogated with the charge of applauding. The judge ad-
dressed Jözef that he was there from the beginning to end and applauded, as there 
were witnesses who saw him do so. Jözef opposed the allegations. He claimed that 
he had neither stayed among the crowd nor clapped his hands. He mentioned two 
witnesses, Tahsin and Mehmet Efendi with whom he went to his house since they 
were all scared. He claimed he had been quite sure the government would punish the 
rebels.324 Hoca Mehmetoğlu İbrahim was the witness who indicated that Jözef had 
been applauding. Jözef stood up and accused İbrahim of bearing a grudge against 
him and hence speaking ill of him. İbrahim further asserted that everyone had ap-
plauded; yet he had not been able to see exactly who had, so he stated he did not 
want to accuse anyone wrongly.325 Jözef stated that he was detained on charges of 
applauding, although there were no witnesses who saw him actually doing so. The 
only thing he had done was “to be loyal to the government.”326 Yet, the witnesses he 
mentioned were not brought to the court and he could not change the situation in his 
favor, so he was hanged.327 There were others who struggled to prove their inno-
cence, but their defenses were similarly disregarded by the court. Thus, none of the 
witnesses mentioned by the detainees were brought to the court.328 
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Kerimoğlu İbrahim, an inhabitant of Menemen, was charged with supporting 
Derviş’s actions. He denied the accusation and added that the ones who accused him 
were Hulusi and Deveci Mehmet. According to İbrahim, Deveci’s camels had once 
entered his field and damaged the crops. Then, İbrahim took a certain tool of Deveci, 
in return. This was why Deveci had borne a grudge and testified against him.329 He 
was then questioned about particularly summoning people to see the company and 
announcing them to be saints. Although he denied it, there were witnesses who testi-
fied that he actually did this. Mehmetoğlu Hulusi, a witness under oath, testified that 
İbrahim was telling the townspeople that Derviş and his disciples were invulnerable 
and no bullet could hurt them. In return, İbrahim asserted that Hulusi as well was his 
enemy, because of an earlier dispute. He claimed he had been at home with two of 
his neighbours during the demonstrations of the company.330 The judge reminded 
him the opposite assertion that he had been outside. In reply, İbrahim suggested that 
if his witnesses told the same story, he would consent to the punishment. The judge 
in return tested whether İbrahim would retract his denial of being outside. The judge 
expressed that standing outside was not itself a crime and that he might express it 
without hesitation if he had done so. Still, İbrahim maintained his claim to have been 
at home. Another witness, Mustafaoğlu Mehmet, a municipal guard, agreed with Hu-
lusi’s claims against İbrahim. İbrahim had something to say against Mustafaoğlu 
Mehmet as well. He asserted that this was all because he had taken Mehmet’s felt 
cloak after a certain camel issue.331 Clearly, the detainees were determined to defend 
themselves however they could. 
Kerimoğlu İbrahim was not the only person accused of helping Derviş and 
his company. Hasan and Ahmet, two villagers, were accused of advising Derviş and 
the company to invade the Emiralem station, kill the officers and take their weapons 
since it had fewer officers on duty. Both men denied the accusations. Ahmet stated 
he did not even know where the Emiralem station was located.332 Hasan said if the 
allegation were to be proven, he would consent to his punishment.333  
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Another prisoner Molla Süleyman was charged with providing cigarettes to 
the rebels. His excuse was, once again, the grudge of Çolak Hacı Hasan, the owner 
of the adjacent shop. Süleyman stated they had traded stamps years ago and he had 
made a greater profit. Çolak spoke against him because of this rivalry. They resented 
one another for six years and everyone in the town knew about this.334 Molla Süley-
man mentioned three civil servants working in the neighbourhood. If they were to 
testify as to his giving cigarettes to the rebels, he would consent to the penalty. He 
also stated to have taken Fehmi and Hacı Hasan to his house during the events. He 
added that his son had been outside and he could not go out to look for him because 
the soldiers prevented him. Thus, he returned home and waited.335 Nevertheless, his 
explanations were not taken into account. None of the names he mentioned as wit-
nesses were brought to the court. Regardless of whether he consented to the verdict 
or not, he was executed at the end.  
The respondents often claimed that they were being wrongly accused, and 
expressed their consent to the forthcoming punishment. A substantial part of the de-
tainees was composed of the villagers of Bozalan and Paşa. Some of them were the 
relatives of Derviş’s followers while others were familiar with them. Although none 
of the villagers joined the company, they hosted them and did not report them to the 
officials. As for the Menemen inhabitants, they were acquainted with neither Derviş 
nor his friends. Still, a proportionally small group followed them into the town. They 
had no previous preparation, nor did they know anything regarding the upcoming 
events. Therefore, the defendants did not have many arguments with which they 
could defend themselves. They certainly denied all charges and made simple argu-
ments to defend themselves against the accusations. Claiming that their accusers 
were a slanderer who nurtured a grudge against them was indeed a simple defence. 
Stressing the willingness that they were ready for the punishments in case proven 
truly guilty was as well a desperate attitude of the defendants. These naïve defences 
did not benefit them. 
3.6. Tragicomic Statements 
Some statements of the detainees could be seen as tragicomic for they were 
so unreasonable. For instance Ramiz, charged with participating in the company’s 
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activities, said he was following the group in Menemen from thirty steps behind in 
order to observe where they were going. When the judge asked the reason why he 
followed the group, his answer was “to prevent them from harming the country.” The 
judge further questioned Ramiz why had he not reported the company to the gen-
darme station if he truly doubted their intentions. Ramiz claimed he was not able to 
report to the station. He told to have been afraid the company would escape while he 
went to the station to report. He was also worried that the gendarme would interro-
gate him about why he had let them get away, if he reported the company. He re-
counted the happenings as if he was an official and it was his duty to follow the 
group. Nevertheless, Nalıncı Hasan intervened and indicated Ramiz followed the 
group, because he participated in the demonstrations. Ramiz further asserted how he 
encountered a doctor and a man named Tevfik at the square, and asked them whether 
they had reported the situation to the gendarme. When they said “yes,” he continued 
his mission of tracking the insurgents.336  
Another person charged with standing among the Derviş’s crowd was 
Harputlu Mehmet from Menemen. He stated he was in the coffeehouse observing the 
rebels. He stressed he foresaw the probable consequences of the insurgents’ actions 
and that the group consisted of shady and bad men. Then, he lost his interest in the 
insurgents.337  
Mustafa, a member of the administrative council of the Bozalan Village was 
questioned about not informing the authorities about the insurgents. He said he had 
been very busy in his field all day and was not able to talk to anyone else. Other 
members of the village administration, İbrahim and Mustafaoğlu Mustafa, were in-
terrogated regarding the same issue. İbrahim said he had been ill during that period. 
As for Mustafa, he stressed that his house was located at the upper edge of the vil-
lage and it was only natural for him not to be aware of the company. Mustafa 
claimed to have been ill as well, and he said he was home all day playing with his 
children.338 
Fırıncı Hasan from Manisa was accused of being an associate of the 
Nakşibendi order. He claimed he did not have any connection with the order. He said 
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he never attended the meetings in Manisa, nor did he know Laz İbrahim. The judge 
questioned Fırıncı Ahmet as to why he had been arrested and brought to the court 
then. Fırıncı said he did not know why.339  
Ali Koç, an inhabitant of Horos, was questioned about his visit to Şeyh Esat. 
He said they went to İstanbul and travelled around the mosques and subsequently 
visited Şeyh Esat’s mansion. He stated they could not see him as he had been ill. 
They visited his son and stayed there for one night. The judge asked the reason of 
their stay, if not for sufi issues. Ali Koç replied the reason was that Esat was old. 
Then the judge stressed there had been a certain man named Zaro Ağa in İstanbul 
who was 150 years of age, much older than Esat. He asked Ali Koç if their purpose 
was to visit the old, why had they not visited Zaro Ağa instead. Ali Koç replied that 
if they had heard of Zaro Ağa, they would have visited him too.340 
As previously mentioned, these kinds of defence did not influence the attitude 
or perception of the chief judge Muğlalı. He was not to be deluded. On several occa-
sions he grilled the detainees on specific issues, but when the interrogations ended up 
in a vicious circle because the detainees kept denying all the charges, he passed on to 
the next issue by realizing they did not have much to say and were merely trying to 
save themselves. Still, these accounts prove that the people, who were connected to 
the events in one way or another, did not act in a pre-planned manner. They were not 
highly motivated contrarians expecting someone to emerge to lead the way to a revo-
lution against the republic. Rather, as it seems, their different levels of dissatisfaction 
against the republican ideology could merely present itself by watching Derviş to see 
what would happen.  
According to the statements of all the detainees and witnesses as well as the 
official records, followers of religious orders in Manisa were speaking out against 
the government. Thus they were, to various degrees, opposing the republican regime. 
This was a passive opposition in the sense that no disciple of the Nakşibendi order, 
except Derviş and his fellows, participated in the demonstrations. The villagers of 
Bozalan and Paşa might have been displeased with the government as well, perhaps 
particularly in regards to their perception of secularist politics. However, there is not 
substantial information to verify this premise. Thus, what explains their hosting of 
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Derviş or his fellows is the fact that they were relatives of some of these villagers. 
Therefore, their relationship of affinity or acquaintance with insurgents was the de-
fining reason of their treatment of the company. In other words, the villagers’ rela-
tionship with perpetrators might have taken precedence over their dependence on the 
government, regardless of the extent to which they were discontent with the policies 
of the government. 
3.7. Extolling the State 
Another pattern one can observe in the trials is the exaltation of the state by 
the detainees as well as the chief judge. The defendants revered the state in various 
ways to specify their intimate loyalty as they had absolutely nothing to do with an 
action undermining the republic. Some of the detainees declared their loyalty to the 
republic by mentioning their civilian or military services as proof of their innocence. 
For instance, Halil from Manisa remarked that a young Turkish man’s fundamental 
duty was to love his country and to defend his honour. He asked, therefore, how 
could one ever turn against the state. Keçeci Süleyman expressed he had been in the 
service of his country for eight years. To arise pity, he also spoke of his two children 
left in miserable conditions in Manisa.341 Manisalı Ali Çavuş emphasized his eleven-
year of military service for the sake of the country and nation. He claimed he had not 
been guilty of treason.342 Ömeroğlu Hafız Ahmet indicated he had been a poor man 
who had lost his mind at the time of the Greek invasion, since he loved his country 
so much. He asserted to have regained his mental abilities when the country was tak-
en back.343  
Hafız Hilmi Efendi from Manisa was charged with being an associate of the 
order and for laying the groundwork for a rebellion. His initial words were that he 
had always been loyal to the government and had never committed any offense 
against it. He had worked in favour of the ideal of Turkish victory during the period 
of the Greek occupation.344 He had monitored every step the Greeks took and in-
formed the government. When the Greeks realized what he was framing, they re-
tained him. He stated he would absolutely shy away and abstain from reacting 
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against the government, which definitely saved the vulnerable nation from brutality. 
He was so loyal to the government that if he had any contrary idea inside him, he 
would have committed suicide. He swore an oath in the name of his knowledge of 
the Quran and religion, and told he regarded opposing the government as a sin. He 
told the judge to inquire about his personality in the RPP organization and Türk 
Ocakları.345  
Hafız Hilmi’s words are representative of the statements of other accused 
persons who were charged with providing necessary material and moral support for 
the rebellion. Cases in point are Mehmet Ali Efendi, Laz İbrahim, and Saffet 
Hoca.346 They all asserted to have done their utmost in the service of the country and 
pointed to the contradiction between their previous services and the recent charges. 
However, the chief judge did not take such claims into serious consideration. When-
ever someone started to praise himself by mentioning former services, the judge told 
him to get to the point and address the accusations. Indeed, when someone began to 
extol the republic, it could affect the judge adversely. When the respondents digni-
fied the state, the judge told them that since the state was sacred, then how come they 
dared to undertake counteraction against it.  
The chief judge, representing the court, was evidently convinced that the 
people before the court had betrayed the state in various degrees. Although it was a 
company of six people who initiated the revolt actively, their action brought to light 
that the fellows of the order in Manisa were speaking out against the government on 
their own. According to the state, this was also considered to be disloyalty or even 
betrayal. By hosting the company, villagers already committed serious offense 
against the state in the eyes of the court.  
The chief judge did not take seriously the arguments of even the ones who 
brought forth that they were members of RPP. Due to the prevailing tension in politi-
cal grounds between RPP and former FRP, defendants sought to take advantage and 
gain the favour of the chief judge by mentioning that they were associates of RPP. 
For example, Gözlüklü Mehmet Ali was accused of applauding the rebels. He men-
tioned he was a member of the RPP’s local committee. He expressed he had never 
participated in such sedition against the government. As many others did, he told he 
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would have definitely informed the officials of the situation, if he had only known 
about it. When disorder occurred in Menemen, he claimed he was suspicious of a 
party conflict and refrained from possible violence as he had been a member of RPP. 
He swore several times that he was far from collaborating with the insurgents, and he 
did not see any of them. He said he could most certainly prove this.347 He also added 
that none of the perpetrators cited his name while accounting the details of the 
events. He ended his last words by asserting that revolt against the government did 
not conform to his character.348  
Another respondent, Topçu Hüseyin was charged with attending the gather-
ings at Tatlıcı Hüseyin’s house in Manisa. He denied his alleged presence in those 
meetings. The persons who asserted that such meetings were held had a grudge and 
hence sought to ruin his name. The key element of this grudge against him was the 
conflict between political parties. Topçu stated he supported RPP, while his accusers 
were from the FRP, and this was a good and sufficient reason for them to slander 
him.349 However, the chief judge did not take much notice of the defendants’ party 
memberships. Instead, he remarked that association with political parties was not an 
issue in the trials and required the ones who brought up their party affiliation to 
move on and get to the point.350 
3.8. The Court Searching for Behind the Scenes 
The court’s major objective was to reveal the background structure and the 
agents of the Menemen Incident. As previously mentioned, the court intended to rule 
that the Nakşibendi order organised the event. Nevertheless, the statements of the 
perpetrators in this regard were quite unreliable and controversial. Therefore, the 
most equivocal stage of the trials involved the effort to elaborate the origins of the 
event.  
Throughout the trials, the perpetrators mentioned three separate phases of 
meetings held in Manisa. The first was the gathering of Derviş and his followers in a 
certain coffeehouse. In these meetings, they performed the zikr and smoked hashish. 
After the municipal police found out what they had been doing there, the coffeehouse 
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was closed down. Then Derviş’s disciples continued to gather in Tatlıcı Hüseyin’s 
house. There was nothing disputable, since all three perpetrators said the same thing 
until this point. However, ambiguities emerged with regard to two other groups of 
people who were not Derviş’s disciples. The first group consisted of people gather-
ing in each other’s homes, such as those of Manifaturacı Osman Efendi, Ragıp Bey, 
and Mutaf Süleyman Efendi. The second group consisted of some notable associates 
of the order, who were active locally and in general, such as Hafız Ahmet, Laz 
İbrahim, and Şeyh Esat. Perpetrators asserted that Derviş Mehmet was fully under 
the influence of the persons of the latter group. They alleged it was these sheikhs 
from whom Derviş learned all the maleficent ideas on which he acted. 
Mehmet Emin stated that after Derviş Mehmet made him a disciple of the or-
der, they attended, along with their own gatherings, the sermons of certain preachers 
in Manisa, such as Hafız Ahmet, Hacı Hilmi, Şeyh Hakkı, and Saffet Hoca. In his 
statement, Mehmet Emin referred to a conversation that took place between Derviş 
Mehmet and Hafız Ahmet. Derviş Mehmet asked Hafız Ahmet from where the ex-
pected Mahdi would come. Hafız replied he would emerge from among mankind, yet 
he, who recited the name of God the most would be assigned the task. He also indi-
cated that the Prophet Muhammed was the general soul of the order. Allegedly, 
Derviş Mehmet declared his Mahdism to Hafız Ahmet and Hafız acknowledged it 
and recommended him to others. However, they fell into bad terms with each other 
later on.  
When the judge questioned what he would say about the issue, Hafız Ahmet 
Efendi rejected all allegations. For him, there were many taskmasters, officials, and 
civil servants among those who had come to listen to his preaching. His sermons at-
tracted about three hundred people each time. Therefore, Hafız Ahmet stated if the 
asserted conversation between him and Derviş Mehmet had actually occurred, some-
body would have reported it to the authorities. He indicated that all the assertions 
against him were outright lies. When asked again by the judge whether a quarrel had 
occurred between them, he claimed he had never seen or heard about Derviş Mehmet 
before.351 Nalıncı Hasan and Küçük Hasan said they did not know whether Hafız 
Ahmet had met Derviş or not. Then, Hafız Ahmet accused Mehmet Emin of casting 
aspersions on him. He further referred Menmet Emin to God’s punishment and told 
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their accounts would be settled in the greatest court, after death. Mehmet Emin’s an-
swer was “The greatest court is right here.” Thereon, Ramazan began to speak and 
said Mehmet Emin was not telling the truth about the issue between Hafız Ahmet 
and Derviş Mehmet. The judge later turned to Hafız Ahmet and told him that there 
were written documents and testimonies indicating his affirmation of Dervish 
Mehmet as the Mahdi. Still, Hafız Ahmet rejected the materials in question, and 
brought forward several names as witnesses who could assert that he did not know 
Derviş.352  
At that point, although the chief judge referred to documents indicating the 
reality of the dialogue between Derviş and Hafız Ahmet, he did not go into detail. As 
will be demonstrated later in this section, the judge introduced the content of sub-
stantial materials, such as letters written between the prominent figures of the order, 
in order to prove the activities of the order. The judge thus cornered the authors of 
these letters. For this reason, it is quite surprising why the judge did not display all 
the evidence that the court supposedly held regarding the alleged conversation be-
tween Hafız Ahmet and Derviş.  
As stated, other perpetrators, Ramazan, Nalıncı, and Küçük Hasan continued 
to state their ignorance about that conversation. Mehmet Emin further emphasized 
that he had heard it from Derviş and Fırıncı Ahmet, another inhabitant of Manisa, 
who was also charged with being a disciple of the order.353 When questioned about 
the topic, Fırıncı Ahmet expressed he had heard this story from Sütçü Mehmet, an-
other member of Derviş’s company, who was killed by soldiers in Menemen.354  
Thus, the story about Hafız Ahmet’s ratification of Derviş Mehmet as the 
Mahdi is unfounded. It seems Mehmet Emin’s ungrounded story intended to discred-
it all leaders of the order. As opposed to Mehmet Emin’s account, Hafız Ahmet’s 
sounds reasonable. Indeed, he had a large audience and one of them would have re-
ported to the authorities if he made an inappropriate statement.  
There were other equivocal matters stated by the perpetrators. Still, no matter 
how equivocal, expressions of the perpetrators formed the basis of the charges 
brought against the Nakşibendi order that it arranged the Menemen Incident. The 
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idea was to adduce the accusations in perpetrators’ testimonies as substantial proof. 
According to the court, the perpetrators’ accounts would indicate the specific role 
that the order played in the incident. As the judge had already said previously in the 
court, he considered the statements of the perpetrators as true as their crimes were 
apparent. They had nothing to lose while others were seeking to hide the truth. In ad-
dition, as demonstrated before, the court process had already been determined to in-
flict the responsibility of the Menemen Incident on the Nakşibendi order. This had 
been decided prior to the trials. Given this decision (and presumption), the perpetra-
tors appear to have taken instructions from officials to make accusatory statements 
against the members of the order. It was evident that two of the perpetrators could 
not be sentenced to death due to the age limit. Only Mehmet Emin’s condition 
seemed fit for capital punishment and he pinned his hope on the court’s mercy for a 
probable pardon. Under such circumstances and particularly to reveal the supposed-
backstage of the event, the perpetrators attributed it to the malevolent aims of the 
Nakşibendi order and its members. The court kept on giving credence to the perpe-
trators’ sayings. 
The judge told Mehmet Emin that praying at home was not legally prohibit-
ed. Yet, he questioned him and friends about the cruel purposes of the prayer meet-
ings they held at home. He replied that the meetings discussed how the government’s 
aim was making every Muslim become disbelievers and infidels. According to 
Mehmet Emin, these statements subverted the republic and poisoned young minds. 
He said Derviş Mehmet served two ideas. First, he abused people to serve his inten-
tions. He poisoned their faith and made them smoke hashish. Second, he intended a 
crime against the republic by dreaming to re-establish the order of sheikhdom and 
dervish lodges. During meetings in Manisa, Derviş Mehmet continuously con-
demned the officers of the republic, for letting their family members, particularly the 
women, walk outside without clothes to cover their bodies fully.355  
Nalıncı Hasan initially mentioned Derviş Mehmet’s aims were put into words 
during their meetings in Tatılıcı Hüseyins’s house, in Manisa.356 He said additional 
meetings took place, to which Laz İbrahim, İzmirli Mehmet Ali Hoca, İmam İlyas 
Efendi, Şeyh Hakkı, Hacı Hilmi, Hafız Cemal, Hafız Ahmet, Ragıp Bey and Mutaf 
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Süleyman attended.357 He signified these gatherings as other occasions when the tar-
gets of the order were discussed. He emphasized that Laz İbrahim used to go to İs-
tanbul and return to the gathering with books relevant to the order. They used to per-
form the zikr after the night prayer. Later, as Nalıncı conveyed, Laz İbrahim men-
tioned the arrival of Sultan Abdülhamid’s sons as well as the re-establishment of the 
caliphate. Having retrieved the old regime, they would be able to easily perform their 
reciting. In other words, their fundamental aim and the subject matter of their meet-
ings was, according to the perpetrators, to overthrow the republican regime.358 
In this regard, the chief judge questioned Manifaturacı Osman Efendi as to 
the goals and content of the meetings and about his relationship with Laz İbrahim. 
He identified Laz İbrahim as his customer who used to come to his shop and that he 
had taken him as a guest to his home a few times. He said they would gather in each 
other’s homes, along with Ragıp Bey, Süleyman Efendi and İlyas Hoca. However, 
they never discussed anti-government concerns in any of the meetings. Osman 
Efendi told the court that those who asserted the opposite did not know what they 
were saying and named them as “mad.” He requested the chief judge to be deaf to 
the perpetrators’ allegations.359 Mehmet Emin intervened and asked Osman Efendi, 
“Then, from whom did Derviş Mehmet take his denominational inspiration, since he 
had no education from school or madrasa?”360 It must be re-noted that the only evi-
dence for the disparagement of the republican regime during the gatherings in ques-
tion was the accounts of the perpetrators. The extent to which the attendants of the 
meetings criticized the republic remains quite uncertain. This allegation might be 
true due to the aforementioned displeasure, particularly in religious terms, against the 
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secularist politics of the republic. The wish for the ancient regime might have lived 
on for a long time in conservative circles. However, the perpetrators’ statements do 
not prove this point. Their allegation that they stepped into action because of the 
people’s discontent with republican policies, as if people were ready follow them, is 
ungrounded. Their activities were of small-scale and flimsy. Despite the presence of 
displeasure with the republican policies in different extents and terms, the event was 
not an arranged riot rested on people’s support. 
Hafız Cemal, another person accused of participating the meetings in Manisa, 
initially defined himself as dignified and self-respecting. He told he despised going 
to coffeehouses and he met with his friends only at each other’s homes. There were 
only around four or five of them in total. They did not even think of talking about 
politics or the government. He told he respected İlyas and İbrahim Hoca since they 
were government officials. Osman Efendi was one of his colleagues, and Ragıp and 
Süleyman Efendi were his neighbours. Therefore, he knew all of them well, and they 
regularly went to each other’s houses and had heart-to-heart talks. At that point 
Nalıncı Hasan interrupted the conversation and claimed Hafız Cemal had been a 
member of the Nakşibendi order and made the villagers of Horos perform the zikr in 
a certain mosque.361  
As seen, the crimes to which Nalıncı referred were the activities of those who 
adhered to an order. Although dervish lodges were closed down in 1925, they were 
still present, but they remained underground. Indeed, the court’s charge was not to 
determine the extent to which the associates of the order were active. Nevertheless, 
the Chief Judge Muğlalı was probing the agents operating under the roof of the sufi 
order, in a manner that the court’s concern was to reveal whether the order was ac-
tive or not.  
Thereafter, Nalıncı turned to Ragıp, another participator in the Manisa meet-
ings, and asked him why they were denying the facts. Ragıp replied they were not as 
crazy as to act in opposition to the government’s prohibitions. He added he was not 
that mad to perform the zikr. For Ragıp, the perpetrators were criminals and were 
able to say anything they wanted. Nalıncı Hasan shouted “As long as these men in 
point stay present, the Republican regime would not be everlasting.”362  
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Cemal Efendi stated later that it was irrational and insensible for a few men to 
oppose the government.363 The judge then aggressively questioned Cemal Efendi as 
to whether he had known about Laz İbrahim’s previous detention for making a stim-
ulating speech in a sermon in Manisa. Cemal Efendi expressed that Laz İbrahim was 
released after the initial inquiry, and cleared of the charges. He asked the judge if 
Laz İbrahim would be released if he were guilty. When Mehmet Emin argued against 
him, Osman Efendi asked the judge how possibly a criminal, Mehmet Emin, could 
speak out against him. He required the court not to pay attention to Mehmet Emin’s 
assertions and not to rely upon them. Still, according to the judge, if Mehmet Emin 
had not seen Cemal Efendi, he would not have spoken about him.364 Here again one 
comes under the impression that the court had already decided to depend on the 
statements of the perpetrators and rule accordingly. 
Next, Ragıp Bey admitted his presence in Osman and Cemal Efendi’s houses 
along with Laz İbrahim. The judge asked the topics Laz İbrahim spoke about in the 
meetings. Ragıp Bey expressed they were religious issues and advice. The chief 
judge further questioned Ragıp Bey why he needed to be taught as if he did not know 
religious rules and conventions. Ragıp Bey described the topics as ordinary ones 
about praying to God.365 At that point Nalıncı Hasan accounted that Laz İbrahim told 
them to be extremely quiet in order not to alert the police while they were perform-
ing the zikr at İlyas Hoca’s house. Evidently, the judge was rather trying to uncloak 
religious gatherings and zikr performances as the background of the incident. 
Another defendant, Şeyh Hakkı Efendi, was accused of being a sheikh and 
gathering disciples around him in Manisa. He asserted that he did not know about the 
gatherings and had no claim to be a sheikh. Nalıncı Hasan and Mehmet Emin, how-
ever, indicated that he was indeed a sheikh. Hakkı Efendi said his brother was a 
sheikh before he died, but he himself was not. He also emphasized that one needed to 
have a certificate to become a sheikh, but he had none. At that point, Mehmet Emin 
                                                
363 Ibid., 32. Such sensible statements made in the court by some of the defendants reveal 
that something was not right. Indeed, how could those people be in charge of an attempt to 
overthrow the republican regime? The movement those insurgents initiated ceased quickly as 
soon as the battalions with machine guns arrived at the scene. Three of the insurgents were 
killed on the spot. Meanwhile, people were detained regardless of the extent of their partici-
pation in the event. 
364 Ibid., 33. 
365 Ibid. 
 95 
took the floor and asked how a certification for sheikhdom could still be present after 
the abolition of sheikhdom.366 Still, the trial records indicate that the attenders of the 
meetings in question did not contribute to Derviş’s actions in any way. Their only 
crime was to be in a meeting with Laz İbrahim, who was considered to be one of the 
main protagonists of the events that led to Kubilay’s killing. 
A letter written by Hafız Ali Osman to Şeyh Esat was read in the court as a 
concrete evidence. The date of the letter was 1930. The judge stated that Hafız Os-
man had previously said he was no longer interested in issues regarding the order. 
The letter proved otherwise. Another letter to the same effect was written to Hacı 
Hilmi, who was also charged with being a member of the order.367 The judge ex-
pressed that there were such as words as tarikat (sect) and ihvan (Muslim brother-
hood, fellows) that were signs of Osman’s relationship with the order. 
Another person accused of being a disciple of the order was Ahmet Muhtar 
Efendi. During his interrogation, the judge referred to an amulet found on Derviş. 
Ahmet Muhtar’s name was written on the amulet. He denied the charge and said he 
did not give it to Derviş. Yet the judge stated that the writing on the amulet was 
compared to his writing and found similar. Küçük Hasan stated that he saw Ahmet 
Muhtar once entering Derviş Mehmet’s house. Küçük Hasan also added how 
Derviş’s wife told him that Ahmet Muhtar had stayed at their home once. Ahmet 
Muhtar insisted that these statements were false. Nalıncı Hasan stressed that Derviş 
Mehmet was a disciple of Ahmet Muhtar. According to Nalıncı, once Ahmet Muhtar 
Efendi had asked Derviş Mehmet if he had wished to become a saint (veli). Derviş 
Mehmet said he wanted to and asked him to make him one. Thereafter Ahmet Mu-
htar told him to commit himself to the order. Derviş accepted the offer. Then Ahmet 
Muhtar brought forward the issue of his smoking hashish. When Derviş admitted it, 
Ahmet Muhtar made him promise not to smoke hashish again. Afterwards, Ahmet 
Muhtar taught him the many names of God and made him his dervish.368 Mehmet 
Emin also confirmed Ahmet Muhtar stayed at Derviş’s home. 
Nalıncı Hasan accused three additional inhabitants of Manisa for being der-
vishes with Hafız Ahmet as their sheikh. These individuals, Ahmetoğlu Mehmet 
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Çavuş, Tütüncü Hasanoğlu Hasan and Hüseyin Mazlum who were present in the tri-
al.369 The issue continued to be elucidating the memberships of the order. Although 
substantial evidence indicated that the order was active, there was by no means any 
element pointing to an attempt to riot. The transition of the court’s agenda towards 
establishing the activities of the membership of the order and uncovering the times 
and places of their zikr meetings was not incidental. After a certain point, the subject 
matter of the trials turned into testimonies regarding the existence of the order and 
the activities of certain detainees in this regard. Revealing the persons who were dis-
ciples did not shed light on the background of Derviş Mehmet’s attempt to revolt. 
The three men Nalıncı mentioned were acquitted. Among the aforementioned names, 
those charged with organizing meetings in their homes, Manifaturacı Osman Efendi, 
Hafız Cemal, İlyas Hoca, Ragıp Bey and Mutaf Süleyman Efendi were sentenced to 
capital punishment. The owner of the coffeehouse in which Derviş and his fellows 
initially gathered, Çırak Mustafa, who did not speak one single word during the trials 
and Tatlıcı Hüseyin whose home was the second meeting place were also given the 
death penalty. The aforementioned members of the Nakşibendi order, Hafız Ahmet 
and Ahmet Muhtar, shared the same fate. As for Hafız Ali Osman and Hacı Hilmi, 
they received imprisonment for one year, while Şeyh Hakkı Efendi was acquitted.370  
3.8.1. Laz İbrahim 
Laz İbrahim had been an imam in a military regiment of Manisa for three 
years. He was introduced as the real intriguer behind the Menemen Incident. He al-
legedly motivated Derviş Mehmet to initiate a rebellion against the republic. The 
judge asserted that Laz İbrahim did not commit such an act on his own but he took 
instructions from Şeyh Esat, the leader of the Nakşibendi order at the time. Nalıncı 
Hasan’s accounts were the primary evidence on which the charges against Laz 
İbrahim were based crimes. Nalıncı stated he had become a disciple of the order via 
Laz İbrahim.371  
Laz İbrahim was charged with recruiting people from Manisa and nearby vil-
lages for the Nakşibendi order. He convinced people to dedicate themselves to the 
order. He spoke of the republican politics critically and talked about the re-opening 
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of dervish lodges. The judge questioned Nalıncı as to whether Laz İbrahim organized 
secret meetings in the villages or not. Nalıncı replied that he did not know about any 
secret organization, but he remarked that Laz İbrahim made people perform the zikr 
after the prayers (namaz). He stated that Laz İbrahim advised people not to be afraid 
of the government. He further said the government could not prevent their reciting.372 
Mehmet Emin as well stated Laz İbrahim was an important person in the Nakşibendi 
order and an enemy of the republic. He added that the organization and its members 
acted against the republic by hiding behind religion. Laz İbrahim was reported to 
have referred to people who wore hats as infidels.373  
Laz İbrahim was not consistent in his replies. He initially mentioned having a 
poor memory and an impairment of consciousness. He said he had a heart condition 
and an eye disease as well and he was not able to see clearly. It is quite difficult to 
determine to what extent these weaknesses were true and affected him during the tri-
al. It is apparent that he tried to avoid the pressure which the judge put on him. When 
asked about whose home they had been gathering in in Manisa, he said he did not 
remember, but their meetings did not involve conversations about politics or the 
government. He said they only discussed the Prophet’s sayings and he gave advice 
only about religious issues.374 To support his claims, he cited some verses from the 
Qur’an, and stressed he was ready to take an oath.  
Laz İbrahim’s restless attitude, together with his other manners, reflected that 
he had been speaking against the government. He had also been organizing zikr rites 
and summoning people to the order. For example, when imam Mustafa Asım Efendi 
was brought to the witness stand, he said he knew Laz İbrahim in the past. Laz 
İbrahim talked to him about the favours of being a dervish on several occasions. 
Mustafa Asım was not interested in becoming a dervish. Yet, Laz İbrahim insisted on 
the favours of being a dervish and suggested to Mustafa Asım to enlighten those who 
came to his mosque. At that point, Laz İbrahim became annoyed with Mustafa 
Asım’s resistance and told him “A person must take initiative actively and not be 
[driven like] an animal.”375 This report (and others) suggested that Laz İbrahim 
looked for imams to participate in the order organization and to train others and was 
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tense about the persistent rejection of the imams of his request -judging by his harsh 
words which Asım Efendi could clearly remember.376  
Another witness Uncu Mehmet Emin Efendi explained in his sworn statement 
that the villagers of Horos had no connection with the order previously. Yet, Laz 
İbrahim came to the village in 1928 and recruited the villagers into the order. He 
took three of his fellows to İstanbul to kiss Şeyh Esat’s hand. When questioned by 
the judge about other issues, Uncu said Laz İbrahim was taken to court for saying 
that anyone who dances is an infidel.  
Another incident of Laz İbrahim was that he had argued against the hat act 
and was reported by the village headman of Horos, İbrahim.377 Laz İbrahim remind-
ed the court that those charges against him were dropped and asked the judge if it 
were legal to be interrogated again for the same charges. The judge responded that he 
wanted to examine Laz İbrahim’s past.378 The judge asked him about the zikr. Laz 
İbrahim expressed he recited God’s name at home on his own. He referred to a verse 
from the Qur’an in which reciting the name of God is advised. He also added that 
since zikr is a form of prayer, he performed it in the mosque as well. Nalıncı Hasan 
interrupted and said, “You are standing in the presence of a paşa of the republic but 
you still lie!” Mehmet Emin added, “What might the ignorant and illiterate ones do if 
scholars like Laz İbrahim act in such impulsive ways.” Laz İbrahim said reciting 
God’s name was not a crime. In return, the judge stressed everyone can pray at home 
or recite, but he blamed Laz İbrahim for gathering naive people around him and poi-
soning their minds behind the mask of the order. Laz İbrahim stressed the purpose of 
his reciting was not what the judge claimed. He added he did not break the law.379 
Thus, this interrogation as well developed along similar lines to previous ones. In-
stead of investigating the degree and forms of the role Laz İbrahim played in the 
Menemen Incident, his interrogations revolved around his organization of zikr per-
formances and his working for the benefit of the order. 
Nalıncı accounted for his visit to the mansion of Şeyh Esat in Erenköy in de-
tail. This narration is significant in indicating the unreliability of the statements of 
the perpetrators about the position of the order’s notable leaders. Nalıncı told the 
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court that he stayed there for eleven days. During his stay, Laz İbrahim was there as 
well. One day, while Nalıncı, Laz İbrahim, Şeyh Esat and others were having a con-
versation, they asked Nalıncı to leave the room and let them talk in private. Nalıncı 
said he left the room but stayed in front of the door to listen to the conversation. He 
alleged that, in the room, Laz İbrahim told the others that the caliphate would be re-
constituted, and the dervish lodges would soon be re-established. The Hat Act would 
be repealed and wearing the fes would be brought back. In other words, allegedly 
they were engaged in conversations against the republican government.380 In re-
sponse, Laz İbrahim admitted that they stayed at Şeyh Esat’s house. Moreover he 
agreed that they asked Nalıncı to leave the room. So Nalıncı did not hear what was 
said. But he stated that obviously Nalıncı was lying about the nature of their conver-
sation.381 Indeed, it is quite uncertain whether Nalıncı could have heard the talks be-
hind closed doors. Still, the authenticity of the story did not have great influence on 
the profile of Laz İbrahim due to his prevailing antagonism against the republic, in 
the eyes of the court. However, Nalıncı’s account made Şeyh Esat liable for hostility 
against the state. Regardless of the truthfulness of the story and because the court did 
not care to verify it, Şeyh Esat became implicitly connected to the Menemen Inci-
dent.  
As it will be further discussed below in detail, Esat had nothing to do with the 
event in reality. Nalıncı’s story provided the basis of the court’s opinion about Şeyh 
Esat’s antagonism to the republic. In addition, Esat was accused of and charged with 
instructing Laz İbrahim to undertake a rebellion. Again according to Nalıncı, at one 
point, he and Laz İbrahim were walking in İstanbul, and Laz İbrahim pointed to two 
battleships and told him that the sons of Abdülhamid II were waiting inside for the 
caliphate order to be re-established soon.382 This was only an assertion by Nalıncı, 
and there is no way to know whether or not Laz İbrahim told such things. 
The concrete materials against Laz İbrahim were letters written by him, Şeyh 
Esat’s son Mehmet Ali Efendi, and Şeyh Esat himself. In one letter written by Laz 
İbrahim to Mehmet Ali in 1928, he mentioned he had no fault in a certain matter and 
begged Şeyh Esat’s pardon. In addition, Laz İbrahim stressed his efforts to increase 
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the public’s sympathy towards Şeyh Esat in the region.383 The letter in question was 
a reply of Laz İbrahim to a former letter by Mehmet Ali. In the former one, Laz 
İbrahim was warned to know his own bounds. He was told not to go over Şeyh 
Esat’s authority while conducting the order’s work. The judge interpreted what was 
written in these letters as evidence of Laz İbrahim’s full commitment to the better-
ment of the Nakşibendi order.384  
Other letters written by Şeyh Esat to some others about Laz İbrahim were 
mentioned in the trials as well. In one of these letters, Şeyh Esat notified a certain 
person about where to find Laz İbrahim.385 In another one, Esat informed someone 
that Laz İbrahim was with him in İstanbul386 Another letter included Esat’s statement 
that a district governorship was established in Sarıyer, and Laz İbrahim had applied 
to the mediators and their “dear friends (muhib)” to be appointed as mufti there.387 
The letters in question evidently show the mutual acquaintance between Şeyh Esat 
and Laz İbrahim. Thus, they can be seen as implicit evidence that the order remained 
active. Nevertheless, the letters provide not a single piece of information about the 
Menemen Incident or Derviş Mehmet and his followers. 
Afterwards in the trials, facing the judge’s insistent questioning, Laz İbrahim 
altered his statements and pretended to be confessing. Addressing the judge, he said 
he was at fault for performing the zikr and regretted to be advising everyone to do 
so.388 He told giving people religious advice was his fault. He pretended as if he had 
just comprehended that the order was harmful. He took a step back and yielded to the 
judge’s negative attitude and adverse interpretations. But he never admitted anything 
related to the Menemen Incident.  
However, the judge did not seem to be convinced by his explanations. He 
continued to question him harshly. He asked him why did he invite others to join the 
order. Moreover, he questioned why he tried to attract supporters to the order even 
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though Şeyh Esat had retired after the abolition of the lodges. At that point, Laz 
İbrahim expressed one of the vital points of the case. He stated that, because of the 
atmosphere of the period after the abolition of the lodges, the Menemen event was 
made to look as an undertaking of dervishes. He implied that the three perpetrators 
were intentionally casting aspersions on him and on others. However, according to 
Laz İbrahim, the members of the Nakşibendi order were loyal to the government.389  
These last statements of Laz İbrahim were truthful. As discussed in various 
sections of the present work, the state officers were completely aware of the presence 
of the order. In the meeting in Dolmabahçe on 2 January 1931, Mustafa Kemal re-
ceived a report from Şükrü (Kaya) about the Menemen Incident as well as the sufi 
activities of religious circles in certain regions of the country. Mustafa Kemal’s fol-
lowing meeting on 7 January in Çankaya plainly demonstrated that top government 
officials had inherently known about the activeness of the order and stressed their de-
termination to annihilate all religious orders for the sake of the republic. 
3.8.2. Şeyh Esat 
Şeyh Esat, was the leader the Nakşibendi order at the time of the Menemen 
Incident. As it is stated above, Nalıncı Hasan claimed to have overheard a conversa-
tion in Şeyh Esat’s mansion, where anti-government issues were discussed. He stated 
that the people taking part in the conversation said the caliphate order and the dervish 
lodges would soon be reconstituted. This was the only testimony implicitly hinting 
that Şeyh Esat was involved in the Menemen Incident. Şeyh Esat as well gave tem-
perate statements, seeking to refrain from any kind of tension between him and the 
judge. He was 83 years old and exhausted at the time. His initial sayings indicated he 
had no criminal record and a clean past, and the government had never had any is-
sues with him.390 
Şeyh Esat admitted the guests came to his mansion and stayed for days. He 
stressed he remained to preach people after the abolition of the sheikhdom. The 
judge asked if there had been any kind of procedure with which a guest had to com-
ply, prior to coming to his presence. The judge pointed out few letters in which there 
were instructions for guests to follow.391 
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The Judge further questioned Esat to what extent the order was concerned 
with the superficial events. Having presumed that the sects had been depending pri-
marily on esoteric and internal issues, the judge asked if they were involved in any 
physical action in the world. Esat said the order had no connection to superficial mat-
ters. Another question was what were the essences and features of the order. Esat re-
counted five elements: heart, mystery, soul, privacy/secrecy and faith (kalp, sır, ruh, 
hafa, iman). The Judge further asked him to elaborate on the element of mystery. 
When Esat defined it as a divine grace of God, the judge inquired what the intention 
of the order was regarding this element. Esat spoke of some mystical details, none of 
which were relevant to the society or policy, so the judge changed the topic.392 
There were other letters brought forth during the trials. They were written by 
Şeyh Esat to his son Mehmet Ali. The letters involved Esat’s recommendations to his 
son about the development of the order. The judge told Şeyh Esat that it was good 
for a father to advise his son, but as far as he could understand from the letter, Esat 
had assigned the organization of the order to his son. Esat stressed that his letters 
were not specifically about the order. He alleged to have been merely advising his 
not to lose his way.393 
Later, the judge asked Şeyh Esat whether he was on good terms with Laz 
İbrahim. He answered he knew Laz İbrahim as a sincere person. When questioned 
about his son’s warnings about Laz İbrahim, Esat’s reply was the same; he said he 
knew Laz İbrahim as a well-intentioned man.394 However, Esat’s son Mehmet Ali 
told that he had warned his father against Laz İbrahim, in view of his blameworthy 
actions. Despite this concern, according to Mehmet Ali, his father was a naive old 
man and kept in touch with Laz İbrahim.395  
Mehmet Ali said he did not take care of the order’s business. He also empha-
sized his loyal services to the country. He asserted that he had not been involved in 
any counter political movement against the government.396 He added that he had 
been away from his father and did not intervene in his affairs. He was not aware of 
the zikr recitals and it would not have been suitable for their social status to be en-
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gaged in such activity, which was forbidden by the government. He claimed Laz 
İbrahim did not listen to him. Mehmet Ali asserted that he had been worried about 
Laz İbrahim’s probable actions when Laz İbrahim told him he was going to Manisa. 
Mehmet Ali said he advised Laz İbrahim not to go, yet he did not listen.397 Neverthe-
less, particularly the last statement of Mehmet Ali was rather ostensible. He appears 
to be seeking to impress the court that he was really concerned about Laz İbrahim’s 
presumptive and harmful conduct. In order to justify himself and to prove his inno-
cence, Mehmet Ali further implicitly accused Laz İbrahim of being the agent of sub-
sequent happenings upon his arrival at Manisa. However, as mentioned before, there 
was no substantial evidence revealing that Laz İbrahim or any other local associate 
of the order contributed to the Menemen Incident. 
When the prosecutor indicted Şeyh Esat for being among the instigators of 
the Menemen Incident, Şeyh Esat told he was astonished at the prosecutor’s opin-
ions. He stated that they loved the government and remained very obedient to it. He 
told that the government banned performing the zikr and founding orders, but not 
welcoming guests and advising them. If hosting guests was banned as well, then he 
had nothing else to say. He repeated that he had no former criminal reports. He re-
fused the allegation that his greeting of guests and advising them caused any damage. 
He asked the judge to clarify the terms by which he was charged guilty. He asked 
what offenses had he committed exactly. He said he did not accept charges based on 
presumptions and probabilities. He added that he was uncomfortable and had not 
slept, so he had become confused and tired. He also asked for the mercy of the court. 
The chief judge assured him about the justice of the court and expressed his best 
wishes.398  
Şeyh Esat was right in being surprised about the charges brought against him. 
Similar to other members of the order, a link was somehow established between him 
and the actions of Derviş Mehmet. The judge maintained his pursuit to ultimately 
prove that the order remained active. Interrogations of Şeyh Esat aimed to indicate 
the presence of a leader whose words were still welcomed, respected and obeyed. 
These steps of the court aimed at establishing the basis of the punishment of a crime, 
although they were not about the Menemen Incident. The interrogations focused on 
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revealing that the order had a leader and followers and continued its (religious) activ-
ities –but did not (could not) prove a connection between these activities and the 
Menemen Incident. Nevertheless, prominent figures of the order mentioned here 
were eventually sentenced to the death penalty for their involvement in the Menemen 
Incident.  
None of Esat’s objections were taken into consideration. His interrogation 
consisted of his affairs related with the order while he was charged with instigating 
the insurgents involved in a reactionist revolt. Furthermore, as mentioned above, his 
activities had already been under surveillance. Laz İbrahim during his interrogation 
had remarked that the provision of the law regarding the closure of dervish lodges 
did not include restrictions for people to pay visits to sheikhs. Moreover, the mansion 
of Şeyh Esat had always been under police surveillance.399 Police officers and the 
police captain occasionally came to the mansion to observe the situation. Therefore 
the activities in the mansion were not illegal or clandestine. If an incident or move-
ment had occurred against the government there, it would instantly become evident 
and officials would have intervened.400  
There were as well newspaper reports about the surveillance of Şeyh Esat.401 
The martial court sent an information request to the attorney general of İstanbul re-
garding this issue.402 The Prosecution Office assigned the request to the Police De-
partment of İstanbul on 5 February 1931. In reply, the Security Directorate stated 
that the mansion of Şeyh Esat had been under surveillance de facto. It was deter-
mined that visitors came to the mansion from various cities, bearing gifts. Particular-
ly on Fridays, many guests from the city centre of İstanbul visited the sheikh and this 
was reported to the Department of the Interior. The Security Directorate emphasized 
that they infiltrated the order by placing an officer who knew Esat to work as a serv-
ant in the mansion. The agent reported back and stated that no religious ceremonies 
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or zikr performances happened in the mansion. The Security Directorate stated the 
officials sought to “create” grounds to necessitate legal intervention. In this way, 
they had been in touch with the Security Chief Office of Konya, where a relevant 
event had taken place. They asked information, which would be sufficient for them 
to start the investigation on Şeyh Esat’s work regarding the order’s activities. The 
police department of İstanbul stressed that the officials had not received any confir-
mation from Konya at that time. Consequently, the Security Directorate of İstanbul 
could not commence an investigation about Şeyh Esat.403 
3.9. Suspicious Aspects of the Judicial Process 
This section aims to discuss certain suspicious situations that came to light 
during the trials. For example, the names of some detainees who were present in the 
trials were not included in the decision text of the court. Some of the defendants 
claimed their statements were falsified. Certain others asserted they were forced into 
admitting to accusations when they were first interrogated in the gendarme or police 
stations. For instance, İbrahimoğlu İsmail said he had not applauded while the events 
were taking place. However, when he was first taken to the station, the captain prom-
ised him he would be set free as soon as he confessed and admitted to applauding.404 
By false persuasion, he confessed he applauded, but then he was arrested.405  
Another defendant who faced the same situation was Berber (Barber) Hafız 
Ahmet. He was accused of firing a rifle from the mosque minaret to the gendarme 
while the insurgents were beheading Fehmi.406 Hafız Ahmet stated that a disorder 
occurred after a gunshot (probably the shooting of Mustafa Fehmi). There he en-
countered a soldier who asked him to climb to the minaret and check whether 
Menemen was surrounded by 70,000 men or not. When he climbed the minaret, an-
other gun was fired, but he could not go up to the balcony of the minaret. Later in the 
day, he was called to help gather the corpses. He went to the office of the gendarme 
to give his statement. The officers told him to admit to be reciting the ezan (call to 
the prayers) while he was up in the minaret, so they could save him.  Hafız Ahmet 
claimed he did not say he recited the call, and he told them he did not witness any-
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thing. Moreover, he directly addressed the judge and told him to interrogate the per-
petrators and ask them if he had done anything wrong. 407  In other words, 
İbrahimoğlu İsmail and Berber Hafız Ahmet made the same assertion that they were 
imposed on to admit the charges made against them. Nevertheless, Hafız Ahmet was 
acquitted while İbrahimoğlu İsmail was executed due to perpetration in the second 
degree. The judicial basis of these different verdicts remains unclear.  
Another intriguing matter is related to Laz İbrahim. The judge questioned 
him about a letter he wrote to Hafız Osman Hoca when he was arrested.408 He admit-
ted to the letter in which he asked for pocket money from Hafız Osman as he was de-
tained unexpectedly and did not know where he was being taken. However, accord-
ing to Laz İbrahim, an anonymous sentence was added to the letter. He said he 
brought this point to the attention of the examining magistrate earlier and asserted 
that the sentence was added to the letter by government officers. The statement al-
legedly added to the letter was “Do not worry.” The judge did not press the matter 
since it was obvious that Laz İbrahim only asked for money in the letter.409 However, 
Laz İbrahim’s assertion is quite interesting in revealing the extent of the lack of evi-
dence. The officers might have tried to plant evidence particularly to pave the way 
for the court to conclude that the event was pre-planned. Since Laz İbrahim’s asser-
tion was neither falsified nor verified, it remains as a point that needs to be used with 
caution. 
Ayanoğlu Mehmet was among the ones whose names were not included in 
the decision text. He was questioned as to whether he was acquainted with the cap-
tured villains or the ones who fled. He asserted that he was detained and brought to 
Menemen anyway although he did not know the insurgents. It was not clear whether 
Ayanoğlu Mehmet told the truth or not.410 It seems, he was not charged with any 
crime but was detained and taken to the court. Nevertheless, his name was not in-
cluded in the decision text.411 Memetoğlu Halil was in the same situation. He said 
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that although he told the officials he was innocent and unaware of anything, the in-
vestigating magistrate issued his arrest warrant and he was brought to the court.412 
There was no court decision regarding Memetoğlu Halil either. 
Some of the anomalies observed in the trial process were probably the result 
of the regime’s strong reaction to the Menemen Incident. The distinctive point of 
Kubilay’s cruel murder was its attribution to Islamist reactionists. The perpetrators 
were seen as reactionists, and this perception ascribed significance to the event. Six 
armed men in a republican town, with a banner in their hands, declared Mahdism. 
They encouraged and attracted the interest of the townsfolk as spectators, although to 
a very proportion of them. The townspeople’s explicit and implicit support to the 
group, along with the beheading of Kubilay received harsh response from the regime, 
notably from the republican leaders. Given this reaction, the local law enforcement 
agents might have acted in a rush to prove that the inhabitants supported the demon-
strators. They used many means to achieve this end, including deceptive promises to 
make them admit to the accusations. In return, officers assured some of the respond-
ents that they would soon be set free. However, the reason why some of the defend-
ants came to the stand only once and then were never seen again was that the court 
probably recognized they had nothing to do with the event and sent them away. 
Two accused persons were sentenced to the death penalty by the martial court 
but the decision was reversed by the parliament. One of these persons was Talat Bey. 
During the trials, Mehmet Emin said Talat Bey was a dervish. For him, Talat was an 
important member of the order and had a significant position in the eyes of Şeyh 
Esat. He stated Talat Bey and Derviş Mehmet used to meet at Ali Çavuş’s coffee-
house. When the judge questioned Ali Çavuş as to whether Talat and Derviş Mehmet 
had met in his coffeehouse, he answered they had.413 Although the court decided on 
capital punishment for Talat Bey, the Justice Commission of the Parliament reversed 
the decision and gave him two years of imprisonment instead. 
Keçeci İsmail414 from Paşa Village was the second detainee whose verdict 
was changed to two years of imprisonment. His situation was, at the same time, the 
first of the two cases in which the perpetrators changed their testimonies. Based on 
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the initial statements of the perpetrators, he was accused of taking Derviş Mehmet 
and his company into his car. He was found guilty as charged. The accusations held 
that Derviş Mehmet got in Kahya (Keçeci) İsmail’s car and set off to the village of 
Paşa along with others.415 Later in the concluding remarks of the trials, Mehmet 
Emin stated that his mind felt fuzzy previously when he said Keçeci had taken them 
into his car. He changed his statement and said they only had been in Keçeci’s home 
but not in his car. Küçük Hasan as well said they stayed at Keçeci’s home for an 
hour.416 Still, the alterations in the statements did not influence the court decision at 
first. Keçeci İsmail was among the persons who were sentenced to capital punish-
ment. However, as in the case of Talat Bey, the Justice Commission of the National 
Assembly changed the decision and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment. 
The commission’s justification of changing the court’s sentence in these two cases is 
unknown. 
The second case involving a change in the perpetrators’ statements took place 
during Saffet Hoca’s interrogations. The distinctive point of Saffet Hoca is that he 
was charged with being an instigator of the actions of Derviş Mehmet and his fel-
lows. As pointed out in the second chapter, testimonial statements and official narra-
tions agreed on Saffet Hoca’s doings in the scene of the event. He had not joined in 
Derviş’s group. While the group went around the town, Derviş met Saffet, then 
summoned his men, and lined them up. He made them show their guns in the pres-
ence of Saffet. Still, Saffet did not join to the group, and went home.  
During the interrogation regarding Saffet’s acquaintance with Derviş, Nalıncı 
Hasan said that he came across Derviş Mehmet and Şeyh Saffet one day three weeks 
prior to the incident. They were next to a pine grove and were talking in Greek. They 
offered him a cigarette, and shortly after, Nalıncı left them. But he stayed close in 
order to spy on them. Although Nalıncı stated that they talked to each other for an 
hour, he did not give details about the conversation. Another day, again according to 
Nalıncı, Saffet saw him and took him to an olive grove. Saffet pulled a piece of paper 
from his pocket, wrote something down on it and gave it to Nalıncı to deliver to 
Derviş Mehmet. He took the note, but he had no information about what was written 
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in it. What is interesting in this case is that even the court judges did not ask what 
was written in the note.417 
In the court, Saffet Hoca initially gave details about his life to prove his point 
that he was not involved in the crime. He emphasized his full commitment to the bet-
terment of the country, as did many of the defendants. He gave well-known names of 
some generals with whom he had fought side by side during the War of Independ-
ence. He also mentioned some important names as mutual acquaintances. All these 
acquaintances were of the intellectual class. He told that after the occupation, he ap-
plied to jobs and was appointed as the Preacher of Manisa. His preaching was in 
complete accordance with the instructions of the programme assigned by the Direc-
torate of Religious Affairs. He claimed his preaching he had nothing to do with the 
opposition to the government and included explicit,  self-evident topics.418  
Saffet rejected all the allegations and stated that if it were established that he 
had known even the name of Derviş Mehmet previously, he would comply with the 
decision of the court. Saffet’s statements were at a higher intellectual level compared 
to most others. He pleaded his innocence in an effective and literary discourse. He 
swore an oath to the effect that he by no means had any relationship with the reac-
tionist movement and was ready to do anything to justify that his hands were 
clean.419 He stated it was him as a scholar who declared there was no such thing as 
the Mahdi twenty years ago. He warned people not to believe in such supersti-
tions.420 However, according to Mehmet Emin’s statements, they went to the mosque 
and listened to Saffet Hoca’s sermons.421 According to Mehmet Emin, though he did 
not see any personal contact between them, Derviş had been inspired by Saffet Hoca. 
Again according to Mehmet Emin, everyone knew that Derviş depended on Saffet 
Hoca.422 
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Saffet Hoca’s defence, thus, did not influence the court’s decision. In the 
general opinion as to the accusations, he was considered among the principal actors 
of the crime.423 However, during the concluding remarks of the detainees, an inter-
esting situation occurred. “As the chairmanship of the court considered necessary,” 
Küçük Hasan was “re-questioned” about a dream he had while residing in Bozalan. 
He gave a statement conflicting with other accounts. Küçük Hasan, in his new state-
ment, alleged that on the day of their departure to Menemen, Derviş Mehmet ques-
tioned the members of the company as to what they dreamed of during the former 
night. Küçük Hasan said he saw a hoca who would help the company when they ar-
rived at Menemen. Since Nalıncı Hasan had often been to Menemen to sell pattens, 
Derviş asked him: “Who would be the hoca to help us upon our arrival at Mene-
men?” Nalıncı Hasan replied the hoca must have been Saffet in Menemen. At first, 
the judge had not questioned any of the perpetrators regarding any dreams in the 
course of the trials. Nalıncı had emphasized earlier in the trials that Derviş had said 
they would go to the home of Saffet Hoca in Menemen and would take measures 
against the government.424 Mehmet Emin also stated Derviş informed them that they 
would stay at Saffet Hoca’s house for one night.425 As for Küçük Hasan, it was 
Nalıncı who had mentioned Saffet Hoca, not Derviş himself.426 That is to say, the 
judge intentionally brought up the subject of dream and made Küçük Hasan change 
the content of the aforementioned conversation. In other words, it was an interven-
tion at the end of the trials on the way to proclaim Saffet’s innocence. 
Saffet Hoca’s wife wrote a letter and submitted it to the chief judge. It was 
highly literate and stated Saffet’s innocence by praising the government and express-
ing their trust in the court’s justice. It touched upon the lack of evidence against 
him.427 At the end of the trials, Saffet was acquitted due to lack of evidence.428 Saf-
fet’s situation was quite unusual compared to others who were charged with support-
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ing Derviş’s actions. All the other prominent detainees were sentenced to heavy pen-
alties, most of them to capital punishment. Although the evidence against the other 
prominent figures was as unjustifiable as that against Saffet, his name was somehow 
cleared. The real reason why he was acquitted still remains as unknown. 
A final point that needs to be mentioned here is the judge’s attitude towards 
the detainees regarding the alleged crimes. The persons whose crimes were obvious 
did not have much to say. They merely rejected the accusations, but did not defend 
themselves from various aspects. For example it was plain that the villagers hosted 
the company, and they pleaded themselves in simple terms. In some of the cases 
though, such as the case of the defendants from Manisa who were assumed to be be-
hind the events, the chief judge brought forward evidence such as letters and state-
ments, pointing to the crime of the person in question. Nevertheless, he usually did 
not expand on the assumed concrete proofs that he mentioned to be present, and 
passed on.  
The trials did not only exhibit counter evidence and statements against the de-
tainees. It became apparent that there had been suspicious situations that occurred 
during the interrogations made by the gendarme, police and investigating magistrate. 
Some respondents were misled by officers, records disappeared, and there were alle-
gations that officers planted evidence. Such suspicions cast doubt on the judicial pro-
cess. It can be argued that the court had already made its final decision at the very 
beginning that the event was planned by a religious order to harm the republic, and 
this is why the contradictions in the judicial process did not matter. 
3.10. Court in the Name of the Republic 
The attitude and statements of the chief judge demonstrated that he was posi-
tioned as the representative of the republic. He was acting on behalf of the regime ra-
ther than seeking to establish the justice. Thus, examining his expressions help un-
derstand various aspects from which the Menemen Incident was perceived by the 
state. He explained what the republic would have expected the people to do in the 
case of such an incident. Moreover, when religious issues were brought forth, the 
judge’s explanations reflected the general policies of the republic on public-religion 
relations. Among the interrogations, he frequently assured the defendants of the ul-
timate justice of the court. 
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The chief judge stated there had never been such an incident in history in 
which an officer was slayed in front of many citizens. He condemned the defendants 
for standing by as spectators.429 He occasionally questioned the defenders one on one 
to see why they did not take a stand against the six insurgents as a crowd collective-
ly. He asked if they had been so afraid of Derviş that they became paralyzed.430 He 
further questioned them angrily if their lives were much more precious than that of 
the officer who was killed. Another question was if they would run away when a 
robber entered their homes and cut their wives and children, as “unmanly” as they 
did in Menemen. He argued that they could have intervened in the shameful event in 
one way or another, even though they were unarmed. By not doing so, for the judge, 
the defendants dishonoured Turkish history.431 
As for the chief judge’s accounts on personal and religious affairs, he stated 
that fulfilling the duties of Islam was a necessity. Every Muslim was to know God, 
recognize the Prophet, and pray.432 Anyone could perform zikr when alone, since 
worship was the most sacred duty of Muslims. In one particular interrogation, an ac-
cused person, as a strategy of defence, stated that far from being a dervish, he did not 
even perform salaat. The judge admonished the man, telling him he ought to perform 
salaat and if he did not, he was at fault. For the judge, saying “I do not perform sa-
laat” was not a defensive argument; “a Muslim man could not talk in such manner,” 
it was shameful for him to say “I do not even perform salaat” to defend himself.433 
When he asked the detainees to tell the truth about the issue, he sometimes evoked 
religious phrases such as “God is the helper of the one who tells the truth.”434 
During his interrogation about his connection with the villagers of Horos, Laz 
İbrahim said some of the peasants did not know how to perform ablution. They were 
so ignorant that some of the inhabitants even thought God was situated in İstanbul. 
He said this was why he preached to the villagers. When the chief judge asked the 
villagers of Horos about this, they admitted their ignorance. They stated Laz İbrahim 
taught them the rules and conventions of Islam. In return, the judge expressed his 
surprise and asked how they possibly had not known how to perform their ablutions. 
                                                
429 Ibid., 26. 
430 Ibid., 24. 
431 Ibid., 26. 
432 Ibid., 62. 
433 Ibid., 70. 
434 Ibid., 31. 
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He asked them if they were not Muslims, since they did not know such a fundamen-
tal element of Islam.435 According to the judge, there were preceptors who possessed 
scholarly competence and were assigned by the government to explain and educate 
people about religious matters. He then asked, why would one regard being directed 
by someone else about religion necessary? Laz İbrahim said his purpose was to re-
cruit people to do good and be benevolent. He taught people that doing good things 
was among the provisions of the Qur’an and asked the judge if what he did was a sin. 
The judge replied that illiterate people might seek a scholar to learn from. Laz 
İbrahim metaphorically responded that “the people are so much ill that the doctor is 
supposed to visit him personally.” He recounted that many of the villagers of Horos 
did not know how to perform salaat either. The judge’s response was that a patient 
ought to call a doctor himself, implicating that it was not their duty to go to people 
and instruct them about religion.436 The judge said a hoca might pray and recite 
God’s name in his home, which was praiseworthy. However, in this case, others 
were coming together in houses to discuss damaging issues.437 “One must not gather 
people around him and use religion as a means for other purposes. It is wrong to poi-
son people this way. Evil would occur if people come together to justify their inten-
tions religiously.”438  
After these statements of the judge, Laz İbrahim provided political examples. 
For him, until then, there had been approximately 10,000 pashas and deputies de-
pended on the government. Yet, for him, the hocas did not object to governmental 
acts since they had no intention of getting political positions in the state. However, 
the judge had a different opinion. For him, the nation had suffered much from the so-
called enlightened and scholarly members of the order. If one were to examine the 
four hundred years of Turkish history, one would realise that the followers of the 
Nakşibendi order had been poisoning naïve and poor Muslims under the roof of the 
order. For the judge, the order used the Turkish nation as an instrument. The judge 
then said that people who acted secretively had done harm to the country. Laz 
İbrahim restated that the people who had harmed the government were inside the 
parliament, or were among other important state officials, but there was no notable 
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religious person among them. However, the judge’s response was immediate and 
harsh. He referred to the rebellion of Şeyh Said and said the leader himself and his 
sixty followers were sheikhs.439 The judge stressed that the republic had no more en-
durance and patience left for them. Reactionist movements and revolts constantly oc-
curred so that consequently foreigners ridiculed the country. He asked the detainees 
how could this be possible.440 
The judge said the government of the country worked day and night for these 
lands, which had been blessed with the pure blood of Turks. For him, the court had 
been conducting detailed investigations in order to expose and punish the betrayers 
who tried to damage the state and the nation. The court was capable of distinguishing 
the cruel from the innocent. He stressed it was necessary to stop those who damaged 
the country. Common good and public interest required this action. Instead of four-
teen million Turkish people crying because of the actions of the traitors, it should be 
the insurgents who must shed tears.441 
3.11. Distortion of the Newspapers 
The officially-biased newspapers reported the judicial proceedings in their 
own terms. Along with conveying distorted information, they made the perpetrators’ 
statements particularly those related to the order, look trustworthy. As discussed ear-
lier, starting immediately on the day after the event, these newspapers described the 
incident as the planned revolt of a religious organization. Subsequently, they main-
tained and promoted this position. They analysed the perpetrators’ statements in 
terms of the malevolent and harmful intentions of the Nakşibendi order. The martial 
court facilitated great convenience for these reporters of these newspapers to observe 
the court process at all phases.442 
After the first session, Küçük Hasan was interestingly depicted as very intel-
ligent in the media.443 Küçük Hasan and Nalıncı Hasan were most probably ordered 
to tell everything they knew with exaggeration. They were probably told to degrade 
the Nakşibendi order and its associates, its leaders who were present in the trials.444 
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443 Cumhuriyet, January 16, 1931. 
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In return, they would be rewarded and not be sentenced to death because of the age 
limit. That praise of Küçük Hasan also provided the basis for the presumption that 
the perpetrators would tell the truth about everything. However, there were also false 
reports that the newspapers made up about the statements of the defendants. For in-
stance, it was asserted that Şeyh Esat told his son Mehmet Ali about his regret and 
that he wished he had not “become involved in such bloody affairs.”445 As discussed 
earlier, Şeyh Esat never said anything that implied his involvement in the incident.  
Mehmet Emin was asserted to have said in the first session that Derviş 
Mehmet had not performed the salaat but made his disciples do it. Nevertheless, 
Mehmet Emin did not say anything such as this in any session of the trials.446 A 
quarrel was also alleged to have taken place between Mehmet Emin and Ramazan in 
trials. While Ramazan was making statements, Mehmet Emin was reported to have 
intervened by saying: “Do not tell a lie to the court of the republic. Did you not adore 
Derviş Mehmet as if he were God?”447 Again such a dispute never occurred during 
the proceedings.448  
Another misleading article was about Raşitoğlu İbrahim, who allegedly said 
to the public, “You will get what you deserve three days later.” before the inci-
dent.449 According to the newspaper, although the accused refused to confess saying 
so, “some witnesses” asserted the truth of this statement. It is necessary to discuss 
this matter because the newspapers relied on these stories to indicate that the events 
had been pre-planned. As the issue came to the fore in the trials formerly, İbrahim 
was not addressing the “public” or telling the people publically about what was go-
ing to happen. This was merely a conversation between him and a certain Yusuf in 
                                                                                                                                     
chology of the defendants. They were sorrowing because they would rot in jail, but were 
glad also because being younger than twenty-one saved them from the death penalty. Cum-
huriyet, January 23-24, 1931; Milliyet, January 23, 1931. However, it was not the same for 
Mehmet Emin who was twenty-nine years old and could not take advantage of the age limit. 
He was more eager to cooperate with the court to reveal “the truth” in trials and more dis-
tressed outside the court room than the other two perpetrators. He kept telling that he was in-
nocent and deceived by Derviş Mehmet in desperate sadness. Yeni Asır, February 2, 1931. 
445 Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 9, 1931. 
446 Milliyet, January 16, 1931. 
447 Cumhuriyet, January 17, 1931. 
448 These newspaper reports are significant not only for reflecting the extent of the misinfor-
mation fabricated by the media, but also for showing how a good part of the literature pub-
lished on this matter later relied on these reports as their source, as if they conveyed true in-
formation. 
449 Milliyet, January 20, 1931. 
 116 
Menemen. During the trials, the judge as well initially took this account as evidence 
that İbrahim knew what would happen. Later, Yusuf Efendi and Mehmetoğlu Abdul-
lah, inhabitants of Menemen, were asked about the issue. They explained that while 
talking about the RPP organization in the town, İbrahim jokingly said, “Although 
you established the party organization, you will see what will happen.” Witnesses 
said İbrahim had been a supporter of FRP and he attended the party rally, which had 
been organized before the local elections in Menemen.450 That is to say, there were 
no “witnesses” insisting on the accuracy of the aforementioned sayings as alleged by 
the newspaper. Besides, Raşitoğlu İbrahim would be among the persons who were 
acquitted.  
There was distorted information about Saffet Hoca as well. Certain newspa-
pers reported Nalıncı Hasan to have stated that when they arrived at Menemen, first 
they went to the home of Saffet Hoca. Saffet did not answer the door initially. But 
then, he came and talked to Derviş Mehmet. There, Derviş promised him that if they 
were to achieve their goals, he would appoint Saffet’s uncle as a civil servant.451 One 
newspaper even defined him as “the would-be qaimaqam of Menemen under the as-
pired reactionary order.”452 However, news about Saffet Hoca had to be reversed be-
cause of his acquittal. The papers wrote “Saffet Hoca’s acquittal may seem bizarre at 
first glance” since the perpetrators had blamed Saffet Hoca for having a hand in the 
incident during the trials. As explained above, however, the concluding remarks of 
the detainees cleared Saffet of the blemishes. Nalıncı stated that what he had said 
about Saffet Hoca was only a dream and not true. This change of statement was as 
well reported and the court’s decision regarding the acquaintance of Saffet was 
commented as rightful.453 
3.12. Verdicts of the Martial Court and Executions 
The decisions of the court were read on the last day of the trials. There were 
serious judicial contradictions and ungrounded statements in the decision text. This 
was the case because the court was to rule reach certain designated verdicts after all. 
As previously discussed, the prosecutor’s arguments in the opinion as to the accusa-
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tions conflicted with the facts. The offences with which the prosecutor charged the 
detainees in the opinion as to the accusations were almost the same with the initial 
charges of the court. Decisions of the court accorded with initial charges and prose-
cutor’s opinion. So to say, the arguments of the defendants do not seem to have in-
fluenced verdicts. Only the women from the aforementioned villages, the female rel-
atives of the perpetrators, and some men who had no direct connection to the events 
or the order, were unconditionally released due to lack of evidence. 
In the opinion as to the accusations, the prosecutor had inferred that the event 
was not local but extensive in nature. He stated that the evidence revealed the pres-
ence of an organization as the real actor behind the incident. According to the prose-
cutor, the details of the intended event had been discussed and the attendants agreed 
on the steps to be taken in the last meeting held at Tatlıcı’s home in Manisa on 6 De-
cember 1930. This was a strategic point to link the actions in Menemen to Manisa. 
However, nothing about Menemen was mentioned in Manisa. As all the perpetrators 
expressed, though they took action with the purpose of declaring Mahdism, Derviş 
Mehmet firstly stressed his plan to go to Menemen in Bozalan. This is among the 
crucial points, which undermines all allegations that the riot had been pre-planned. 
As the newspapers of the era as well as subsequent narrations asserted, the insurgents 
chose Menemen deliberately because of the opposition of its people to government 
policies. But this reference to a deliberate choice is not true. As the perpetrators stat-
ed, Derviş asked them questions about Menemen just before they left Bozalan. It is 
difficult to determine whether Derviş had set his mind to going to Menemen from the 
beginning. Still, it is clear that the company did not depart from Manisa especially to 
arrive at Menemen. Although the prosecutor mentioned that Derviş gave hashish cig-
arettes in pairs to each of his disciples and that they entered the town under its influ-
ence,454 he still insisted they were acting according to plan. 
 In the opinion as to the accusations, the prosecutor expressed that he would 
bring the origins of the events to light. He emphasized it was the Nakşibendi order 
that trained the actors of Menemen and it was again the same order that had deceived 
the people by operating under the mask of the order. In the document, he gave some 
general information about the order and named Laz İbrahim the caliph of caliphs 
(halifeler halifesi). He stated that by traveling almost all over Anatolia, Laz İbrahim 
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made the roots of the order stronger. He was trying to empower it, while spreading 
his corrupt thoughts as an enemy of the state.455 In other words, the prosecutor de-
fined Laz İbrahim as a nemesis of the regime without remarking in detail on his al-
legedly hostile and maleficent actions.  
As for Şeyh Esat, the prosecutor stressed that as all the notebooks, letters and 
the like, found in the search during the investigations demonstrated, the order was 
“still active and he was its sheikh.”456 However, establishing this was not on the 
agenda of the court and hence it should not concern the prosecutor. For him, the evi-
dence about the Nakşibendi order explicitly revealed that it was a political organiza-
tion.457 Nevertheless, the way the Nakşibendi order was defined as a political agency 
was a fabrication. Neither a single political movement of the order was specified, nor 
a collective attempt of its members to intervene in the political arena was found.  
 The issues pointed out by the chief judge about the background organisation 
were recounted by the prosecutor as well. For instance he mentioned that there were 
meetings held in Manisa to which Laz İbrahim, Osman, Ragıp and others attended, 
and zikrs were performed. He expressed some of the men frequently went to İstanbul 
to visit Şeyh Esat. These were among the points made to justify that the order was 
the actual agency behind the events. He further spoke of Hafız Ahmet testing Giritli 
Mehmet to see if he were fit for Mahdism.458 The story was most probably a fabrica-
tion, as discussed earlier. However this story implicated that not only Hafız Ahmet 
but all hocas in question were associated with the events.459 The fact that Laz 
İbrahim made villagers of Horos disciples of the order was further irrelevantly de-
fined as a pointer of the incident as a planned action of the Nakşibendi order.  
The aforementioned letters of Şeyh Esat and Laz İbrahim were brought forth 
as evidence as well.460 As the most important element, the prosecutor emphasized 
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460 The statement in the document was as follows: “Anadolunun bir tarafında bulunan bir 
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that “all perpetrators claimed that the hocas in question were involved in the events”. 
In other words, the statements of the perpetrators were the justification of their accu-
sations against others. The perpetrators’ explanations regarding the purpose of the 
Nakşibendi order to overthrow the government, re-establish the dervish lodges and 
bring back the sultanate order reflected the reality because they said so. The only ev-
idence was Nalıncı’s supposed eavesdropping on a conversation in which “re-
constituting the caliphate order was discussed” in the mansion of Şeyh Esat.461 
 With a few exceptions, such as that about Saffet Hoca, the court’s verdicts 
corresponded to prosecutor’s charges. The detainees were sentenced to penalties on 
various grounds. Some of them were charged with forcibly attempting to change the 
constitution of the Republic of Turkey by declaring Mahdism. Another group was 
found guilty for joining the said attempts. Several others were convicted for helping 
insurgents, while some were accused of encouraging the public to join the riot. Pun-
ishments were inflicted according to the relevant provisions of the criminal code.462 
 The martial court passed sentences for 105 detainees on 25 January 1931. 
Seventy-eight of the arrested people were punished while twenty-seven were acquit-
ted, including all of the women. There were thirty-seven death sentences, however, 
six of them were later changed to imprisonment for twenty-four years, because of the 
age limit. Capital punishment verdicts of thirty-one men were submitted to the par-
liament for approval, along with the interrogation records of the court process. The 
Justice Commission of the Parliament examined the file, then approved twenty-eight 
of the capital punishments and submitted it to the Speaker’s Office for voting.463 The 
decision of the Commission was put to vote in the parliament and approved on 2 
February 1931.464 
All the notable dervishes and sheikhs charged with implicitly or explicitly 
participating in the Menemen Incident, those who hosted the group and supplied ma-
                                                                                                                                     
ed that they were entirely about religious issues or the business of the order such as perform-
ing zikrs and reciprocal regards. There was nothing about Menemen in those letters, or any 
indication that Laz İbrahim or others “trained” some activists as pioneers of forthcoming re-
bellions. Nevertheless, later on newspapers would define Laz İbrahim as “the Lawrence of 
reactionism.” Milliyet, February 5, 1931. 
461 Ibid., 81. 
462 Ibid., 87–9. 
463 One of the convicts died a natural death. The commission reversed the judgement of Talat 
Bey and Keçeci İsmail and converted them to imprisonment for two years. As accounted in 
the relevant section, the reason of this change was not specified and is still difficult to tell. 
464 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:25 Yirmi Beşinci İn’ikat,” February 2, 1931, 11. 
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terials for them, and the townspeople who were asserted to have applauded the de-
monstrators during the events were sentenced to capital punishment. Şeyh Esat was 
condemned to death and his punishment as well was changed since he was over-age. 
He died in hospital.465 
 The newspapers published news about the executions. The executions of the 
convicts were carried out one by one on 4 February, in various districts of Menemen 
including the governmental square and the market place.466 Mehmet Emin was 
hanged exactly the same place where Kubilay was beheaded.467 In order to make it 
be a lesson and make sure that all people observed, officers did not remove the bod-
ies but let them wait for several hours.468 There was a piece of paper on each of the 
bodies in which their crimes were written.469 Later on, the corpses were loaded on a 
truck and taken to the cemetery.470 
 Newspapers published the pictures of the hanged ones along with the photo-
graphs of the killed perpetrators on the day of the event as a deterrent to others. Ac-
cording to some newspapers, the executions were a sign showing that those who 
committed murder under the name of religion and tarikat would certainly be pun-
ished. “Within the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey, all such attempts would 
end the same way.”471 Newspaper reports in general conveyed the exact message that 
the republican regime intended to give. It must be noted that although the chief judge 
Muğlalı recurrently stated the maleficence of the order during the trials and the pros-
ecutor defined the Nakşibendi order as the enemy of the republic, the case of the 
Menemen Incident did not evolve into an operation to annihilate it. By inflicting se-
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vere punishments,472 the regime demonstrated its intolerance against the reactionist 
movements, no matter how they may have occurred. Apparently that was deemed as 
a sufficiently strong message that religion was for private life and should have no 
place in politics and governance. 
3.13. Subsequent Trials 
The martial court examined 606 files, which were prepared by investigating 
magistrates during the martial law. The court decided to hold trials for 272 files. It 
also decided non-prosecution for 255 and it had no jurisdiction for seventy-nine 
files.473 After the sentencing of the 105 detainees of the Menemen Incident, the mar-
tial court resumed the proceedings to hear the cases of the remaining 167 people. 
This second phase of the trials continued until the martial law was lifted on 8 
March.474 In this second stage, the trials were not conducted in the same way as the 
former ones. The trials were separated into various categories.475 
There were detainees from Bozalan, Alaşehir, Balıkesir, İstanbul, Eskişehir 
and other places. They were generally accused of breaking the law regarding the clo-
sure of dervish lodges, working to rebuild the orders, particularly the Nakşibendi or-
der, and subverting the regime by exploiting religion.476 Particular charges included 
membership in the order; continuing to be engaged in the activities of an order; visit-
ing, writing and receiving letters from sheikhs, performing rituals through gatherings 
at mosques and homes; not informing the law enforcement agencies about such ac-
tivities and the like. Sixty-one of the 167 detainees were given imprisonment sen-
tences ranging from two months to five years. These accusations as well as the evi-
dence regarding the associates of the order were almost the same as the ones in the 
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case of the Menemen Incident. Still, the martial court inflicted much lighter sentenc-
es in this second phase of the trials where half of the people in the sixty-one cases 
were given imprisonments for three months.477 
 The martial law in Menemen was removed on 8 March 1931, when the mar-
tial court resolved all the cases before it.478 Life in Menemen returned to normal and 
a bronze statue of Kubilay was erected in the governmental square.479 As soon as the 
trials in Menemen were concluded, National Assembly as well completed its third 
term and went on a break until the next elections. 
 
*** 
This chapter focused on the trials of the court process of the Menemen Inci-
dent. Rather than constituting a fair judicial process, it appeared to be a formalistic 
procedure intended to mark the Nakşibendi order as the planner of the incident. De-
spite the apparent lack of evidence, the leader of the order was found guilty of insti-
gating Derviş Mehmet to initiate a revolt against the republic. The conclusion of the 
legal proceedings that the event was a pre-planned anti-government rebellion, would 
be taken for granted unquestioningly by authors who wrote on this event in the fol-
lowing years.   
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CHAPTER 4 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND EVALUATIONS  
ABOUT THE MENEMEN INCIDENT 
A variety of diverse accounts make up the literature on the Menemen Inci-
dent. All of the writers we will review here claim that the information they present is 
based on the primary sources of the time. However, there are many contradictions 
between their accounts of the incident. Subsequent literature on the event is catego-
rized here in accordance with the statements and news reports, made right after the 
event by RPP leaders, officers and newspapers. I divide the accounts about the event 
that I discuss in this chapter into three main groups: officially-biased and misleading; 
counter-official and presumptive of conspiracy; and unbiased. Officially-biased nar-
ratives mainly rely on official statements made after the incident by RPP leaders as 
well as pro-government newspapers. Along with their biased approaches, almost all 
of the accounts discussed under this category include wrong information about spe-
cific aspects of the incident as well. Thus, bias and misinformation explored in this 
chapter are inseparably intertwined.  
Counter-official accounts include the similar manner as well. On the one 
hand, they specify noteworthy issues and ask questions which profoundly challenge 
officially-biased accounts. On the other hand, they also recount misinformation and 
speculations about the event. Their speculations even verge on presumptions of con-
spiracy. Thus, the significance of their critiques against officially-biased explana-
tions fall short because of their fictively conspiratorial stories.  
There are unbiased descriptions of many aspects of the incident, made by 
scholars. These studies constitute a third category. They are not prejudiced in the 
ways the former two categories are. Still, although they seek to understand the ac-
tions as well as the conditions under which the incident occurred, they make un-
grounded evaluations to provide causal explanations. Besides, these unbiased schol-
ars also recount, though to a small degree, misinformation particularly on the activi-
ties that took place prior to and on the day of the event. Some of the misleading in-
formation, rooted principally in newspapers and official statements of the era, has 
penetrated all the writings in a way that influenced even unbiased scholars.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to discuss all these categories of literature and 
to correct misleading information through grounding on substantial primary sources. 
By doing so, the context of the event is discussed, analyzed and interpreted from dif-
ferent angles. 
4.1. Officially-Biased and Misleading Accounts 
I will not discuss officially-biased accounts separately in this section. I divide 
these biased narrations into subtopics since they generally repeat the same issues as 
well as give the same sort of wrong information. I will indicate that officially-biased 
accounts converge on defining the Nakşibendi order as the agent of the incident. In 
this way, I will discuss the misleading information on the historical background of 
the order provided by these accounts. I will also argue how the order has been de-
picted as the enemy of the republic. The support that the people allegedly gave to 
“reactionism,” according to officially-biased narrations, is another subject matter of 
this section. I will also discuss the false presentations of the perpetrators. Another is-
sue of this section is the substantial infrastructure that the order was alleged to have 
prepared for such revolt. I will discuss the extent to which the relevant literature ex-
aggerated the insurgents’ actions. I will further explore the officially-biased ac-
counts’ coverage of the responsibility of the officers when the incident occurred. I 
will also point to the flaws of recent literature particularly concerning the actions of 
the company. Finally, I will discuss the officially-biased narratives’ attacks on FRP 
as being politically responsible for the event.  
4.1.1. The Nakşibendi Order as the Ultimate Culprit 
The basic point of the officially-biased literature is that the Nakşibendi order 
was the driving force behind the Menemen Incident. These authors did not fabricate 
this point on their own. Their sources were the newspapers of the era, official state-
ments and most significantly, the decision text of the martial court of Menemen. 
Once the court delivered this judgment about the order, that it was the agent that in-
stigated the incident, a large part of the subsequent narrations have taken it for grant-
ed. Thus, they have reiterated the decision of the court. 
 RPP leaders announced and continued to define the event as an act of the 
Nakşibendi order. For instance, in an interview he gave to a French journalist, İsmet 
Paşa expressed that someone was trying to hurt their reform efforts for civilization, 
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freedom and the republic. For this purpose, “Nakşibendi members carried out the in-
cident to revive an order that the republic can not tolerate any more.”480 This official 
notion has remained identical and the agents of the event are still thought of as asso-
ciates of a reactionist organization in the eyes of state. 
The predetermined verdict of the court has been the primary mainstay for of-
ficially-biased literature. On the whole, they narrated the event as far-reaching and 
organized by Nakşibendi followers with the specific phrase “according to the official 
records of the martial court of Menemen.” According to the officially-biased writers, 
official investigations and legal process revealed that it was not the act of a few mis-
creants and hashish addicts. Rather, for them, the Nakşibendi order was “its real sup-
porter,” “planner,” “effective power,” and “organizer.”481 “Inquiries uncovered that 
Derviş Mehmet was just a front man.”482 The center of the event was Manisa483 and 
many other arrangements were made elsewhere.484 Menemen was just one of the tar-
gets of the insurgents. Had the reactionist revolt not been suppressed, it would have 
expanded to other places. Therefore the Menemen Incident was nationwide in nature, 
rather than local.485 Newspaper accounts have also been a primary source for this 
type of narration. Such newspapers as Cumhuriyet “certainly validated” that the inci-
dent was preplanned.486 “Under the circumstances of 1930, national press made a 
                                                
480 Vakit, February 9, 1931. 
481 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 33–8; Erdinç Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki 
Tepkiler” (unpublished master thesis, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap 
Tarihi Enstitüsü, 2007), 101–3. 
482 In other words, the writer insinuates that the Nakşibendi order decided to step into action 
once Derviş Mehmet attracted supporters and claimed himself as the Mahdi. However, in the 
same article, the writer contradicts himself. He states; “Since it was brought to the light in 
the court process that the event was not broad in scope, subsequent trials dealt with giving an 
intimidation to religious orders. Capital punishments were executed but the inhabitants of 
Menemen were not banished.” Necdet Aysal, “Yönetsel Alanda Değişimler ve Devrim Ha-
reketlerine Karşı Gerici Tepkiler ‘Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,’” Ankara 
Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü 11, no. 44 (2009): 601, 610. In other words, Aysal 
is quite aware that the incident was not broad in scope, but he maintains his officially-biased 
position that the incident threatened the republic. 
483 Tabak, “Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını’nda Yankıları,” 315. 
484 Aslan Tufan Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939) (İs-
tanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1984), 239. Yazman states that he was a former 
neighbour of Kubilay. 
485 Nihal Gonca, “Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yıllarında Menemen Kazası (1923-1933)” (unpublished 
master thesis, Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2005), 72. 
486 Hikmet Çetinkaya as well described the event as a planned reactionist action, referring to 
the relevant reports of Cumhuriyet of which he was a reporter. As mentioned previously, he 
had an interview with Bedri Onat, a friend of Kubilay and a member of the Türk Ocakları. 
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significant contribution in conveying the truest and broadest information about the 
Menemen Incident to the country.”487 
4.1.2. On the Background of the Nakşibendi Order 
Some of the officially-biased accounts provide background information about 
the Nakşibendi order. They usually depend on secondary sources about Islamic faith 
and mysticism. The information they offer is limited and superficial. For instance, a 
master thesis asserts that in the essence of Nakşibendis there are some remnants of 
old Persian cults, particularly Zoroastrianism. “Nakşibendi rituals of reciting the 
names of God have adopted some patterns from Zoroastrianism.”488 This explanation 
does not only consider a grand order as simple and uniform, it also fails to substanti-
ate its comparison of two religious practices. İsmail Kurtoğlu, the writer of the thesis, 
does not point where and how these rituals resemble each other. He also does not 
give a single reference to scholarly studies regarding either the Zoroastrian or the 
Nakşibendi rituals.  
Another assertion of the officially-biased authors is that the Nakşibendi order 
was the sole social, political and ideological force which formed the cultural history 
of Asian Muslims, particularly under the Ottomans in the nineteenth century.489 
“Those establishments were initially constituted as religious and cultural centers but 
degenerated in time. On the one hand, they were addicted to lazing around and self 
indulgence, relying on the donations of rich Muslims to good causes and the poor, 
while on the other, they collected money from the humble folk under the name of 
sheikhdom.”490 
                                                                                                                                     
Onat’s expressions about the event and the inferences of Çetinkaya, all in the same book, are 
explicitly contrasting. Çetinkaya quotes Onat, “if we had known anything previously, we 
would have caught the insurgents tightly and prevented the incident. Those men had nothing 
in their minds. They were all exhausted and beaten up from smoking hashish.” Çetinkaya, 
Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 16, 21, 27, 28. In other words, people there knew that 
the incident was an isolated, unexpected and simple event in nature. Nevertheless, 
Çetinkaya, under the influence of the official position regarding the event, did not notice and 
consider these important details. 
487 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 101. 
488 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 36. 
489 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 52. 
490  Neşet Çağatay, Türkiye’de Gerici Eylemler (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat 
Fakültesi Yayınevi, 1972), 18. 
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According to İsmail Kurtoğlu, “they became organizations that brought every 
sort of harm in the name of religion.”491 Moreover, he claims the Nakşibendi order to 
have been influential in various regions of Anatolia at different times, taken a stand 
against every type of renewal attempts and given rise to great riots.492 Yazman’s as-
sertion is that “the only thing this order brought to Turkey since the eighth century is 
the rebellion of Şeyh Said and the reactionist Menemen Incident.”493 That is to say, 
what the officially-biased accounts express about Nakşibendi order is that they either 
degenerated in time or already had some deviations. The Nakşibendi order, in this 
regard, is indicated as a uniform and invariably harmful organization, beginning 
from its origin and throughout the time. The writers referenced above make no ex-
planations about how and in what ways did the Nakşibendi order become trans-
formed into a detrimental organization that arranged revolts every now and then. 
They present no political or religious historical context for their argument nor ex-
plain how the order instigated any specific riot. Therefore, these unsubstantiated nar-
ratives on the order’s history are not useful academically.  
According to officially-biased accounts, religious orders, particularly the 
Nakşibendism, has been using religion as a tool to maintain their interests. The pres-
tige of the members of the order rested on the religious sensibilities and fears of peo-
ple.494 “By means of secret exercises, it exploited the weakest and most delicate sub-
ject of the society, namely its religious thoughts.”495 “Whenever its interests were in 
danger, it intensified the exploitation of people’s religious senses and prompted them 
to fight against progressive reforms.”496 This was the case for the Menemen Incident 
as well. “It was understood from the Menemen Incident that the disciples of the order 
were not busy with just mysticism and religion but also engaged in political is-
sues.”497 “Although some notables of the order recommended waiting and leaving 
everything to time, they could not make others hear them.”498  
                                                
491 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 35. 
492 Ibid., 37. 
493 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 242. 
494 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1998, 137. 
495 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 33. 
496 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 100. 
497 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 242. These words, 
too, come from the statement of the Menemen prosecutor that characterized the order as a 
political organization. 
498 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 53. 
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Indeed, the notion of “using religion as a means” has been a common element 
in many accounts regarding religious issues in the republican period. The authors of 
such accounts have generally been speaking for the republic itself by extolling the 
new state, its revolutions and castigating opposition elements. Describing opponents 
as “exploiters of religion” was a usual practice of this officially-biased point of view. 
However, the content of this repeated statement has been rhetorical and poorly sub-
stantiated. Like the case here, sufi organizations are described to have been deceiving 
the common people, who fail to see that they are exploited. This general type of ex-
pression is not accompanied usually by specific instances or details indicating how 
the sufi orders use religion to preserve their interests. The members of the order in 
question are described as if they are insincere in their religious beliefs in the reality. 
That is to say, these biased accounts are not seriously interested in showing how the-
se orders use people and oblige them to make donations to the orders.  
4.1.3. The Enemy of the Republic 
Officially-biased narrations allege that religious orders, particularly the 
Nakşibendis, sought to sustain their elevated positions in the republican era as well. 
“Factions whose interests were harmed by the transformation from theocracy to a 
secular state described laicism as irreligiousness and strived to stir up opposition to 
the reformists.”499 Thus emerged the problem of “reactionism” against the republic, 
according to the biased writers. They state radical religious groups did not embrace 
the abolition of the dervish lodges, and religious orders continued to exist in secre-
cy.500 “They watched for an opportunity to regain their interests”501 and “tried to an-
tagonize their followers, who made up the lower class of society, against the gov-
ernment.”502 “They intended to deceive ignorant citizens with the motto that “Reli-
gion is at stake!”503 “The Menemen Incident occurred under these conditions the 
Nakşibendi order, which was weakened, sought to stir up a revolt by appealing to the 
religious senses of the people so as to recover its former strength.”504 
                                                
499 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1998, 137. 
500 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 33. 
501 Bahriye Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı” (unpublished master thesis, Dokuz 
Eylül Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1997), 10–1. 
502 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 50. 
503 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 10–1; Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 
126–7. 
504 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 100. 
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According to the authors who adopted officially-biased points of view, the 
event was exactly a reactionist movement.505 “It was an attack of the Nakşibendi or-
der, which did everything possible to deceive society and demolish the public or-
der506 as well as the republic507 and Atatürk’s Reforms.508 The purpose was to over-
throw the republic and the secular system.509 “The republic of Atatürk prohibited un-
derdeveloped organizations like sheikhdom, and yet the order aspired to establish a 
sharia state.”510 Even after the suppression of the rebellion of Şeyh Said, a prominent 
member of the order, it dared to raise its voice511 and to attempt to achieve its dream 
of reviving the old regime.512 
The only other rebellious figure associated with the order in the officially-
biased accounts, in addition to the case of Menemen, is Şeyh Said. His rebellion too 
is depicted as a movement carried out by exploiters of religion who did nothing but 
harm for the country. It is somehow taken as an element of an element of truth that 
the Nakşibendi order watched for an opportunity to step into action to overthrow the 
government. That is to say, the order operating to the detriment of the republic was 
so powerful that state administrators and law enforcement agencies were unable to 
prevent it from doing harm. This explanation is unconvincing in many respects. 
Firstly, mystical circles and rituals continued after the legal abolition of orders within 
the knowledge of government officials. Indeed, public administrators did not regard 
the orders as an enemy which needed to be eliminated. Secondly, officially-biased 
accounts do not give details about the secret plans that Nakşibendis allegedly make 
and how they managed to operate behind the scenes. As the official reports indicate, 
the mansion of Şeyh Esat was not only under surveillance but also there was a secret 
                                                
505 According to Köse, when one takes into consideration the insurgents’ intention to found a 
theocratic state, their preparation for the event, their financial situation and their educational 
level, it does not “sound reasonable” that they did it on their own. Moreover, writers like 
Köse stress that it is crucial to reveal the real agents behind the incident, thus, they look for 
background figures and structures carefully. Ibid., 1, 3, 47–8. 
506 For Kurtoğlu, “it could be said that” among religious circles, it was the Nakşibendi order 
that reacted to the abolition of the caliphate and the proclamation of the republic most. 
Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 28, 33. 
507 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 126–7. 
508 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 21. 
509 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 10–1. 
510 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 16. 
511 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 38. Kurtoğlu’s words intend to show that the Nakşibendi 
order stirred up a riot as occasion served. 
512 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 48. 
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police put inside it. This is just a synoptic example of the extent to which state offic-
ers kept an eye on orders.513 
4.1.4. People’s Support for Reactionism  
Some of the officially-biased accounts assert that the masses, whose level of 
education was low and who were blindly attached to the “old social order”, reacted 
against the innovations made in the early years of the republic. The Menemen Inci-
dent was also a consequence of this reaction.514 One of the stories discussed in the 
third chapter is told in the later literature as well. Erdinç Köse’s master thesis refers 
to Milliyet of 27 December 1930 that a certain citizen had heard some rumors from 
two women while shopping in the villages of Menemen that wearing the fes and the 
old order would be restored within a week. Köse expresses that after this instance 
was reported in newspapers, the opinion that the event was a prearranged action be-
came even stronger.515 This story was most likely fabricated, in that it depended on 
third person narrations and was devoid of substantiality. Questions about the identity 
of those women and why a legal procedure was not conducted remain unanswered.  
The significant matter here is that the later authors writing about the event see 
no harm in taking this sort of stories for granted without making an effort to verify 
their accuracy. By doing so, they frame a certain group of people as being hostile 
towards the republic, ready to participate in opposition movements,516 and involved 
in one when the opportunity arose as in the case of the Menemen Incident. In other 
words, officially-biased authors imply that ordinary people were somehow informed 
about the approaching riot, while law enforcement agencies were not.  
This opinion applies to villagers as well. It is asserted that each inhabitant of 
Bozalan, including village headmen, assured Derviş Mehmet and his followers that 
                                                
513 The reason why this type of account defines religious sub-groups as enemies of the repub-
lic and keeps on reproducing this expression partly lies in those writers’ perception of the re-
publican reforms. The primary mistake of these writers however, is their projection of them-
selves as representatives of the republic without considering the actual implementation of the 
republican reforms and their adoption by the people. They seem to make normative evalua-
tions with respect to their positions rather than regarding people’s cultural and religious di-
versity and the process of how long and in what ways they would keep pace with the repub-
lican type of ideal citizen. 
514 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 31. 
515 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 71–2. 
516 The number of people who gathered at the municipal square in Menemen was exaggerat-
ed, arguably to make it look like that the townspeople supported the so-called rebellion in 
great numbers. (See the explanation of this point below in this chapter.) 
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they would raid a gendarme station, take their guns and come to assist them as soon 
as the group arrived at Menemen.517 This anecdote is not true either. According to 
the statements of the perpetrators, merely one man named Abdülkadir, while accom-
panying the group outside the village, wished them Godspeed and told that he would 
come for help if needed. Still, Abdülkadir told it for the sake of conversation and he 
was not speaking for the whole village. There is no evidence indicating that the vil-
lagers of Bozalan and Paşa, inhabitants of Menemen or Manisa were anticipating an 
opportunity to stir up a rebellion against the republic. Not a single scene of action 
against the republic was recorded in the regions in question. All the defendants in tri-
als seemed to be afraid of what might happen to them. They did not leave this im-
pression that they would or could oppose the republic. On the contrary, they tried to 
keep on the right side of the chief judge no matter all the hard time the judge gave 
them.  
 Some of the officially-biased writers make demi-fair evaluations about the 
inhabitants of Menemen. They want the republic to have mercy on them. Another 
master thesis states that it would be unrealistic to expect the republican principles to 
spread in a society that was accustomed to absolutism for 600 years. According to 
Bahriye Acar, the author of this thesis, the reason why local inhabitants did not react 
too strongly against reactionists in the Menemen Incident was that they did not com-
prehend the republican regime adequately yet.518 As for Köse, newspapers right after 
the event reported that the inhabitants of Menemen did not engage in the reactionist 
movement but condemned it vehemently.519 Nevertheless, the majority of newspa-
pers harshly disparaged all the people of Menemen, and not just the ones who partic-
ipated in the events.  
Another case in point is Kemal Üstün’s account, which contradicts itself. 520 
On the one hand, he defines the incident as the incitement of ignorant masses by 
those people whose interests had been negatively affected by republican reforms.521 
On the other hand, he talks about the role of inhabitants as follows: “Elders who 
                                                
517 Barış Ertem, “Resmi Belgeler ve Basında Menemen Olayı,” International Journal of His-
tory 5, no. 1 (2013): 160. 
518 Acar, “İzmir Basınında Menemen Olayı,” 1997, 76. 
519 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 68. 
520 Üstün was a colleague and a friend of Kubilay in Menemen. He stresses that he was 
among the audience in trials of the martial court. Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 8. 
521 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 126–7. 
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were at the mosque for dawn prayer were taken to the square by the insurgents at 
gunpoint. Other people on their way to work were stopped and forced to participate. 
That was how the crowd gathered around reactionists. In other words, they were 
compelled to do so.”522 This information is also misleading. Though small in propor-
tion,523 about a hundred people were engaged in the demonstrations either by merely 
taking part in reciting God’s name or by substantially assisting the company. Their 
applause was the principal act that received the sharpest reaction from officials as 
well as newspapers. Yet, writers like Kemal Üstün and Aslan Tufan Yazman try hard 
to acquit all of the townspeople. The point they seek to emphasize is that the people 
of Menemen had unhesitatingly embraced the principles of the republic nationalisti-
cally. 
4.1.5. Specifying the Agents of the Event 
Officially-biased accounts describe the notable figures of the Nakşibendi or-
der as the true agents of the Menemen Incident. Much the same as previously men-
tioned accounts, the information being discussed here also derives from the fact that 
the writers take court verdicts and newspaper reports for granted. They adopt the ex-
isting primary sources in their narrations unquestioningly and without examination, 
and present them as true. This is expressed in statements like “as a result of the pro-
ceedings, it became clear (or was revealed) that…” In other words, the judicial pro-
cess is treated as if it did what it had to do and concluded justly. Thus, these accounts 
bear a notion that they are to recount the truth as reached by the court. 
The role played by different figures varies in diverse officially-biased ac-
counts. For instance, it is alleged that “Şeyh Esat played an active role in the prepara-
tion phase of the riot as it became clear in the trials of the martial court.”524 Since the 
judicial process ended with the verdict that the event was preplanned and carried out 
by the Nakşibendi order with its leaders and associates, each named one by one, sub-
                                                
522 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 13–4. He depicts the period as a time in which every 
Turk was full of the joy of living, which Mustafa Kemal had ignited, and was engaged in a 
struggle to rise and reach up to the level of contemporary civilization. 
523 The best evidence indicates that about a hundred people participated in the demonstra-
tions of Derviş’s company in the square, while another hundred stood nearby merely watch-
ing. The population of the town was approximately 12,000. Thus, namely 0.83 % of its 
population was in the square. 
524 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 610. This writer further alleged 
that Saffet Hoca was among the masterminds of the event according to the court. On the con-
trary, Saffet Hoca was acquitted of all charges. 
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sequent accounts recounted those names as the agents. “The murder of Kubilay was 
planned by the leader of the Nakşibendi order, Şeyh Esat.”525 “It was the 84-year old 
leader of the order, living in a mansion in İstanbul, who gave the instructions.”526 
The event took place with the incitement and instruction of the notables of the 
Nakşibendi order, and primarily their leader Şeyh Esat527 who was able to operate 
freely and propagandize for the order in moral and material terms.528 Early writings 
on the case, particularly Üstün’s and Çetinkaya’s books, influenced the later litera-
ture. For instance, an article about the incident refers to Çetinkaya’s definition of 
Şeyh Esat as “pervert” and continues that he did not merely impress the naïve and 
ignorant mass but also the educated and cultured people.529 
Again with reference to the court decisions, Esat’s son Mehmet Ali is indi-
cated as another designer of the incident.530 “The head of the Nakşibendi order and 
his son took advantage of the appropriate conditions, made arrangements and stepped 
into action at a place whose inhabitants they regarded as opponents of the govern-
ment.”531 
Officially-biased narrations claim that, since those unschooled, ignorant hash-
ish addicts could not have implemented the plan of bringing the political system 
down and establish a theocratic order by themselves, there must have been more 
                                                
525 Çetinkaya, Kubilay Olayı ve Tarikat Kampları, 16. 
526 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 126–7. 
527 Kurtoğlu asserts that all three perpetrators stated in trials that they were in continuous 
contact with Şeyh Esat. Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 38, 40. However, the perpetrators nei-
ther said anything of this nature during the trials nor could they provide meaningful infor-
mation to support their asserted connection to Şeyh Esat. 
528 Saraçoğlu repeatedly comments on the agonizing news of the beheading of Kubilay in 
later issues of the journal. In his introduction, he mentions that critical and in-depth accounts 
of this incident based on the evaluation of official and other sources were needed. He defines 
his study as a consequence of several months of hard work. Saraçoğlu, “Menemen İrticaı Adı 
Altındaki,” 2290, 2293. Nevertheless, he provides deficient accounts due to flawed interpre-
tations of the official evaluations of the event. For instance, he points to the newspapers of 
July 1930, which reported rumors on Şeyh Esat’s presence in Erenköy, to comment that Esat 
had been acting against the republic for a long time. He then asks law enforcement agencies 
did not intervene in his wrong-doings. In other words, Saraçoğlu appears convinced that Esat 
was an enemy of the republic and does not reflect on the information available to him. He 
does not take into consideration that security officers knew about Esat and others. Instead, 
Saraçoğlu argues that Esat could operate in pursuit of his own benefits and against the repub-
lic for months despite the close surveillance under which he lived. 
529 Nurşen Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Sosyo-Kütürel ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Analizi,” Top-
lum ve Bilim 90 (2001): 132. 
530  Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 235; Aysal, 
“Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 610. 
531 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 19. 
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agents behind the scenes.532 “One of these agents was a deviant named Laz İbrahim 
who was appointed as his top caliph in Manisa by Şeyh Esat.”533 Some authors offer 
descriptions of Laz İbrahim based on journalist Çetinkaya. For instance, a statement 
in an article is as follows: “Hikmet Çetinkaya adduced Laz İbrahim’s dispatch to the 
region by Şeyh Esat as the most explicit proof of the incident’s instigation by the 
Nakşibendi order.”534 Though he did not engage in actions, Laz İbrahim was among 
the think-tank of the organization, defined himself as ‘the caliph of the caliphs,’535 
and established contacts between Şeyh Esat and other caliphs.536 “He selected 
Menemen as a target since he knew the town and many of its inhabitants. He poi-
soned the people’s minds, attracted many supporters, and staged the incident.”537 
Another master thesis recounts the latter argument and emphasizes that Laz 
İbrahim’s choice of Menemen is very conceivable since he knew like-minded people 
lived there.538 
Officially-biased accounts also rely on evidence brought forth in trials, such 
as the evidence on meetings in Manisa and letters. For instance, a specific meeting in 
Manisa, in which Laz İbrahim and some others participated, is asserted to demon-
strate the preparations and determination of the agents. In this gathering, Laz İbrahim 
talked about a conversation made in İstanbul. There, it was discussed that İstanbul 
Selim Efendi, son of Abdülhamit II, would occupy the country with a great force, 
become the caliph and the sultan. “Nevertheless, since the reactionists could not 
speak their thoughts out loud, they began to prepare and watch for an opportunity in 
secret.”539 In other words, it is beyond question for officially-biased accounts that 
these agents were able to make plans and take action on their own. It is not consid-
ered whether they had enough facilities, infrastructure and material organization to 
actualize such a large-scale goal. Instead, those figures are indicated as enemies of 
the government and seeking its overthrowing.  
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The issue of letters is remarked as well in the literature: “The court obtained 
the letters Laz İbrahim and Şeyh Esat had written to each other, which proved that 
they took steps against the republic.”540 However, those letters in question neither in-
cluded a simple anti-republican stance nor implied such an opposition. But these de-
tails are not addressed, and the evidence offered by the court is accepted unquestion-
ingly in much of the officially-biased literature. For instance, Laz İbrahim’s bringing 
books from İstanbul for the betterment of the order is mentioned as one of his malig-
nant doings.541 Typically, officially-biased authors do not elaborate on details of the 
information provided by the court as evidence. 
Derviş Mehmet is defined as having had a close relationship with Şeyh Esat 
in this line.542 “He was one of the accredited and prominent disciples of Esat.”543 
Derviş Mehmet’s acquaintance and collaboration with Çerkez Ethem is also brought 
forward. Related assertions do not merely say that he was a former fellow of “the 
traitor” Çerkez Ethem, but also that he was a homosexual.544 “Derviş Mehmet fled 
from the country with Çerkez Ethem but returned since he was not among the list of 
the 150 persona non grata.”545 A further allegation is that both of them aligned them-
selves with the Greeks.546 These are almost entirely mere immaterial allegations. The 
extent of Derviş Mehmet’s previous relationship with Çerkez Ethem is unknown. 
Writers in question give no substantial references to the expressions related to 
Çerkez. They neither doubt nor examine the extent of the reliability of this infor-
mation and how such a supposedly detrimental figure could act freely against Turkey 
for quite a while. 
4.1.6. Material Support of the Nakşibendi Order 
These biased authors also explain the commitment of both Derviş Mehmet 
and his followers to the Nakşibendi order. “As it became evident, the leader of the 
Nakşibendi order Şeyh Esat and Laz İbrahim gave money to poor people as well as 
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to unemployed youth.”547 “Laz İbrahim took the money that Şeyh Esat collected 
from surrounding people, and distributed it to the unemployed youthful disciples of 
the order.”548 “The leaders of the order selected Derviş Mehmet as the protagonist 
and put miserable wretches together with him.”549 In other words, it is claimed the 
perpetrators were very poor in economic conditions. Due to their dependence on 
handouts, their primary concern was “to gain happiness in the afterlife since there is 
no way for me to be happy here.”550 Their dedication to the order increased by this 
means. “However, since they were not knowledgeable about religion, they easily fell 
into the trap of wealthy notables, operating for their own benefit backstage.”551 Simi-
lar to previous statements, this matter of giving money to youth for deception is not 
validated. Rather, it is a general argument of writers whose accounts regarding reli-
gious issues run in parallel to official statements. Neither the perpetrators’ statements 
in trials nor the official reports refer to any money or other type of support provided 
by the order notables. To promote the assertion that the event was carried out by the 
Nakşibendi order, these biased writers seek to form an unreal material background. 
It is also claimed that Derviş Mehmet and his company received support in 
the form of money, clothes, guns etc., on their way to Menemen from people, who 
were Laz İbrahim’s followers.552 This is another unverified assertion. All the support 
the group got derived from affinity and acquaintanceship. They were hosted in 
homes, were provided food and guns and were not reported to law enforcement 
agencies for their probable actions since they were known around the region.  
4.1.7. Exaggerating the Capacity of Insurgents  
Just like the newspapers of the period and many official statements, official-
ly-biased accounts introduce the actions and aims of the insurgents as if they were 
realistic. Although the aims of Derviş Mehmet, as stated in the trials by the perpetra-
tors, were completely infeasible, they are depicted as tangible plans. According to 
the authors in question for instance, the company’s choice of Menemen was not ac-
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cidental. Laz İbrahim was ranked as “the caliph of caliphs” and sent to Anatolia by 
Şeyh Esat to augment the disciples of the order. “He came to Menemen where his 
acquaintances were living and there he poisoned them.”553 However, this account of 
Yazman is full of incorrect information. According to the perpetrators’ statements 
and official reports, the inhabitants of Menemen did not expect Derviş and his fol-
lowers. There is no information indicating the presence of Laz İbrahim’s acquaint-
ances in Menemen whom he organized to revolt. Yazman seems to have used unreli-
able second-hand information and not made careful research.  
According to other similar narrations, “Menemen was among the places that 
insurgents selected as targets and if the reactionist movement had not been stopped 
there, it would have expanded to other locations. Therefore the Menemen Incident 
was not local but national in nature.”554 “In order to announce that the caliphate had 
been revived, insurgents chose of a small town populated by 4000-5000 people, and 
not a big city such as İzmir or Manisa where security forces would instantly bring the 
situation under control.”555 These arguments as well are problematic. Menemen had 
a population of about 12,000 people and hence was not as small as alleged. Moreo-
ver, Menemen was thirty kilometers away from İzmir city center. Therefore the ob-
servation is not very sensible. 
 Another exaggeration about the insurgents is their so-called religious objec-
tives. They are portrayed as trying to establish a theocratic state and spread Islam to 
the entire world. “After they constituted a state based on sharia in Turkey, they 
would go as far as China and to all the European countries in order to make every 
non-Muslim accept Islam.”556 Authors of these arguments give references to court 
records and express the forementioned purposes, which were mentioned by perpetra-
tors, as realities. The perpetrators are framed as if they were organizationally pre-
pared and the conditions were proper for them to actualize their purposes.  
However in the same court records, there are so many anecdotes which pre-
sent the true circumstances and the pitiful state of the insurgents. Still, writers take 
these claims as well seriously. For instance, when the company wanted to cross the 
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Gediz River, they had no money and nothing to pay the boatman. They told him that 
they would appoint him as a civil servant as long as he helped them cross the river. 
Rather than regarding this state as another indicator of the company’s lack of re-
sources to carry out their plans of overthrowing the government, it is interpreted as 
evidence of “the detailed plans the insurgents made in advance.”557 Their arrival at 
Menemen is accounted as an incoming of “the army of sharia.”558 Moreover, it is 
suggested that if Derviş Mehmet waited longer instead of taking the road with a few 
men, there might have occurred a much larger event with a lot more disciples joining 
the group, since the order had sufficient resources.559 
Another exaggeration is describing the incident as a threat against the very 
existence of the republic.560 Referring to the parliamentary minutes, it is mentioned 
that “the rebellion was an attempt to change the constitution of the Republic of Tur-
key by force and establish the rule of a caliphate and sultanate depending on sha-
ria.”561 “The newly-founded republican regime and its ideology overcame a signifi-
cant challenge in Menemen.562 Another repeated assertion is that the regime recog-
nized the potential of the opposition.563 “It was further perceived that the foundations 
of the new regime had not yet been secured and it was under a severe threat.”564 
However, this is not a reasonable evaluation since the government was already aware 
of the discontent of a part of the population as well as the presence of religious or-
ders. This situation is obvious in the debates of the deputies at the parliament. Alt-
hough the terrifying beheading of Kubilay and the applause of some people con-
cerned the government, no specific legal regulation was made to suppress public’s 
opposition. In other words, although the event was not extensive and far-reaching in 
nature, authors who assume the responsibility and duty of speaking for the regime, 
depict the event as another menace that the republic overcame. 
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4.1.8. Responsibilities of the Security Forces 
Although the issue of the security force officers was given a wide place in the 
newspapers of the era, officially-biased accounts do not pay it much attention. They 
approach the matter differently and are divided into two types: one criticizes the 
gendarme officers, the other praises them highly. According to the latter approach, 
Gendarme Captain Fahri Bey realized the severity of the situation, entered the state 
house to take measures and demanded a support force from the regiment as required 
by law.565 The critical approach disparages the captain as well as the privates in Ku-
bilay’s battalion. Fahri Bey is accounted to have become so terrified by the reaction-
ists and by the crowd that gathered around them that he could not stop the event. 
Fahri Bey, in this opinion, assumed that he would not halt the insurgents with the 
unit under his command. “However, if he had fired his gun into the air at once, he 
would have brought the situation under control. But he ignored that possibility and 
was unable to prevent the murder of a young Turkish officer.566 
4.1.9. Wrong Information on Moves Before, During and After the Incident 
There is much misinformation and exaggeration about the concrete actions of 
the company as well in line with the assertions about the event that it was an inclu-
sive and far-reaching revolt carried out by furious enemies of the republic. The mis-
information is presented according to the chronologic flow of events. 
It is alleged that the dervishes had been on a diet of merely eating figs and 
drinking water as an element of their preparation.567 However, the perpetrators did 
not make such a statement in the trials and there is no report referring to it. So this 
anecdote is a fabrication.  
The number of townspeople standing around Derviş Mehmet is another in-
stance of information pollution. For one account there were 1000 impertinent people 
“unconsciously gathered together under the influence of herd mentality and scared 
by threats.”568 According to another account, there were 1500 people and none of 
them sought to prevent the traitorous movement but rather gave support by saying 
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Allahuekber.569 Kubilay entered the scene with a battalion to disperse the crowd, but 
the number of soldiers under his command is indeterminate. Although some writers 
assert that there were twenty-six privates with him,570 no official record verifies this 
number. We have confusing information also about the rifles of Kubilay’s unit. Jour-
nalist Hikmet Çetinkaya conveys from a witness of the event that Kubilay and his 
soldiers came to the square with blank cartridges in their rifles.571 Another allegation 
of Yazman is that Kubilay ordered his privates to fire blanks into the air.572  
Later literature refers to these initial narrations as well as the newspaper re-
ports of the time.573 It is additionally alleged that there had been a military maneuver 
recently and Kubilay forgot to change the blank cartridges with real bullets.574 When 
privates fired rifles and no one got hurt, according to these stories, Derviş Mehmet 
began to shout: “You see, I am invulnerable!”575 For another account, a certain hoca 
among the crowd cried to people: “As you see, bullets did not hurt them, those are 
saints (evliya)!”576 Thus, “Derviş Mehmet and his disciples took courage very 
much.”577 They “considered themselves to be immortal”578 and “attributed this situa-
tion to Derviş Mehmet’s being the true Mahdi.”579 However, as previously discussed 
and as official reports explicitly indicated, there were no bullets in the rifles of the 
privates under Kubilay’s command. They had only bayonets and fled when Kubilay 
was shot at. Given this situation, the story of the blank cartridges was fabricated most 
likely because of the oddness that those rifles did not have bullets. In order not to 
tarnish the image of law enforcement agencies, and thus of the republic, this untrue 
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information was published by newspapers as well as the initial narrators of the inci-
dent, who seem to have considered themselves as representatives of the government 
or its ideals. 
 Reports and perpetrator statements point out that Kubilay was ignored by 
Derviş Mehmet at first. After this underestimation, Kubilay became angry and seized 
Derviş by his collar. Another allegation is that Kubilay slapped Derviş.580 However 
this is another exaggeration and not true.  
A different sort of disinformation is about the way he was beheaded.581 Ac-
cording to the claim, “raving, rabid and punk zealots” beheaded Kubilay with a 
saw.582 However, it is certain that he was beheaded by a knife. Furthermore, one ac-
count asserts that Kubilay’s head was cut off slowly and in an agonizing way.583  
Based on the newspaper reports of the time, it is also proclaimed that the 
townspeople applauded the beheading of Kubilay as they did Derviş’s former ac-
tions. While one writer states that it was only a small part of the crowd that applaud-
ed the demonstrations,584 for another, Kubilay was beheaded with the applause of all 
of the one hundred people gathered at the square.585 However, it is quite uncertain 
whether the townspeople witnessed the beheading and applauded him. The extent to 
which they kept on applauding when Derviş brought Kubilay’s head to the square is 
also uncertain. Although the chief judge of the martial court mentioned a certain 
number of defendants had applauded Derviş’s actions, he did not charge any of them 
with doing so at the scene of Kubilay’s beheading. Therefore, asserting that “the 
townspeople of Menemen applauded the martyrisation of Kubilay” is unjustified. 
The publication of such exaggerated and uncertain information is also defamatory for 
the townspeople in nature. 
As previously mentioned, officially-biased authors base much of their infor-
mation on newspaper reports. For instance, the 30 December 1930 issue of Yeni Asır 
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reported that “onlookers clapped the beheading of Kubilay for twenty minutes, and 
that some merely grinned in the face of this atrocious murder.” For the newspaper, 
they further acclaimed Derviş’s drinking the blood of Kubilay.586 Although such an 
issue was not brought to the agenda of the court in any session, the decision text of 
the justice commission of the parliament included a phrase about the drinking Kubi-
lay’s blood.587  
Though there is no evidence for it whatsoever, blood drinking became anoth-
er subject repeatedly narrated by officially-biased authors. Thus they wrote, for in-
stance, “unsatisfied with beheading, Derviş Mehmet drank Kubilay’s blood by hand-
fuls in the sequel.”588 It is additionally alleged that prior to drinking Kubilay’s blood, 
Derviş shouted: “Although it is forbidden (haram) by religion, drinking the blood of 
this (addressing Kubilay) is legitimate (helal).”589 “When he said this, other perpetra-
tors drank the blood of the young officer as well.”590 “Derviş subsequently said Al-
lahuekber with his bloody mouth.”591 It is further stated that Derviş put the head of 
Kubilay on a stone in the courtyard of the mosque and said: “You see! Infidels end 
up just like this!”592 Nevertheless, none of the perpetrators mentioned such an issue, 
nor did the chief judge. Official reports written right after the incident did not men-
tion any blood either. Clearly, it was a fabrication of republican administrators and 
pro-regime newspapers. 
Other trivial instances of misinformation about the actions of the perpetrators 
include assertions that they fled into the corners of a the Gazez mosque as soon as 
support forces arrived at the square.593 However, the onlookers are not reported to 
have left the square and hidden in the mosque. Rather, they were still there in the 
square when the troops arrived. Although one account alleges that all the remaining 
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three perpetrators were seized while trying to flee after the shootout,594 only Mehmet 
Emin was captured and the others ran away. 
 There is wrong information about the attitude of the perpetrators after their 
detentions. “The national press described the perpetrators to be in good mood.”595 
According to another account, many of the Nakşibendi disciples shouted at the pros-
ecutor of the martial court saying “You are an infidel! Derviş Mehmet will be resur-
rected and kill you!” during the interrogations.596 These assertions do not reflect the 
reality and even distort it entirely in certain respects. To start with, contemporaneous 
newspapers do not describe dispositions of the detainees all together. The available 
evidence indicate that the detainee were concerned about their situation and were 
afraid of what would happen to them. They were aware that they would possibly be 
condemned to capital punishment. Indeed, officially-biased authors as well knew that 
the defendants repeatedly stated their loyalty to the republic, but they evaluated these 
statements as the result of the hypocrisy and slyness of the arrestee.597  
4.1.10. Literature on Political Reasons of the Incident 
Recent accounts about the political motives of the insurgents, likewise, de-
pend on contemporary newspaper reports. To a large extent, these narrations repeat 
those news reports. They do not look for substantial causal connections but insist that 
the perpetrators took advantage of the internal and external political conditions of the 
era. Some authors mention the general circumstances under which the insurgents 
stepped into action while others directly refer to and blame FRP as a primary cause 
or instigator. 
 For instance, the economic situation of the era is indicated as a determi-
nant.598 Acar states that the great world economic depression of 1929 influenced the 
economy of Turkey.599 According to her, some armed groups from Iran crossed Tur-
key’s border and raided some villages in Eastern Anatolia in the second half of 1930. 
“Those activities strained the relations between the two countries, and Turkey sent 
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diplomatic notes to Iran a few times. This topic remained on the agenda of the coun-
try until September of 1930. Alongside these external problems, the government was 
obliged to tackle the newly founded FRP in domestic policy.”600 However, Acar does 
not establish a substantial connection between the Menemen Incident and these de-
velopments. Moreover, she seems to be unaware that FRP was established with the 
instructions of Mustafa Kemal. In other words, it emerged under the control of RPP 
and not by itself.  
Economic conditions are also considered important in other accounts. Ac-
cording to Öz, the effects of the 1929 great depression and progressively intensifying 
social displeasure led the government transit to a multi-party system.601 This expla-
nation does not make much sense in that the political atmosphere of the country was 
already intense. Officially-biased authors describe the repealing of the law on the 
maintenance of order (takrîr-i sükûn) on March 1929 as an inception of a more liber-
al period. However, for them, the opposition media exploited the freedom of the 
press. “Still, although it was absolutely apparent that some press agents abused their 
liberty, the government sought to act consistently regarding the freedom of the 
press.”602 “[This act] that set the opposition free on the way of democratization in 
1930 prompted reactionist circles to step into action to overthrow the republic.”603 
“Proceeding to another political stage made the disguised fanatic reactionists think 
the conditions were ripe for revolt.”604 
 “The discontent of the masses became apparent with the foundation of 
FRP.”605 The municipal elections of 14 October 1930 triggered debates on FRP’s en-
couragement of reactionists. Long discussions took place in the parliament in which 
RPP deputies, notably ministers, often mentioned FRP as a reactionist party. For in-
stance, Interior Minister Şükrü (Kaya) Bey once told that the notion of reactionism 
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(along with communism and anarchy) was inherent in FRP.606 People’s support for 
FRP as opposed to RPP in the Aegean Region allegedly gave hope to cloaked disci-
ples,607 first and foremost of the Nakşibendi order.608 “The real reason of the Mene-
men Incident was the tendency of the people close to FRP to encourage the sheikhs 
and followers of the order.”609 
Officially-biased accounts vary in their coverage of FRP. While some of 
them specifically blame FRP, others indicate that it was innocent in itself, but taken 
advantage of. On the one hand, some descriptions assert that although FRP was 
founded by people bound to the republic in their hearts, they were unable to prevent 
some enemies of the revolution from infiltrating the party organization.610 On the 
other hand, penetration of reactionists is regarded unexceptional. “In the party meet-
ings, the government was plainly being accused; from time to time it was said that 
religion was at stake, that women had been uncovered and that wearing the hat be-
came obligatory. These issues attracted some anti-revolutionist sharia-seekers and 
groups to either join the party or to become its partisans. Thus they were provided 
the political opportunity to fight for their own ideas.”611 Nevertheless, these writers 
give no information about who participated in and manipulated the FRP organiza-
tion. This opinion remains as an assumption that lacks both specificity and adequate 
support. Some writers also argue that FRP pursued concessive policies that provided 
incentive to reactionists in the Aegean Region.612 “The planning of the Menemen In-
cident was made possible under these circumstances.”613 
 The most significant issue within this context is the mayoral elections in 
Menemen. Many of the townspeople voted for the candidate of FRP.614 Kurtoğlu 
                                                
606 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:22 Birinci İn’ikat,” November 1, 1930, 50. The FRP was 
linked with the event to such an extent that Ahmet Ağaoğlu, vice chairman of the party, later 
commented that they were described as if they participated in Derviş Mehmet’s actions. Son 
Posta, January 12, 1931. 
607 Kemal Üstün, Devrim Şehidi Öğretmen Kubilay: 60. Yıl (1930-1990) (İstanbul: Çağdaş 
Yayınları, 1990), 18. 
608 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 27, 32. 
609 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 19. 
610 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 53. 
611 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 601. 
612 Köse, “Menemen Olayı ve Ulusal Basındaki Tepkiler,” 47. 
613 Üstün, Menemen Olayı ve Kubilay, 145; Anday, “Bir Yıldönümü: Kubilay,” in ibid., 142. 
614 I could not refer to original sources to double check this information, but according to Öz, 
FRP received 1009 votes while PR received 544. Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 
416, 420. 
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makes an unsubstantiated assertion in his thesis. He argues, For him, “as the court 
records show, insurgent reactionists considered Menemen an appropriate place [to 
initiate revolt] since it was the FRP candidate who won the municipal elections 
there.”615 However, such a matter was not brought to the fore in any of the trials. 
Tabak makes a similarly unverified assertion: “the prosecutor of the martial court of 
Menemen specified in the bill of indictment that insurgents deemed Menemen a suit-
able place to achieve their goals since FRP had won the municipal elections 
there.”616 However, the prosecutor did not touch upon this issue implicitly or explic-
itly as best we can tell from the available evidence. 
Eyüp Öz states that “the question of ‘Why Menemen?’ leads us to the identity 
of the town as well as to its strong bond with FRP.”617 For Öz, Menemen becomes 
prominent with its former intense opposition to the government.618 Nevertheless, this 
issue is itself complicated. İsmet Paşa, in his parliament speech, stressed the enlight-
ened character of the western regions of Turkey, including Menemen, and expressed 
his surprise at how such an incident could occur there. This case is recounted by 
some others too as follows: “Menemen was not situated in a region from which an 
attempt at revolt was expected.”619 Yet, when looking for the political causes of the 
incident, the town’s opposition to the government comes to mind. One should make 
a distinction between opposing the government religiously, sympathizing with a reli-
gious order, onlooking a demonstration and participating in one actively. Since pro-
portionally a very small number of the town population participated in Derviş 
Mehmet’s actions, the events there had little to do with the general characteristics of 
the people of Menemen, as previously explained.   
                                                
615 Kurtoğlu, “Menemen Olayı,” 34, 258. 
616 Tabak, “Menemen Olayının İzmir Basını’nda Yankıları,” 316. 
617 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 416. 
618 Ibid., 425. 
619 According to Mazıcı, among the revolts that occurred between 1924 and 1938 only the 
Menemen Incident took place in Western Anatolia. She purports that rates of literacy and 
economic development were higher in Menemen than in central, eastern and southeastern 
Anatolia. Moreover, feudal personages and agencies were less influential there, so the new 
regime could easily reach it. She finally concludes that the Menemen Incident is an aberrant 
instance of revolts. Her interpretations appear to have been based on suppositions or general 
impressions rather than clear information based on an in-depth study. Consequently, the val-
ue of her account remains limited. Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 131. Thus, along 
with the previously mentioned officially-biased wrong information, she does not provide 
significant contribution to accounts on the event. 
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Öz adds another unverified piece of information. He asserts that according to 
the statements made in the trials, all of the defendants were followers of FRP. “They 
tended towards the party since they considered it as the sole remedy for their situa-
tion. Thus, the closure of FRP meant for them the collapse of the legitimate political 
roof. They then directed their expectations to a call for divine salvation.”620 This is 
an unsubstantiated and misleading argument. As mentioned in trials, only a few of 
105 defendants were affiliated with FRP. Besides, the chief judge did not regard this 
affiliation as an important matter. The judge neither used the party issue as a point in 
his considerations nor mentioned it in the final charges and decisions.621 
 Another argument brought forward in recent works is that the Menemen Inci-
dent was another indicator of the prematurity of the transition to a multi-party sys-
tem.622 This point is generally made about the closure of FRP and the failure of that 
second attempt to shift to a multi-party system. FRP was accused of being reactionist 
and creating an opportunity for reactionists to operate. The Menemen Incident is 
viewed in the same equation623 as if it were a politically motivated revolt, planned 
and carried out by the remaining followers of FRP. In reality, the perpetrators of the 
event had nothing to do with the former FRP or any other political group. 
There are also ambiguous arguments in point. According to Mazıcı, the 
Menemen Incident occurred under some intersecting conditions. In addition to the 
closure of FRP, the Popular Republican Party (Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası), which did 
not adopt a reactionist political line, was closed as well by a cabinet decree on 21 
December, 1930. The request to establish the Workers and Farmers Party of the Re-
public of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi) was also refused, on 
the grounds that it tended toward communist purposes. Mazıcı argues that the occur-
rence of the Menemen Incident after the termination of those three political projects 
is significant.624 Her account holds that there was potential for political opposition in 
the country. This potential became manifest in the attempts to establish political par-
                                                
620 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 435. 
621 Although Eyüp Öz diverges from the officially-biased writers in general, his study in-
volves misleading or weak information in no small measure. His emphasis on the FRP con-
nection is a case in point. Öz’s account is discussed in the “Unbiased Accounts” section be-
low. 
622 Aysal, “Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - Menemen Olayı,” 581. 
623 Ertem, “Resmi Belgeler Ve Basında Menemen Olayı,” 177. 
624 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 144. 
 148 
ties. Mazıcı implies that when these initiatives were precluded, oppositional circles 
took action in Menemen. This is a misleading and misinformed deduction. Neither 
the agents of the incident nor the supposed backstage actors were associated with any 
political organization. Such inferences appear to be the consequence of attempts to 
portray the incident as a well-rounded revolt, carried out by networks determined to 
oppose the regime. 
 Not all of the officially-biased writers ascribe direct responsibility to FRP for 
the Menemen Incident. According to Yazman, for instance, “although critics assert 
that it gave rise to the rebellion, FRP was not a reactionist party. It was only indirect-
ly connected to the incident. FRP opened a road to a broad range of freedom in the 
country if for a short time of three months. Under these liberal circumstances, those 
who secretly nursed a grudge against the republican revolutions found encourage-
ment and took off their masks.”625 Yazman continues by mentioning the İzmir meet-
ing of FRP, held on 7 September, 1930, and to which 50,000 people attended. 
Yazman holds that the İzmir meeting revealed how tens of thousands of people 
turned against the hat and wished to wear the fes again. “Owing to that meeting, un-
der the assumption of attracting a wide range of supporters, reactionists chose 
Menemen to initiate their revolt.”626  
This explanation is weak. Defining the participants’ wish to wear the fes 
again in the FRP’s İzmir meeting as an hostile attitude against the republic is not 
convincing. Opposing the hat or even the party in power does not mean opposing the 
regime itself. Although Yazman tries to make his explanation plausible by not charg-
ing FRP directly, he describes its supporters as potential rebels who, in due time, at-
tempted a revolt against the republic. Moreover, the link between the participants of 
the FRP meeting in İzmir and the Menemen Incident is missing in his argument. He 
presumes that secret protagonists of actions against the new regime attended the FRP 
meetings and then undertook a rebellion, Yazman does not explain who these pro-
tagonists were and how their opposition evolved into a revolt. Thus, Yazman’s narra-
tive remains flawed and unconvincing.  
 Mazıcı as well offers explanations about the conditions that facilitated the 
Menemen Incident. “Despite all its efforts, RPP could not lead the country out of the 
                                                
625 Yazman, Atatürk’le Beraber: Devrimler, Olaylar, Anılar (1919-1939), 234. 
626 Ibid., 235. 
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economic crises that occurred after eleven years of war. Additional factors were the 
aridity of the summer of 1927 and the impact of the great world depression of 1929. 
These adverse conditions affected Western Anatolia partıcularly hard. Under the in-
fluence of these economic troubles, the Menemen townspeople voted for FRP in the 
municipal elections. Having fallen short in resolving the country’s economic prob-
lems, RPP adopted a populist policy in order to retain power. RPP appealed to fears 
of ‘reactionism and communism’ to condemn FRP indiscriminately. RPP used these 
notion provocatively to blame the political alliance that FRP represented and thus 
depicted FRP as a meeting ground of anti-republicans and opponents of laicism.”627 
Indeed, as previously discussed, Mazıcı offers some officially-biased arguments to 
explain the background of the Menemen Incident. This study is not the place to elab-
orate on the reasons why people voted for FRP, but one can argue that Mazıcı’s ac-
count about Menemen townspeople’s choice of FRP and why people in general sup-
ported it makes the most sense among the officially-biased recent interpreters of the 
Menemen Incident. However, her explanation is ultimately flawed for the same rea-
son. Asserting that “RPP’s definition of FRP as reactionist stimulated anti-
government agents to gather under the roof of FRP and prepared the ground for the 
Menemen Incident ” is untenable. Mazıcı does not show how and where did the pro-
tagonists of the Menemen Incident connected to opposition leaders affiliated with 
FRP. 
4.2. Counter-Official and Conspiracy Narrations 
The second group of the recent literature about the Menemen Incident differ 
from others by their bent on counter-official and conspiratorial arguments. In this 
section, I discuss two kinds of narrations. The first one is marked with its contrast to 
official arguments as well as reliance on conspiratorial explanations. In order to 
claim that the incident occurred in a different way than that described in officially-
biased accounts, these authors incorporate misinformation peppered with conspiracy 
arguments. The second group of accounts are distinguished by containing conspirato-
rial arguments predominantly, regardless of being officially-biased or moved by 
counter-official concerns.  
                                                
627 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 140. 
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The counter-official perspective628 stresses that although many years have 
passed since the event, it is still used to defame religious figures and Muslims in 
general.629 Counter-official authors thus describe the incident as an organized plot 
aimed at putting believers and Islamic orders, as well as Islam itself (as a religion) in 
a difficult position. In this regard, the initial point of the plotline is a decision of RPP 
administrators allegedly made in Bursa, “in the summer of 1930, [when] Şükrü 
Kaya, Mahmud Esat Bozkurt, Vasıf Çınar, and other prominent figures of RPP were 
staying in a hotel in Bursa.”630  
According to the story, Şeyh Esat was also in the city and went to a hotel 
across from the one in which RPP leaders stayed. It is alleged that RPP leaders ob-
served the crowd gathered in front of Şeyh Esat’s hotel, welcoming Esat, presenting 
their affection and respect.631 “There, RPP magnates decided to crush all religious 
figures, starting with Esat.”632 They had a conversation among themselves as fol-
lows: “It’s time to annihilate those men. An incident shall be stirred up in Menemen 
under the guise of rebellion against the regime. Religious protagonists will be 
grabbed and crushed one by one.”633 That is to say, Kemalists allegedly condemned 
Şeyh Esat much earlier than the Menemen Incident. These authors do not seem to 
have been concerned with providing evidence to back their story. Therefore, we do 
not have a clue where to check whether such an encounter happened or not. 
Counter-official accounts thus describe the event as a staged revolt,634 part of 
a game plan to condemn “reactionism.”635 According to Mustafa İslamoğlu, his ar-
                                                
628 The first influential author who accounted the event in a counter-official context is Necip 
Fazıl Kısakürek. The arguments of subsequent authors are based on his explanations. 
629   Recai Kömür, “Menemen İstismarı Artık Bitmeli”, Aksiyon, December 31, 1994, 
http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/kapak/menemen-istismari-artik-bitmeli_500412  ; Mustafa Ar-
mağan, “Menemen’de Ajanlar Cirit Atıyordu!”  Zaman, December 28, 2014, 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazarlar/mustafa-armagan/menemende-ajanlar-cirit-
atiyordu_2267024.html 
630 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 73. 
631 Mustafa İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler ve Menemen Provakasyonu, 7th ed. (İstanbul: 
Denge Yayınları, 1998), 78. 
632 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 25th ed. (İstanbul: Büyük Doğu 
Yayınları, 2009), 159. 
633 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 86. 
634 Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 129. 
635 For these writers, “some would show displeasure for the suspicion that the Menemen In-
cident was a provocation of the Kemalist regime.” The incident is defined as having been or-
ganized to satisfy both İsmet Paşa’s desire to punish the public for its support of FRP and 
Mustafa Kemal’s wish to annihilate the Nakşibendi order. As for FRP, it discovered that the 
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guments “would be described as another conspiracy theory. Those, who will describe 
them in that way, believe what the official history and state chroniclers say. Howev-
er, there are proofs that demonstrate the presence of some dirty hands in the inci-
dent.”636 “Based on the narration of a certain private, who did his service in the unit 
under Kubilay’s command, some secret agents were working undercover in Mene-
men in those days. A specific bearded agent was instigating the townspeople on the 
day of the event. He was detained but did not appear in the court, and no one ever 
saw him again.”637 “Since the perpetrators of the incident did not truly intend to stir 
up a revolt, but were rather directed by the state, the work of the secret agent was not 
difficult.”638 “The agent in question observed the events in black sheet from afar.”639 
Although the narrators of this story refer to people who witnessed or knew about the-
se situations,640 they neither give names nor provide details. Therefore, this account 
of a secret remains a fictional story. 
 According to these authors, none of the actors engaged in the incident was 
qualified to initiate such a religious movement. “In addition to the fact that they ut-
terly lacked any sort of religious perception and sensibility, the leader of the compa-
ny was also an ignorant pervert and psychopath.”641 “All these prove the presence of 
a secret background without the need to offer further support.”642 “Kubilay was sac-
                                                                                                                                     
people were yearning for a religious order. Thus, the label of “reactionism” attributed to the 
FRP, would be proven through staging “the game of Menemen.” (See Müftüoğlu, Menemen 
Vak’ası, 60, 61.; İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 93; Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din 
Mazlumları, 128.) 
636 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 81. 
637  Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 69. Mustafa Armağan, “Menemen’de Ajanlar Cirit 
Atıyordu!” This writer remarks that the British ambassador to Ankara at the time reported in 
an official document on 4 February, 1931, that a statement of Mustafa Muğlalı, the chief 
judge of the martial court, alleged that Şeyh Esat made an explicit declaration in his death-
bed that Lawrence, the famous British agent, was connected with the Menemen Incident. 
Armağan thinks that this alleged British document was fabricated to cover the provocation 
executed by native secret agents. 
638 Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 138. 
639 Ibid., 140; İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 85. 
640 Kısakürek even says that one of those witnesses was still alive at the date of his writing. 
Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 140; İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler. 
641 They are also described to not have any sort of association with the Nakşibendi order. 
Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 83. 
642 Misinformation about the actions of the company are also present in these counter-official 
writings. The company members are described as having been so raving that hashish addict 
Derviş did not content himself with cutting the head off the poor officer but also drank his 
blood by handfuls in the manner of a mad man. Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 139; 
İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 76. 
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rificed for the sake of this conspiracy. He was deliberately sent in unarmed, with his 
privates’ rifles loaded with blanks.”643 In this account, the district wardens are assert-
ed to have been shot with the bullets of machine guns of support units, and killed in 
the confusion.644 “There are witnesses of this last event as well.”645 Nevertheless, the 
accuracy of this testimony is doubtful because the witnesses in question are untrace-
able.  
A further allegation is that the perpetrators were shot in the crossfire to do 
away with the evidence instead of detaining them.646 The so-called plan involved a 
payment to the actors as well. “Those hashish-addicts were given 10,000 liras in ex-
change for what they would do. According to the testimonies of someone present 
there, Mehmet Emin said: ‘What happened to the money which we were promised to 
get?’ when he was apprehended.”647 As the examples above should illustrate, these 
narrators who challenge the official accounts do not provide verifiable information 
and largely remain conspiracy theorists. 
There are some reasonable points in the accounts of these counter-official au-
thors. They indicate the incapacity of the insurgents to stir up as well-rounded a re-
bellion as argued in the officially-biased accounts. They plausibly note the ignorance 
and stupidity of the actors,648 though they reach the conclusion that they were di-
rected by government agents.649 They also mention the implausibility of the over-
throwing of the government by six hashish-addicts and drunks.650 “If the Nakşibendi 
order had been the organizer of the alleged rebellion to institute sharia, they would 
not assign the task to such ignorant hashish-addicts as Derviş Mehmet, but to re-
spectable and esteemed persons.”651 “The perpetrators had nothing to do with either 
the Nakşibendi order or the Islamic religion. Smoking hashish is out of the question 
                                                
643 “Kubilay’s lamenters were the ones who sent him to his very death.” İslamoğlu, Devrim-
lere Tepkiler, 87. 
644 Ibid., 76. 
645 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 67. 
646 The exaggeration here is that this way of removing proof is similar to the methods em-
ployed by the CIA, KGB and MOSSAD. İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 87. 
647 Ibid., 82. 
648 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 83. 
649 Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 140. 
650 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 97. In a former interview published in Zaman, 25 De-
cember 1988, Kubilay’s daughter-in-law Müzeyyen is claimed to have said: “The killers of 
Kubilay were a few hashish-addicts. Yet, because of several bad seeds, all Muslims have 
been tarnished,  I’m against this.” Mustafa Armağan, “Menemen’de Ajanlar Cirit Atıyordu!” 
651 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 83. 
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for a Muslim.”652 İslamoğlu further argues that the government was aware of the 
perpetrators beforehand, and their families had reported them to the police.653 “Şeyh 
Esat was under surveillance as well.”654 İslamoğlu stresses that the prosecutor based 
his charges regarding the incident, which was carried out by six hashish-addicts, on a 
ridiculous assertion655 and the court ascribed the responsibility of the incident to the 
Nakşibendi order in an unlawful way.656  
Within this context, counter-official accounts indicate that the real purpose of 
carrying out the incident was to destroy the Nakşibendi order, frustrate religious 
people,657 and annihilate notable religious figures,658 Şeyh Esat especially.659 The as-
sertion here is that Şeyh Esat did not die a natural death due to his old age and dis-
ease, but was murdered.660 “As he could not be legally executed because of his age, 
the executioners of the government resorted to murder.”661 Nevertheless, Şeyh Esat 
was already eighty-four years old at the time and was so ill that during the trials he 
was excused by the chief judge several times to rest. The idea that he was murdered 
by state officers lacks any sort of substantial proof and hence it remains merely a 
rumor.  
                                                
652 Recai Kömür, “Menemen İstismarı Artık Bitmeli.” 
653 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 87. 
654 Kısakürek explains on this issue basing upon Saraçoğlu’s account. Kısakürek, Son Devrin 
Din Mazlumları, 144. 
655 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 97. 
656 İslamoğlu says that anyone who wish to write the history of “radical irreligiousness” and 
to know how cheap life is in Turkey should read the prosecutor’s opinion as to the accusa-
tions that justify the death sentences issued in the Menemen Incident. Ibid., 103. 
657 It is alleged that İsmet Paşa, as usual, incriminated all Muslims in his parliament speech 
on January 1, 1931. Ibid., 77; This is not true. The prime minister did not condemn all Mus-
lims. He disparaged the actors who had been seeking to use religion as a means to intervene 
in the political arena. Furthermore, for Eyüp Öz, Jewish Jözef’s sentence with capital pun-
ishment for applauding the demonstrations of Derviş Mehmet and his followers was “a price 
paid in the name of all non-Muslims.” Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 429. 
658 Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din Mazlumları, 128–9. 
659 Müftüoğlu, Menemen Vak’ası, 75. 
660 Kısakürek alleges that Şeyh Esat’s food was poisoned several times, but “they” obtained 
no result, except that, he became sicker. Later, they injected poison with a syringe to his 
body at night, finishing Şeyh Esat off and reaching their goal. Kısakürek mentiones that this 
information is based on rumors and there is no document to justify these news, but he adds 
that the logic of the flow of events leaves no room for doubt. Kısakürek, Son Devrin Din 
Mazlumları, 160–1. 
661 İslamoğlu says: “What I have heard from Şeyh Esat’s old disciples, who were dedicated 
to him, agrees with the news of his being martyred by poison injection.” İslamoğlu, Devrim-
lere Tepkiler, 116. 
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These counter-official conspiracy theorists express significant points regard-
ing the contradictions of the accusations against the entire Nakşibendi order. Howev-
er, their arguments are flawed for defining the incident as a plot and disregarding the 
crowd in the square. They ignore the people’s implicit or explicit acclamation and 
support during the event. It was this support that invited the government’s harsh re-
sponse. The counter-official accounts discount the rationale behind the government’s 
reaction and hold that “the republic showed extreme injustice, in punishing and 
hanging many people regardless of their involvement in the incident, [making one 
think of] a state terrorism”662  
The republican regime had no tolerance for someone manipulating people 
with political-religious promises such as establishing a caliphate regime, abolishing 
the Hat Act, and the like. An even more unbearable matter was people’s putting their 
support behind such movements. Thus, the regime wished to give a clear and intimi-
dating message to everyone, particularly religious orders, so they would not dare to 
attempt such a rebellion.  
Counter-official authors also suppose that the republican regime aimed to an-
nihilate the sufi orders for good. According to these authors, “the regime was the en-
emy of the activities of all sufi orders.”663 However, this is not true. As even the au-
thors in question stress, state officers knew that the sufi organizations were still ac-
tive. Moreover, they remained alive after the incident as well. Thus, the suggestion 
that the regime aimed to destroying all sufi and other religious activities is mislead-
ing. 
The second category of this section covers the totally fictive arguments, re-
gardless of official or counter-official perspectives. The accounts of Atilhan and 
Küçük top the list.664 For Atilhan, the incident was “a game planned by Zionist anar-
chists who used thousands of Nakşibendis as an instrument and made them play it 
                                                
662 İslamoğlu, Devrimlere Tepkiler, 77. 
663 Ibid., 102. 
664 Cevat Rıfat Atilhan (d. 1967) was a former military man and ideological writer. He wrote 
hundreds of articles and books from such ideological perspectives such Turkism, pan-
Islamism as well as anti-Semitism. Yalçın Küçük (b. 1930), has similarly adopted quite vari-
ous ideological positions ranging from Marxism to Nationalism. He writes on political and 
historical issues. 
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through using their naiveté and ignorance.”665 According to Atilhan,  “the main pur-
pose of the event was to blacken religion and religious figures in the eyes of the ris-
ing generation. Aegean people considered the abolition of FRP an affair of honor. 
Their dissatisfaction of the government grew day by day. Thus, it posed a danger for 
İnönü. Consequently, to frighten as well as to win the favor of the Aegeans, İnönü 
prepared a scenario of insurrection with the help of a few free-mason deputies. 
Nakşibendis were unwittingly used as a means of Zionist ideals and enabled İnönü 
and other masons to remain in power for many years.”666  
Yalçın Küçük describes the incident as a mission, prepared and launched to 
set the Kemalist regime right. “An anti-regime revolt was considered necessary in 
order to discipline the society and suppress economic distress. Kubilay was deliber-
ately sent to his death so that the government could bring its opponents to their heel 
and legitimate its oppressive regime.”667 Despite the ungrounded content of these 
conspiracy theories, they are recounted in proto-academic writings. For instance, 
Mazıcı remarks “although Küçük’s interpretations may seem to be speculative exag-
gerations, he makes thought-provoking points. ‘Why was an unarmed reserve officer 
with a few days of experience of military service sent to intervene’ is an important 
question. Another point is why the rifles of Kubilay’s troops did not have real bullets 
when the rebels could gather 1500 people around themselves.”668  
The criticisms previously mentioned are also applicable for the last two au-
thors. Rather than providing substantial proof to support their claims, they choose to 
speculate on the origin of the event and provide misleading, unverified and unverifi-
able information. While these accounts avoid the black-and-white thinking of the of-
ficially-biased or counter-official authors in their effort to draw a general picture and 
to capture the essence of the event, they can only produce basically fictional stories. 
4.3. Unbiased Accounts 
The accounts discussed here do not generally approach the Menemen Inci-
dent within narrow boxes as do the officially-biased or counter-official accounts. For 
instance, none of these researchers depict the purposes attributed to the perpetrators 
                                                
665 Cevat Rıfat Atilhan, Menemen Hadisesinin İç Yüzü (İstanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1968), 
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666 Ibid. 
667 Yalçın Küçük, Türkiye Üzerine Tezler (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1989), 236–7. 
668 Mazıcı, “Menemen Olayı’nın Analizi,” 141. 
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as feasible –such as occupying Ankara and other cities or re-establishing the cali-
phate. In this sense, instead of describing the incident as a rebellion threatening the 
very existence of the republic, they seek to understand the causal relations within and 
behind the events discussed under the heading of the Menemen Incident. They also 
do not have a biased perspective and do not make normative-ideological interpreta-
tions. Therefore, these attentive scholarly works deserve to be examined one by one. 
The unique interpretations and arguments of this thesis will also be discussed along-
side the relevant issues. 
4.3.1. Hamit Bozarslan 
Bozarslan is the first scholar who elaborated on the primary sources academi-
cally and brought forward path-breaking arguments against officially-biased and 
counter-official accounts. However, Bozarslan’s explanations have weak points as 
well. Intended to focus on the event as a “millenarian movement,” Bozarslan dis-
cusses it in political, economic and religious terms. One of his main arguments is that 
even though the perpetrators of the revolt were associated with the order, “it was a 
local event rather than a rebellion.”669 
Bozarslan explains the circumstances which led to the incident. For him, one 
of the reasons why people, particularly villagers, provided support in different de-
grees was that a social banditry tradition was still alive in the region.670 However, 
Bozarslan appears to be taking this point for granted. Bozarslan does not give refer-
ence to a primary or secondary sources that would help establish the existence of 
bandits and familiarity with bandits in this region.  
According to Bozarslan, immigrants from Crete composed a large part of re-
gion’s population. “Those immigrants were under pressure to gain acceptance by the 
native population. The region was suffering from the economic effects of the Great 
World Depression of 1929. In addition, taxes were high and peasants were in a really 
difficult situation. Moreover, the climate of the region at the time was arid, and 
floods occurred and killed many people while leaving many more of them home-
                                                
669 Hamit Bozarslan, “Messianisme et mouvement social&: l’événement de Menemen en Tur-
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670 Hamit Bozarslan, “Le madhisme en Turquie&: L’«&incident de Menemen&» en 1930,” Re-
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less.”671 Bozarslan underlines that these factors enhanced the people’s perception of 
the era as a chaotic one and raised their expectation of a messiah. Nevertheless, he 
does not give references to primary sources nor he provides detailed information 
about the extent to which these natural disasters affected the lives of people so much 
so that they came to expect a sacred savior. He does not substantially frame the con-
ditions of the region as he describes them. He also does not establish the readiness of 
the people for such a messianic proclamation. He does not provide sufficient infor-
mation to support his claim that the people of Menemen and the surrounding West 
Anatolian regions believed that they were living in the end of times (ahir zaman). 
Bozarslan states that a large part of the population perceived that the republi-
can regime was fighting an open war against religion.672 This aspect of Bozarslan’s 
argument is correct. A common displeasure against the government’s religious poli-
cies might be indicated as a general reason for some people to show support. Indeed, 
the RPP’s policy of laicism would remain the subject of debate for a very long period 
in Turkish history. The transformation from a lifestyle, which was largely defined in 
religious terms, into a secularist political system and culture generated a perception 
among the religiously and culturally conservative people that their religion was at 
risk. This point thus explains to a significant degree why some people supported or 
acclaimed the actions of Derviş Mehmet and his friends. For Bozarslan, within this 
context, although major signs of the end of the world in Islamic literature, such as the 
sunrise from the west and sunset from the east, did not occur, there was tangible evi-
dence to conclude that the Dajjal673 had come and that his name was Mustafa Ke-
mal.674  
Furthermore, according to Bozarslan, “Fethi Okyar was seen as a political 
messiah, a savior certainly unexpected but desired. However, Okyar was betrayed, or 
worse, betrayed his followers by leaving them alone to face their destiny. In Mene-
men, a town which had acclaimed FRP in the municipal elections of 1930, the reli-
gious messiah had only to take on the role of political messiah to fulfill the hopes of 
                                                
671 Ibid., 303–5. 
672 Ibid., 306. 
673 Dajjal, comparable to Antichrist, is an evil figure in Islamic eschatology. It is believed 
that he will emerge on Earth at the end of times and will deceive people to deflect them from 
the right way. 
674 Bozarslan, “Le Madhisme en Turquie,” 305. 
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the crowd.”675 Nevertheless, these last statements of Bozarslan are not grounded on 
facts. Although Derviş plainly stressed the infidelity of RPP leaders, no record indi-
cates that he mentioned the word “Dajjal.” In fact, Bozarslan can not point to a single 
official record or perpetrator statement or another source that would help him verify 
his point. Similarly, he can not produce any source that shows the perception of Fethi 
Okyar as a political Messiah. 
Indeed, Bozarslan’s attempt to offer an esoteric explanation for the incident 
remains ungrounded in general. The villagers’ hosting of Derviş did not derive from 
their expectations of a sacred savior but from their relationship and acquaintance 
with him and his followers. Still, the reason behind a small proportion of the Mene-
men townspeople’s seeming approval of Derviş Mehmet can be explained in terms of 
their disappointments and displeasure of the republican policies –rather than their 
specific anticipation of the Mahdi. Indeed, if the people had truly expected the emer-
gence of the Mahdi and had followed Derviş Mehmet for that reason, they would 
have dedicated themselves to him sincerely and would not have hesitated to engage 
in a gun battle with law enforcement agencies.  
The actions of the company were parts of a sacred ritual, according to 
Bozarslan. “They codified a discrete language for communication. It was incompre-
hensible to persons outside the group.”676 But not a single piece of supporting infor-
mation is present on their using of a communication code. Bozarslan argues that the 
company’s smoking of hashish was also a part of their messianic ritual, “as seen in 
some Christian messianic experiences.”677 He takes Derviş’s presumed saying, “It's a 
sin to drink blood, but his blood is lawful," for granted as well and makes further 
contrived interpretations.678 For him, Kubilay’s beheading signals a return to the pre-
Abrahamic age, in the sense that Derviş, in company with the crowd’s applause, 
transformed the killing of Kubilay into an ethereal sacrifice.679 These assertions indi-
cate a break from the factual base. As a matter of fact, the gathering of townspeople 
around Derviş, though they were very small in number, emboldened him to carry out 
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such a gruesome murder. However, he neither said Kubilay’s blood was lawful nor 
drank it. With reference to these cases, Bozarslan’s decision to assert the messianic 
aspects of the event influences his interpretation of the rumors as fact. His effort to 
set the actual happenings in a metaphysical messianic framework is ultimately un-
productive. 
 Another claim of Bozarslan from the same perspective is the inability of Ke-
malist leaders to understand the violent incident in messianic terms. “Since they did 
not realize the eschatological nature of the event, they interpreted it as an act of sub-
version, a plot against the existence of the government.”680 Nevertheless, the event 
was understood by RPP leaders very well. It was a naive attempt at rebellion, carried 
out by ignorant, senseless insurgents who frequently smoke hashish and acted in im-
pertinent ways. The government’s real reaction to the incident, including hanging 
twenty-eight people regardless of their substantial engagement in the events, 
amounted to a warning to everyone who would dare to initiate such a revolt, particu-
larly in religious terms, and to people who would in any way participate in or ap-
prove of such an undertaking. In this regard, his expression that “the Kemalist gov-
ernment decided to overcome the Menemen townspeople’s acute cry of insurrection” 
is an exaggeration.  
For Bozarslan, the government showed an unprecedented rage against FRP 
and opposition media as well as sufi circles.681 However, the harsh response of the 
government was not as unprecedented as Bozarslan states. A strict polarization af-
fected the political atmosphere of the era and increased tensions. Conflicts between 
newspapers and the statements of RPP deputies make this situation clear. Bozarslan’s 
expression of “the defense of the revolution” was already going on. All the opposi-
tion elements, including the members of FRP and opposition media, were under se-
vere criticism. Bozarslan’s argument that the government did not prioritize determin-
ing individual guilt after the incident however, appears reasonable. As he puts it, “the 
case, though conducted within the legal process, turned out to be an exemplary in-
stance of revolutionary justice.”682 
                                                
680 Ibid., 308. 
681 Ibid., 301. 
682 Ibid., 302. 
 160 
4.3.2. Eyüp Öz 
Eyüp Öz, a student of Bozarslan, basically seeks to expand Bozarslan’s ar-
guments. For him as well, the incident was local in nature and there is no reliable 
proof of external connections of sufi orders or to Şeyh Esat.683 Still, his main purpose 
in the article is to discuss the causes which led the people of the district to support or 
acclaim Derviş in various ways as well as the motivations of the perpetrators in initi-
ating such a revolt. Some of Öz’s explanations are neither verifiable nor falsifiable, 
because there is no reliable primary or secondary source to rely on. Other assertions 
of Öz appear mistaken. For him, the reasons behind the uncertainties of Giritli 
Mehmet stem from his depiction as a pawn in both official and opposition accounts 
of the event. However, Öz asserts that examining his past reveals a fragile and dis-
turbed portrait.684 
 In a similar vein to Bozarslan, Öz states that immigrants composed a vast 
amount of Menemen’s population685 and were having housing problems as well as 
being marginalized by local residents. Therefore, they tended towards sufi orders, 
expecting acceptance and support.686 Indeed, an immigrant crowd of people might 
try to adapt to local organizations. Nevertheless, in the case at hand, such accounts 
remain to be guesses or suppositions. There is no evidence that indicates the general 
orientation of the district’s people towards sufi orders. Thus, the assertion that this 
notion contributed to the Menemen Incident in terms of both the perpetrators and the 
locals remains unconvincing. 
 As for the specific motivations of the insurgents, Öz suggests that conditions 
such as “poverty, all kinds of illegitimacy, prostitution, homicide, family violence, 
and the sale and use of drugs” might have influenced Manisa’s immigrant neighbor-
hoods. “In order to ensure their security and to use in case of need, residents of these 
poor quarters were carrying weapons. Thus, Giritli Mehmet and his disciples’ smok-
ing hashish does not conflict with their social status and environment. The assassina-
                                                
683 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 421. 
684 Ibid., 412. 
685 Öz says the population was approximately 30,000, and yet it was the sum of the entire 
township. The town itself had a population of 12,000 people. Still, the number of residents is 
not the problem. It must be noted that a very small proportion attended Derviş’s demonstra-
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the way for the perception that the incident was a rebellion in which the townspeople of 
Menemen participated widely. 
686 Öz, “Yasak Bir Hafızayla Yüzleşmek,” 426. 
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tion of Kubilay might be defined as a type of violence generated with regards to the 
circumstances under which Derviş lived. Although Öz alleges that local newspaper 
reports support his accounts, he does not give reference to those primary sources. 
Thus, his reference point and further arguments in this line remain ambiguous.687  
 Öz offers details about the social structures of the villages as well. For him, 
“the number of foreclosures was incredible in size, so much so that villages had 
turned into uninhabitable places. Local newspapers had notices of thousands of acres 
of peasant lands in Manisa villages, including the land of Derviş’s wife, put on sale 
in exchange for unpaid loans.”688 For Öz, this issue “directly documents” the connec-
tion between the crisis of the agricultural sector and the event itself. It is also a rea-
sonable answer to the question why Derviş was welcomed with respect, according to 
Öz. That is to say, Derviş Mehmet was elevated to become the religiously identified 
leader of peasants whose land had been seized, in terms of Öz’s explanations. 
Another argument that Öz makes is that “deficiencies of the Menemen Mu-
nicipality’s infrastructure services created another problem for the people. Access to 
drinking water was a particularly acute problem.”689 Öz is under the impression that 
“it is truly tiresome to stand in long lines to water fetch from a few fountains. Epi-
demics, marshes, transportation problems and natural disasters like floods occurred 
in the autumn of 1930, killing tens of people. Government support and relief efforts 
were inadequate and victims became helpless.”690 These were other issues from 
which the people of the region suffered, according to Öz. 
Öz claims that although FRP had been closed, its “associates” remained ac-
tive. “Under the stress of the government’s extreme surveillance, these masses were 
inclined to keep their ears open to any antagonist voice. Under these circumstances, 
several mahdis emerged in various Anatolian provinces and Derviş Mehmet was one 
of them.691 This point appears entirely speculative. It does not rest on any source or 
study that demonstrates the occurrence of similar claims of Mahdism, comparable to 
Derviş Mehmet’s emergence, in those years.  
                                                
687 Ibid., 427. 
688 Ibid., 427–8. 
689 Ibid., 428. 
690 Ibid., 428, 430. 
691 Ibid., 424–5. 
 162 
Following Bozarslan’s lead, Öz also expresses that Derviş Mehmet appeared 
after the political Mahdi, namely Fethi Okyar, since the latter was welcomed in the 
Aegean regions as a savior.692 This statement is partly correct. Okyar had been met 
with great excitement and expectations, primarily due to economic reasons. Howev-
er, Okyar himself did not seem to have wished to be regarded as such a savior. What 
is more important is that Derviş Mehmet did not receive much support.” The incident 
took place within only a few hours. His intentions were wildly imaginary and unreal-
istic. He was by no means able to actualize what he promised. Thus, such compari-
son with FRP experience remains quite far-fetched. 
Öz adds other reasons to the political ones to explain the messianic expecta-
tions of the people. “1930 was an extraordinary year. It was a time in which great 
crises, cultural breaks and state coercion were at their highest level. These factors 
were conceived as signs of the end of the world. Thus, expectations of the emergence 
of the Mahdi naturally arose.”693 However, the inference that all these troubles piled 
up in such an extraordinary degree as to create an expectation of a sacred savior still 
remains an unsubstantiated argument. According to the arguments of Öz and 
Bozarslan, the villagers hosted the company and the townspeople of Menemen wel-
comed Derviş since they considered him as the rescuer who would change their dire 
situations. In other words, those people are described as if they would not have ques-
tioned whether Derviş Mehmet had the qualifications and the potential to address 
their difficulties. Without taking Derviş and his company’s smoking hashish, igno-
rance and pennilessness into consideration, Öz and Bozarslan allege people followed 
him blindly. By doing so, Öz and Bozarslan repeat the mistake of officially-biased 
accounts. In the villages of Bozalan and Paşa, there were relatives of Derviş himself 
as well as of his followers. In other words, kinship and acquaintance were the ulti-
mate determinants of the company’s being hosted as well as the reason why they 
were not denounced. Villagers’ bonds of kinship and mutual acquaintance precluded 
them from reporting the armed group’s suspicious positions to law enforcement 
agencies. It must be noted that the villagers’ silence on this issue does not indicate 
their disloyalty to the state. If they had truly turned against the state and dedicated 
themselves to Derviş Mehmet as a savior in religious terms, they would have fol-
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lowed him on his subsequent actions or at least strengthened his hand as much as 
they could. In addition, the company was able to remain uncaught since no law en-
forcement officers was on duty in these villages. Though a certain villager of Boza-
lan assured them that they would arm themselves and come for assistance if needed, 
nobody left his village or joined the group in any way. Derviş Mehmet’s mother-in-
law even warned him and asked him not to proceed.  
Economic distress can not be offered as the main reason why some towns-
people followed Derviş Mehmet in Menemen. It is an abstract explanation. One 
needs to show specifically how economic distress moved a part of townspeople in 
Menemen to follow some armed strangers. Those who put forward the economic 
misery of people as a cause, do not provide testable data. 
The rationale behind the participation of a small number of the townspeople 
in Derviş Mehmet’s demonstrations has to be sought in several overlapping factors. 
The initial point is the company’s religious statements. Öz reasonably argues that the 
people’s reaction to the republic’s policies regarding religion was one of the strong-
est causes of opposition at the time.694 The group’s promise of re-establishing the ca-
liphate and reinstating sharia must have had an effect on people. Nevertheless, it 
does not suffice on its own to explain people’s support. While wandering around in 
the neighborhoods and meeting in the town square, the insurgents declared that an 
army of the caliphate consisting of 70,000 soldiers, had captured İstanbul as well as 
İzmir, and now surrounded Menemen. They moreover purported to have cut the 
communication lines, and stated that the entrances to and exits from the town were 
under their control. These declarations must have excited and affected some of the 
townspeople to different extents but enough to persuade some of them to follow the 
armed Derviş Mehmet. Some of them must have believed these claims. The insur-
gents’ threats against the townspeople, in that anyone who would not get under the 
banner would be slaughtered by mid-day. Under the influence of such rumors and 
threats spreading by word of mouth, some people probably wondered whether they 
would regret participating in the group or not. Those who were indecisive remained 
to stand still nearby and watched the events unfold. However, a very high number of 
inhabitants chose to stay at home. When one considers that there was not an armed 
intervention until the battalions with machine guns arrived 3,5 hours after the begin-
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ning of the demonstrations, some people’s gathering around the insurgents does not 
become a surprise. The delay of intervention in the demonstrations enhanced the in-
fluence of the insurgents’ words. Even so, the crowd was not determined to stay in 
the square at any cost, but was inclined to disperse. When the shooting started, peo-
ple ran away. No one remained behind to become engaged in the gun battle with mil-
itary units. There was not a single defendant in the trials charged with joining in the 
insurgents during the gunfight. It could be asserted that if Kubilay had not been mur-
dered with such brutality, the gathered crowd would not have constituted such a 
problem in the eyes of the PRR leaders. 
 As for political consequences, Öz accounts that the incident became an op-
portunity “served on a silver platter for the government. The RPP government turned 
the crisis into an opportunity and was able to overcome the strong dynamics that fa-
vored the opposition, particularly the former FRP. The opportunity allowed RPP to 
justify suppressive policies.”695 Öz’s remarks make good sense to a certain extent. 
The characterization of FRP as a reactionist coalition was commonplace. In the polit-
ical atmosphere of the era, RPP members condemned any dissenting opinion, criti-
cism or critic as the enemy of the republic. Thus, they pointed to the occurrence of 
such an incident of the one in Menemen as evidence of the reality of the threat of re-
actionism. Nevertheless, it might be unfair as well as irrational to allege that the RPP 
government, in a sense, enjoyed the political consequences of the incident. On the 
contrary, such an attempt of revolt, carried out with religious zeal, was precisely 
what the RPP did not want. İsmet Paşa’s statements on what the laic state meant was 
significant, particularly his emphasis that it did not amount to a notion of anti-
religiousness. In İsmet Paşa’s review, laicism was the opposite of irreligiousness in 
that it assured people to live their religion under the over-sight of the government. 
İsmet Paşa’s words and similar statements neither relieved the culturally and reli-
giously conservative masses of their worries nor made them embrace the govern-
ment’s laicist policies. Still, RPP leaders insisted on this line of policy and had no 
tolerance for any initiation of religiously motivated political movements. This was 
the reason why the Menemen townspeople were so harshly blamed to have allowed 
such an attempt. 
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4.3.3. Umut Azak 
Umut Azak’s study presents the most reasonable and modest account of the 
incident. Her research does not include exaggerations or unsubstantiated causal 
chains like those of Bozarslan and Öz. She mentions that her account differs from the 
Islamist as well as the Kemalist narrations of the rebellion. Azak initially gives a 
brief summary of the recent political history of the republic, including the attempts to 
shift to a multi-party system, the Şeyh Said Rebellion, the Law on the Maintenance 
of Order, and other key incidents or developments. She then outlines the different 
phases of the Menemen Incident.  
Her account of the rebels’ activities is largely based on the speeches they 
made during the trials. Though she offers a fair summary of the event, there is some 
misleading information as well in her narrative. For instance, she states that the guns 
of Commander Fahri Bey, who came to scatter the crowd prior to Kubilay, and his 
unit did not have real bullets. Here Azak implies that Fahri Bey and his battalion 
might have shot at the company. If so, Derviş Mehmet did not get hurt because of the 
use of blank cartridges and he appeared to have proved at least for a short time his 
invulnerability. Thus the crowd in the square applauded him.696 However, the evi-
dence of hand shows that Fahri Bey went to the government building and did not 
stay in the square or intervene to halt the demonstration when Derviş paid no heed to 
him.  
Another misinformation in her study is that Kubilay was shot in the leg by 
Derviş.697 Actually, he was shot in the chest. After Derviş beheaded Kubilay, as 
Azak accounts with reference to secondary literature, “he displayed his head to the 
crowd and received an acclamation in return.”698 However, there is no reliable in-
formation on this point in the primary sources and it is most likely a myth fabricated 
afterwards.699  
 Azak asserts, “apparently shaken by the violence of the rebels and the peo-
ple’s alleged collaboration with them, the government aimed to restore its authori-
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ty.”700 In fact, the RPP leaders did not seek to restore the government’s authority be-
cause the situation was brought under control immediately as there were merely six 
perpetrators in the so-called rebellion.701 Rather, the government aimed at the intimi-
dation of both the public and the religious figures. Azak as well purports that it was 
the alleged collaboration of the people with the insurgents that disturbed the political 
leaders most.702 And yet, the vital point of the matter is not just the assertions about 
townspeople having provided support. Government officials knew the extent to 
which people gathered in the square to spectate Derviş’s acts or to participate in 
them. The government’s harsh response non-compliance of the people with the warn-
ings of gendarme officers and their applause and acclamation of Derviş. In other 
words, the collective stance of some townspeople typically met with a punitive reply 
of the government. 
According to Azak, RPP leaders truly regarded the incident as a reactionist 
rebellion, a real threat the state overcame.  “The political leadership saw the still vi-
brant social network of the tarikat, despite the formal ban on them since 1925,  as a 
major threat to the state’s authority, and was convinced that the rebellion was 
planned by Nakşibendi sheikhs who used Derviş Mehmet as a pawn.”703 Neverthe-
less, Azak misses the point that the government knew well that certain sufi orders 
continued to exist even after their formal ban. Thus, it was not the case that RPP 
leaders realized all of a sudden after the Menemen Incident that these orders, particu-
larly the Nakşibendis, survived underground. It is clear from the situation that the se-
cond phase of the judicial process mostly aimed at the prosecution of the Nakşiben-
dis in a small part of the country. In other words, the situation did not turn into a hunt 
of the Nakşibendis and other followers of sufi orders all over the nation as Azak as-
serts.704  
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701 Azak uses the term “rebellion” to describe the incident. I believe the events that made up 
this incident can not be defined as a rebellion, as if they enjoyed the backing of a large num-
ber of people engaged in various forms of social and political conflicts, including violent 
confrontation with law-enforcement agencies. Defining the Menemen Incident as “an at-
tempt at rebellion” makes more sense.  
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Azak emphasizes the lack of evidence indicating the Nakşibendi order’s role 
in the incident.705 For her, “the link between the group of Derviş Mehmet and 
sheikhs in the upper echelons of the Nakşibendi order remains obscure”706 and “there 
is no evidence that Derviş Mehmet planned the rebellion in collaboration with larger 
sufi networks. Prosecutor’s claim in this regards, that Şeyh Esat not only engaged in 
the events but was also the leader of the riot is unproven.”707 In other words, the in-
cident “was neither a plot of Şeyh Esat in İstanbul to overthrow the secular govern-
ment nor a plot of the latter to oppress the Nakşibendis. It was an attempt at local re-
bellion conducted by minor and local members of the Nakşibendi order.”708  
Azak also indicates that the reason why insurgents chose Menemen as the 
town to introduce their rebellion is unknown. “Neither the court speeches of the three 
companions of Derviş Mehmet nor the final indictment of the prosecutor include any 
substantial detail which could explain these points.”709 The reason why the company 
headed for Menemen is indeed obscure, but not so significant. This is to say, the ac-
tions of Derviş and his followers did not derive from sound minds. It is not very rea-
sonable to look for logic in the acts of those hashish smokers as if they could have 
taken all their steps thoughtfully. Searching for a higher rationale behind all their 
deeds is pointless. Having taken courage from being hosted by his relatives and ac-
quaintances in the neighboring villages, Derviş might have really supposed that Saf-
fet Hoca would welcome and protect them in Menemen. In this way, he might have 
dreamt of occupying the district governorate and taking the military forces under his 
control. There does not seem to be a clear motive for Derviş to choose Menemen 
aside from these premises. 
As an answer to the writings that put responsibility on the former FRP for the 
incident, she expresses that there is no proof of a connection between FRP and the 
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participants of the Menemen uprising.710 As evidence for her argument, Azak men-
tions that FRP was closed one month before the incident. This is a plausible but in-
sufficient explanation. She needed to show as well that there is not a single piece of 
evidence indicating a concrete relationship between members of FRP and any of the 
perpetrators or their alleged incentives in all the substantial materials available to us 
on the incident –as already indicated above in the present work. 
In explaining the motives of the insurgents, Azak states: “We can only sug-
gest that the rebels might have been inspired by the general expression of social and 
economic dissatisfaction and the consequent support that the masses extended to the 
opposition party in their region.”711 Her argument that insurgents had been affected 
by people’s general dissatisfaction is not substantial, as discussed in the previous 
sections in detail above. It makes more sense to argue that they were deceived by 
themselves rather than that they were encouraged by people’s probable support. Hav-
ing been doped up under the influence of hashish, they must have fancied that the six 
of them would suffice to an attempt of a revolt that would attract people’s support –
although nobody from the villages had joined in them. 
Azak emphasizes that the people believed in Derviş to be the Mahdi and thus, 
hosted him. For her, villagers might have believed in Derviş not because of their 
mere expectance of a random savior but since they had been familiar with the notion, 
located in common vocabulary of Islamic belief.712 Azak explains that, whether they 
recognized or not, the villagers’ help to Derviş possibly rested upon their opinion 
that Islam needed to be restored.713 Azak plausibly describes that “the villages where 
the rebellious group camped were the villages of their close relatives,” but, “the real 
motive of those who hosted the rebels is difficult to discern.”714 Indeed, the extent to 
which the villagers believed in Derviş is a significant question since not a single one 
of them joined the company. The group merely stayed in villages, where they were 
hosted and provided with basic provisions. Villagers did not prepare to become col-
lectively engaged in an upcoming revolt. Moreover, the company practiced their 
                                                
710 Ibid., 25. 
711 Ibid. 
712 She stresses that “a messianic expectation, i.e. the belief in the Mahdi who will come to 
redeem the world and to render it just, as the prophet Muhammed once did, has been part 
and parcel of both Shiite and Sunni traditions in Islam.” Ibid., 26. 
713 Ibid., 27. 
714 Ibid. 
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zikrs in a cottage where they lived on their own. Peasants did not attend the group’s 
rituals. Therefore, it is quite implausible to infer that villagers believed Derviş 
Mehmet to be the Mahdi. In fact, it is quite probable that they grew suspicious of the 
group. Within this context, the most distinct reason why the villagers hosted them 
and not reported them to law enforcement agencies appears to be their kinship ties 
and acquaintance. 
She asks why and in what ways the Menemen Incident deviates from other 
rebellions, since it has been commemorated more than the others. Her reply in this 
regard is that Kubilay has been iconized within Kemalist memory since the case of 
his beheading “revived the fear of reactionary Islam (irtica).”715 Her expression of 
Kemalist commemoration of Kubilay as an icon is very accurate and demonstrates 
the significance of the topic. However, whose fear the beheading awakened is quite 
ambiguous. It would not make much sense to assert that the RPP leaders, including 
Mustafa Kemal, were concerned about reactionism arising as a great threat to the 
state. There did not exist not country-wide antagonist organizations that watched for 
an opportunity to initiate a revolt. Nor was there a domestic disturbance in the coun-
try. Law enforcement agencies were not fighting against reactionist rebels.  
Still, it does not mean that culturally and religiously conservative people were 
pleased with RPP’s policies regarding religion. The state had established his control 
of religious institutions and no reactionist organization constituted a threat to it. 
Therefore, Azak needed to explain her point if she had in mind certain social groups, 
that had embraced secularism culturally and politically, and felt threatened by armed 
reactionism after the incident. In other words, the argument that the Menemen Inci-
dent ignited the fear of reactionism in RPP’s social base needs to be reconsidered. 
Reactionism had been on RPP’s agenda for quite a while. Pro-government newspa-
pers promoted it and presented reactionism as an enemy of the state as well as of the 
nation. Thus, it is more sensible to argue that the RPP government considered the 
beheading of its officers as a challenge to state authority rather than remarking that 
Kubilay’s beheading renewed the fear of reactionism. For the government, the event 
was another proof of the damage that reactionism did and could do to the nation. 
Azak’s statements about the Kemalist regime’s use of Kubilay as a martyr appeals 
sounder. For her, “the Kemalist regime institutionalized the memory of the Menemen 
                                                
715 Ibid., 22. 
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Incident and used the martyrdom of Kubilay as a tool of national mobilization and 
reinstatement of its authority vis-à-vis the continuing popularity of tarikats.”716 
4.3.4. Barış Ertem 
Barış Ertem is another researcher who made an important contribution to 
studies on Menemen Incident. His study as well relies on archival records. Ertem us-
es the documents competently and presents an unbiased summary of the incident. His 
main argument is that the Menemen Incident did not only leave a brutal and bitter 
mark, but also became one of the factors which retarded the building of a multi-party 
political system and reflection of the national will to the ballot box until the 1950s.717 
Ertem states this argument at the end of his article, but his study does not support this 
conclusion compellingly. Though plausible, his study is a short summary of the ac-
tions of the perpetrators, reactions to the event and the judicial process, without any 
critical assessment. He does not carry out an elaborate evaluation of the incident. He 
does not address the charges against the Nakşibendi order. He does not focus on in-
surgents’ motivations and the conditions under which they received support or the 
extent and reasons of this support. 
Despite these shortcomings, his study is more reasonable than many others 
thanks to his balanced statements, careful summary and judicious use of the available 
primary sources. Still, his article involves some points that need to be corrected. For 
instance, he states (with reference to a contemporary newspaper) that there was a 
crowd of 1000-1500 people in the square during Derviş Mehmet’s actions.718 Ac-
cording to him, similar to the discussions in the parliament and the press, the court 
searched for a tangible connection between the former FRP and the incident.719 Thus 
the respondents mentioned that they were members of RPP when defending them-
selves in trials, but might accuse others as being associated with FRP.720 However, 
the Chief Judge Muğlalı did not question the defendants’ party membership. He ex-
plicitly mentioned that the court was not interested in this issue. Similarly, neither 
                                                
716 Ibid., 43; For Azak, the consolidation of the authoritarian regime was such that after the 
incident, no toleration remained for an opposition party until the transition to a multi-party 
system in 1946. Ibid., 42.  
717 Ertem, “Resmi Belgeler ve Basında Menemen Olayı,” 177. 
718 Ibid., 162. 
719 Ibid., 171. 
720 Ibid., 171–2. 
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the prosecution’s charges nor the final decision of the martial court referred to party 
membership or affiliation as an issue. 
4.3.5. General Studies Touching on the Incident 
This section examines the studies that do not focus on the Menemen Incident 
specifically, but include it as a subtopic. These studies diverge from the officially-
biased as well as counter-official accounts in explaining the background of the inci-
dent. Mete Tunçay, for instance, expresses “such a serious order [Nakşibendis] 
would not have regarded an ignorant disciple’s claim of Mahdism worthy of no-
tice.”721 Tunçay’s explanation is sensible, but he does not expand on the issue to 
show that there is no tangible evidence that connects the order as an organization to 
Derviş’s plot. This shortcoming is probably because Tunçay did not have the time to 
check the relevant primary sources about this particular case in detail. 
 Tunçay’s statement that the incident was used to annihilate the Nakşibendi 
order needs to be revised. He contends that the martial court kept working in order to 
find additional evidence to condemn the order.722 Indeed, the second phase of the tri-
als did not expand the investigation on the Menemen Incident, but dealt with addi-
tional personages affiliated with the Nakşibendi order and charged them with violat-
ing the law that abolished the sufi orders. Surely, this second phase of the trials 
marked the government’s attempt to intimidate the sufi circles, yet it differed signifi-
cantly from the first phase. The accused were acquitted except for a small number of 
them who received light sentences. 
 Another point made by Tunçay is that the effort to associate the incident with 
the former FRP remained inconclusive and effectively groundless.723 This is a sound 
observation. However, Tunçay’s point that the reactionists’ smoking of hashish dur-
ing their rituals was a presumption is inaccurate.724 Had Tunçay examined the rele-
                                                
721 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923-1931), 
6th ed. (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012), 304; This is noteworthy in that Tunçay, 
in a previous account, described the Nakşibendis as the most prominent religious circle that 
objected to the abolition of the caliphate and the proclamation of the Republic. In the article 
in question, far from arguing against the official statement, he agreed with the charges that a 
religious order was behind the plot. He advocated as well other officially-biased points dis-
cussed above regarding religious organizations. (See Mete Tunçay, “Menemen Olayı,” 
Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), 573.) 
722 Tunçay, Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması, 305. 
723 Ibid. 
724 Ibid., 304, footnote no. 13. 
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vant primary documents carefully, he would not question the insurgents’ addiction to 
hashish. Tunçay is on firmer grounds when he deems Derviş Mehmet’s drinking of 
Kubilay’s blood by handfuls after his beheading as an agitating exaggeration. Like-
wise, he approaches with suspicion the accounts that described Derviş Mehmet as a 
former associate of Çerkez Ethem. Tunçay observes that attributing a connection be-
tween anyone who opposed the government and Çerkez Ethem became a custom in 
Turkey.725 Yet, Tunçay’s statement that thirty-four people were executed by the mar-
tial court needs to be revised to twenty-eight.726 
Carter Findley also briefly addresses the incident in his recent book and pro-
vides both correct and mistaken explanations. For him, the preeminent Şeyh Esat had 
no relation with the incident, while the order itself was unlikely to have been linked 
to it.727 “Blaming one of the most serious-minded religious orders for the acts of vil-
lage millenarians was typical of an official attitude that equated the most learned re-
ligiosity with reaction and superstition.”728  
Nevertheless, Findley’s account needs revisions on a few points. He argues 
that after the declaration of martial law, a “witch hunt” was initiated. Likely or un-
likely suspects were detained including former FRP associates during that hunt.729 
Findley probably has in mind the second phase of martial court, when approximately 
120 people were brought to the court and charged with breaking the law related to 
the closing of the dervish lodges. Most of these people were acquitted. A small num-
ber received minor punishments, and even fewer of them received imprisonment for 
some years. The government’s intention was to intimidate the religious orders to im-
press on them that they were being watched, rather than a witch hunt. 
Zürcher is another well-known author who offers a brief summary of the 
event. His account too needs revisions. For instance, he says that over 1000 people 
watched Derviş Mehmet’s demonstrations as spectators.730 In fact, about one hun-
dred people and participated in the demonstrations while another hundred of them 
                                                
725 Ibid., 304, fn. 13. 
726 Ibid., 305. 
727 Carter V. Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007 
(New Haven&; London: Yale University Press, 2010), 259. 
728 Ibid. 
729 Ibid. Similar to Tunçay’s account, Findley mistakenly recounts that thirty-four of those on 
trial were executed at the end. This number needs to be revised to twenty-eight. 
730 Erik Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, 25th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
2010), 266. 
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were there as spectators. Zürcher’s statement that insurgents attached Kubilay’s head 
to the edge of a stick and roamed with it731 is a fabrication. The demonstrators re-
mained in the square after the beheading. Though they sought to attach Kubilay’s 
head to the banner in their hands, they failed and hung the banner on a pole. Zürcher 
also says that over 2000 people, including many of the former FRP followers, were 
arrested after the event.732 During the state of siege, the martial court examined 606 
files, which were prepared by the investigating magistrates and FRP membership 
was not an issue on which these magistrates focused. Zürcher also mentions a law 
that was drafted with the support of Mustafa Kemal concerning the eradication of 
Menemen from the map, “but which was later dropped.”733 This was not a draft law, 
but solely a wish Mustafa Kemal expressed in his meeting with RPP leaders on 7 
January in Çankaya. The ministers and especially İsmet Paşa did not support the idea 
at the meeting and Mustafa Kemal never mentioned the matter afterwards. 
 The last scholar we will discuss here as an example of those who offer quite 
objective information on the Menemen Incident, but as a subtopic in a larger work is 
Mahmut Goloğlu. In his book on the history of the republic, published in 1972, he 
defines the Menemen Incident as a basically apolitical reactionist event carried out 
by Giritli Mehmet, who deceived some of his workers and relatives to act with 
them.734 Goloğlu notes, “five of the six perpetrators were shot and killed,”735 alt-
hough only three of them died in the shootout. Goloğlu discusses İsmet Paşa’s alle-
gation that the oppositional groups played a role in instigating the incident. He criti-
cizes the paşa’s position for relying on speculations rather than fact.736 Goloğlu 
holds that the incident was neither a collective uprising of the local community nor 
directed from a political center. Indeed Goloğlu notes that some of the defendants’ 
statements in the trials reveal that they were associates of RPP.737 Thus, Goloğlu in-
sists on the apolitical nature of the incident, but he refrains from discussing the accu-
racy of the charges that a religious order was behind this reactionary incident. 
                                                
731 Ibid. 
732 Ibid. 
733 Ibid. 
734 Mahmut Goloğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi I%: Devrimler ve Tepkileri, 3rd ed. (İstan-
bul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 331. 
735 Ibid., 333. 
736 Ibid., 333–4. 
737 Ibid., 337. 
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*** 
This chapter analyzed the secondary literature about the incident. It depicted 
how the subject is treated quite contradictorily because the authors have opposite 
perspectives. All of the accounts include misinformation in different degrees. This 
literature review is an indication of the extent to which such a small-scale event 
might be narrated in so many diverse ways. Along with sensible statements and eval-
uations, there have been irrational and biased explanations on the incident as well. 
Misinformation and biased accounts are uncritically echoed by others who share sim-
ilar perspectives. This perpetuation of misleading information and skewed perspec-
tives makes it quite difficult to determine what exactly happened and to analyze the 
causal connections between the events. The official description of the incident was 
problematic. Officially-biased accounts adopted, recounted, and defended the official 
arguments. They have supported the official republican usage of Kubilay as a politi-
cal symbol. Counter-official narratives challenged these accounts and created their 
own version of the incident as a plot of RPP against Muslims and have kept repro-
ducing these arguments. Misinformation infiltrated even serious scholarly studies 
and it became difficult to tell fact from fiction.   
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis probed into the Menemen Incident as an attempt to understand it 
from various aspects. It initially sought to establish a concrete base by explaining 
what happened in Menemen on 23 December 1930. It then put forth and analyzed the 
official statements and newspaper reports about the event. It evaluated the judicial 
process and focused on the trials of the incident. Finally, it reviewed the literature 
about the event in detail. 
This study indicated that the event known as the Menemen Incident was fun-
damentally carried out by six uneducated insurgents with apparently questionable 
mental states due to their long addiction to hashish. Derviş Mehmet’s claims to be 
the Mahdi and his goal of re-establishing the sharia order and restoring the caliphate 
were fictitious and unrealistic. They were evidently deprived of the sense of reality 
and lacked the infrastructural necessities to maintain a revolt. The inattention of law 
enforcement agencies, as it was recognized after the event as well, was the reason 
why and how they could leave Manisa and arrive at Menemen armed. It was also the 
negligence of gendarme officers, including the commander, in Menemen that paved 
the way for the insurgents to continue their activities in the town center for three-four 
hours. The eventual consequence of these negligent and careless behavior was the 
brutal beheading of a military officer by stoned perpetrators. Moreover, the events 
were immediately suppressed as soon as armed battalions arrived and none of the 
townspeople were engaged in the shootout with law enforcement agencies. Instead, 
they dispersed.  
It was a minor incident and not a revolt that enjoyed public support. The de-
fendants in the trials behaved in a subdued manner. They all appeared intimidated in 
the trials and did not object to the chief judge audaciously. Indeed, they were aware 
that severe penalties were on the way and tried to stay on the right side of the chief 
judge, hoping to be acquitted or at least to receive light sentences at the end. There is 
not a reasonable clue to define them as antagonists of the republic. They were not 
enemies of the state seeking to riot as soon as they found a chance. This behavior of 
the accused makes one wonder how such a minor event could be treated and de-
scribed as a rebellion, reactionary uprising, and the nemesis of a nation or a regime. 
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However, the Martial Court of Menemen decided that the incident was a re-
bellion planned by the Nakşibendi order and supported by certain villagers and 
townspeople of Menemen. As discussed in this thesis, the court associated the event 
with the notable figures of the Nakşibendi order, primarily with its leader Şeyh Esat, 
without substantial evidence. This opinion of the court was preordained. The martial 
court had little choice but to impute the responsibility of the incident to the 
Nakşibendi order and give capital punishments to presumed antagonists of the re-
gime. The dominant pro-government media as well strengthened the hand of the re-
gime in denouncing the Nakşibendi order as a reactionist organization that strived to 
destroy the republic persistently and defining the Menemen Incident as yet another 
one of its attempts. The essential objective of the martial court was not to establish 
justice, but to reach certain pre-determined decisions. The court was driven by the 
RPP leaders to pin the insurgents’ actions on the order and to condemn it as a plotter 
even before the beginning of the trials.  
This study indicated that the judicial process in the case of the Menemen In-
cident is an example of political use of the law as a tool of intimidation. It tried to 
open a window to the political structure of Turkey at the time of the incident and 
demonstrated that there was no separation of powers thereat. A single party organiza-
tion, RPP, led by a few significant figures, ruled the country. Their views and deci-
sions carried ultimate authority. The handling of the Menemen Incident indicates that 
not only the law enforcement agencies but also the courts observed the decisions of 
the political center, but within the boundaries of certain procedures. An analysis of 
the historical background of this situation and the changes regarding the exceptional 
prerogatives of martial laws and courts from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of 
Turkey need to be addressed in future studies. The structure of martial courts, their 
legal status and boundaries as defined by the constitution and conventions in the ear-
ly republican period might be examined. The regime’s specific use of the martial 
courts in other instances and the legality of their decisions might also be studied. 
Portraits of the members of these courts as well should give us an idea about the no-
tions of law, legality and state-society relations in this era.  
The infliction of twenty-eight capital punishments and other prison sentences 
was a harsh reaction and indicative of the autocratic nature of the regime, as the the-
sis argued. The evidence at hand that helps explain this verdict points to concerns 
 177 
about taking preventive measures to set an example against other probable attempts 
at appealing to religious sentiments to undermine the regime. It was an intimidating 
decision, a show of strength demonstrating what would happen to those who dared to 
initiate a riot against the republic, and aimed as a warning to religious circles in par-
ticular. Three fundamental elements of the incident instigated the regime to resort to 
intimidation: the beheading of Kubilay, acclamation of the crowd, and the religious 
slogans of the group. 
The primary and the most abhorrent aspect of the Menemen Incident was the 
brutal beheading of a military officer. Indeed, the Menemen Incident would have 
been rarely accounted and remembered if Kubilay had not been beheaded. It was 
deemed by Mustafa Kemal as an attempt to cut off the head of the state itself. Such 
audacity urged the regime to punish everyone who were related with the events im-
plicitly, explicitly, or presumably. The republican regime did not only revenge its of-
ficer, but upheld him as an ideal citizen of the republic, and transformed him into an 
iconic-hero of the Turkish nation. 
Almost every year, condolences have been issued especially by the Head-
quarters of the General Staff. Commemorations of the anniversary of the incident 
have been organized to celebrate Kubilay as a hero who stood up to reactionary forc-
es, a martyr killed by reactionists, an icon of progress and enlightenment, an embod-
iment of the republican principles, and an inspiration for all good (ideal) citizens. 
Newspapers have reported, and history textbooks for primary and secondary educa-
tion have accounted the incident and celebrated Kubilay. Annual commemorations 
etched his memory into minds permanently. The Menemen Incident and Kubilay 
thus became one of the most widely known and symbolic topics of the history of the 
Republic of Turkey. 
A further study in this regard might examine the iconization process of Kubi-
lay as a politically and ideologically symbolic figure. One may search for the extent 
to which the memory of Kubilay and the incident have penetrated the minds. Under 
which specific circumstances and how often was the story of Kubilay evoked or trig-
gered to condition political action and ideological reaction in the history of the Re-
public of Turkey? This is a question that needs to be studied in the context of the po-
litical use of symbols in the formation of nations and nation states.   
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 Another reason why the incident invited harsh reaction was the gathering of 
some townspeople around the insurgents and the acclamation of a group of them of 
the demonstrations. The RPP leaders severely condemned this crowd. In his letter of 
condolence, written to the Chief of the General Staff, Mustafa Kemal described some 
of the crowd’s approving and applauding of “the ferocity displayed by reactionists,” 
as “a shameful incident that should embarrass all the republicanists.” Deputies of 
RPP and pro-government newspapers as well criticized the crowd starkly. However, 
this censure of the participants turned into a damnation of the town itself. For a 
while, Menemen was mentioned as a town whose people supported an anti-
government rebellion. After a certain point, what really happened in Menemen be-
came insignificant in official statements as well as in the media representations of the 
incident. What remained in minds was that reactionists revolted against the republic, 
without asking whether it was a real rebellion with significant public support. Future 
studies should elaborate the transformation of the perceptions of the Menemen Inci-
dent in collective memories since then. 
Third, the incident provoked harsh measures because of the insurgents’ refer-
ence to religious terms to carry out and justify their activities. The republican regime 
was newly-established and had the decisive aim to instill its principals in people’s 
minds. Laicism was one of those principles. The RPP regime did not have an issue 
with religious practices and personal religious preoccupations. However, in line with 
its purpose to make culturally religious citizens embrace laicism, it had no tolerance 
for someone who would attempt to use religion as a means to gain political influence 
and to intervene in the political arena. 
The reaction of the regime that derived from these three aspects of the inci-
dent indicates its sense of insecurity as well. The perception that the beheading of 
Kubilay meant cutting the head of the regime, condemnation of the Menemen 
townspeople collectively as if many of them revolted against the government by sup-
porting the demonstrations of Derviş Mehmet and his companions, and responding to 
the religious slogans of the insurgents by emphasizing the laicism of the republic 
were the reactions of a yet insecure regime. The confusion of the law enforcement 
agencies about the handling of such events was another indicator of the insecurity of 
a regime in the making. İsmet Paşa himself stated in the parliament after the incident 
that both citizens and military units were supposed to know under what conditions 
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law enforcement agencies must intervene in such situations. He mentioned it was re-
quired for the government to make a set of arrangements that would regulate the mu-
tual duties and courses of action of both the military forces and the civilians in cases 
of emergency.738 Inefficient communication and the lack of clarity in the distribution 
of duties were echoed in the parliamentary debates, pointing to the yet unsettled as-
pects of the state apparatus. 
Through its control of the terms of political debates, the regime defined “re-
actionism” as a nemesis of the republic and used the pro-government media to warn 
the nation against this enemy. Members of RPP used this concept in such a broad 
sense as to include not only those who appealed to religion in their political state-
ments but almost everyone who opposed the government.  
The sweepingly broad use of such concepts also signifies the insecurity of the 
regime. The statements of the deputies in the parliament after the incident indicated 
that they wanted to aggrandize the republican regime and degrade its presumed ene-
mies, reactionism being on the top of their list. For them, reactionists harmed the na-
tion whenever they found a chance. Although RPP deputies denigrated reactionism 
emphatically, the reactionary actors and organizations were not clear in their dis-
course. This notion of RPP deputies to ostracize reactionists in a sweeping-discourse 
is another sign of their sense of insecurity. 
FRP, which was closed under the impression that it had been promoting the 
reactionist circles, received its share from the aggressive statements made after the 
Menemen Incident. Although none of the associates of FRP were involved in the 
event in any way, they could not avoid the accusations of instigating such a rebellion. 
This accusation as well point to the tendency of the regime to silence all opposition 
to its policies by generating a cursed category of opposition and then lumping to-
gether all opposition in that category. Repression of all the opposition words and 
deeds, including FRP and other short-lived small political parties also point to the au-
thoritativeness of the regime.  
It must also be stated that the widespread argument that claims that the 
Menemen Incident, along with the challenges of FRP, was a significant factor in de-
laying the transition to the multi-party system remains questionable. This is a mis-
leading observation that adopts the officially-biased perspective. This is not the place 
                                                
738 “T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi Cilt:24 On Yedinci İn’ikat,” 3. 
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to ask whether the Menemen Incident delayed the transition to multi-party system 
regime or not. Perhaps it is not even an appropriate question and we should ask in-
stead why Turkey made the shift from a single-party into a multi-party system in 
1946. The answers to that question would shed light on the political conditions of the 
transition. 
 This thesis however focused on generating images and information in an au-
thoritarian era and the legacy or effects of such actions in light of the coverage and 
treatment of the Menemen Incident. Clearly, official (mis)perceptions and/or 
(mis)representations of the incident influenced not only popular imagination but also 
the scholarly texts. Much of the misleading information that was recounted subse-
quently, even reaching up to today, sprang from the initial press coverage and offi-
cial statements. Subsequent officially-biased writings did not only take the early re-
actions for granted, but reproduced and extended them. Counter-official authors who 
challenged the officially-biased accounts created their own way of explaining the in-
cident, but usually by reversing the same, polarized categories of thinking and judg-
ment. The biased content of these two positions ensured perpetuation of disinfor-
mation about the incident until today.  
This thesis tried to reconstruct the events and relationships that made up the 
Menemen Incident through careful examination and a critical analysis of the relevant 
primary sources and major accounts. If, in this process, the thesis has also generated 
a fuller awareness of the limitations of thinking with polarized categories, then it has 
achieved its purpose.   
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